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Abstract

Since the dividend irrelevance theory of Miller and Modigliani (1961), 
academics and practitioners still have little understanding of the managerial 
incentives underpinning dividend policy. Black (1976) observed, “The harder we 
look at the dividend picture, the more it seems like a puzzle, with pieces that just 
don’t fit together.” 
This thesis aims to shed additional light on the dividend puzzle. Accordingly, 
two theoretical models have been developed to help explain why firms pay dividends 
or repurchase their own shares. The models consider the case in which the managers 
of a high-quality firm (firm H) and a low-quality firm (firm L) choose to use 
corporate cash flows to pay dividends, repurchase shares, or invest in a real project 
from which they can earn private benefits. I focus on the case in which firm H has a 
positive NPV project whereas firm L has a negative NPV project. 
In the first model, developed in spirit of Isagawa (2000), I show that paying 
dividends is a dominated strategy for firm H, regardless of the managerial weight 
parameter. If the manager is myopic, firm L will choose to repurchase shares at the 
detriment of existing shareholders. If the manager is farsighted, on the other hand, 
firm L will choose to pay dividends. I also consider the case in which investors are 
irrational in that they do not update their beliefs upon observing one firm 
repurchasing shares while the other firm paying dividends. The model shows that, in 
inefficient market, firm L will not mimic given that firm H repurchases shares since 
it cannot obtain any benefit from doing so. 
In the second model, built on Fairchild and Zhang’s (2005) work, in which 
the managerial payout decisions depend on the relative magnitudes of dividend and 
repurchase catering premia, I demonstrate that a myopic manager of firm H may pass 
up a positive NPV project in order to cater to investor demand for dividends or share 
repurchases (an adverse selection problem). In addition, I show that the agency cost 
of free cash flow can be mitigated if the dividend-catering premium is sufficiently 
x 
high. That is, firm L’s manager will have a strong incentive to return excess cash to 
shareholders rather than invest it in a negative NPV project. 
Then, I investigate dividend changes in Thailand over the period 2002-2005. 
To test the signalling and free cash flow hypotheses, I first analyse profitability 
changes around dividend changes and benchmark them with control firms, and 
examine the relation between dividend changes and the past and future profitability. 
Consistent with Benartzi et al.’s (1997) evidence in the U.S., dividend changes in 
Thailand do not signal future profitability but rather the past performance. Then, I 
examine the determinants of dividend changes and firm’s decision to change 
dividends. I also investigate the short-run and long-run stock price performance of 
dividend-changing firms, and the relation between announcement returns and 
hypothesised independent variables. Finally, I examine firms’ investment behaviour 
following dividend changes. The results do not support the view that dividend 
changes signal future profitability. Overall, the findings are broadly consistent with 
the free cash flow hypothesis rather than the signalling hypothesis. 
Additionally, I provide preliminary evidence on open-market share 
repurchases (OMRs) in Thailand over the period December 2001 to January 2007. I 
find that stock prices react positively to OMR announcements and continue to 
increase in the longer term, suggesting that stock market underreacts to the signal 
conveyed by the managers of repurchasing firms. Comparing the actual repurchase 
cost with the costs of benchmark portfolios, I find that the actual repurchase cost is 
the lowest. This finding suggests that the managers of repurchasing firms have 
substantial ability to time the market. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
Since the dividend irrelevance theory of Miller and Modigliani (1961), 
academics and practitioners still have little understanding of the managerial 
incentives underpinning dividend policy, and the effect on firm performance and 
market valuation. Indeed, Black (1976) observed, “The harder we look at the 
dividend picture, the more it seems like a puzzle, with pieces that just don’t fit 
together.” 
The main aim of this thesis is to shed additional light on the dividend puzzle 
by focusing on testing the two major competing hypotheses in dividend literature: the 
signalling hypothesis and the free cash flow hypothesis. The signalling hypothesis 
states that, under asymmetric information between managers and investors, dividend 
policy may provide signals regarding the firm’ current performance and future 
prospects.1 The free cash flow hypothesis (e.g., Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986) 
states that dividend policy helps address agency problems between managers and 
investors. In Easterbrook (1984), the monitoring role of dividends mitigates agency 
conflicts between managers and shareholders. In Jensen (1986), the agency problem 
arises from managers’ incentives to invest in negative NPV projects in order to build 
their empires. Therefore, dividends alleviate this problem by reducing the free cash 
flows available to managers. In similar manner, share repurchases2 can be used to 
signal the firm’s true value and to disgorge the firm’s free cash flows to shareholders. 
Researchers have developed theoretical models regarding the choice between 
dividends and share repurchases (see, for example, Ofer and Thakor, 1987; Brennan 
and Thakor, 1990; Chowdhry and Nanda, 1994; Persons, 1997). However, most of 
the early models on share repurchases focus on the share repurchase tender offers, 
1 See, for example, Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rock (1985), and John and Williams (1985). 
2 Over recent decades, share repurchases have become a primary means of returning corporate cash to 
investors. Grullon and Michaely (2002) reported that while share repurchase expenditures in the U.S. 
grew at an average annual rate of 26.1% over the period 1980 to 2000, dividends grew only at an 
average annual rate of 6.8%. In fact, in 1998, U.S. industrial firms spent more money on share 
repurchases ($181.8 billion) than on cash dividends ($174.1 billion). 
1 
which are now relatively less common compared to open-market share repurchases, 
and consider only the choices of payouts between dividends or stock repurchases 
while, in practice, the manager may use the firm’s excess cash to invest in 
unprofitable projects in order to earn private benefits. Considering this alternative, 
Isagawa (2000) develops a signalling model in which the manager chooses between 
open-market share repurchases and a real investment from which the manager can 
take private benefits, and then derives a separating equilibrium in which the manager 
with a high private benefit chooses to invest in a new project while the manager with 
a low private benefit chooses to repurchase shares. 
Isagawa’s (2000) model provides a key insight regarding the effect of private 
benefits on the managerial payout decision. Nevertheless, his model appears to be 
incomplete in that: (1) it does not include a cash dividend, which is a primary means 
of corporate payouts; (2) it considers only the case in which the managerial 
compensation is tied solely to the firm’s long-term fundamental value; and (3) it does 
not consider an increase in managerial equity stake after shares are repurchased. 
To fill out these voids, I develop a signalling model in which the managers of 
a high-quality firm (firm H) and a low-quality firm (firm L) decide whether to pay 
out excess cash in the form of dividends or share repurchases, or invest it in a new 
project from which they can take private benefits. In this model, the managerial 
compensation is tied to both the short-term market value of the firm immediately 
after the manager announces his investment/payout policies, and the fundamental 
value of the firm after the return from investment is realised or the cash flow is 
returned to investors in the form of dividends or share repurchases. In addition, the 
managerial equity stake in the firm increases after shares are repurchased. 
I focus on the case in which the return on investment for firm H is positive 
whereas the return on investment for firm L is negative. That is, firm H has a better 
prospect while firm L has a worse prospect. The model is then analysed in three 
possible cases: (1) the manager assigns equal weight to his short-term and long-term 
2 
payoffs; (2) the manager assigns more weight to his short-term payoff; and (3) the 
manager assigns more weight to his long-term payoff. 
The results show that, regardless of the managerial weight parameter, paying 
dividends is a dominated strategy for firm H. Therefore, firm H’s manager only 
considers the choice between investing in the new project from which he can also get 
private benefits and repurchasing undervalued shares from tendering shareholders in 
order to benefit long-term shareholders. If the manager places equal weight to his 
short-term and long-term payoffs, there is a separating equilibrium in which firm H 
invests in the new project while firm L repurchases shares. If the manager is myopic, 
repurchasing shares is a dominant strategy for firm L. In this case, there is a pooling 
equilibrium in which both firms repurchase shares. On the other hand, if the manager 
is farsighted, repurchasing shares is a dominated strategy for firm L. In this case, 
there is a separating equilibrium in which firm H invests in the new project while 
firm L pays dividends. 
I further consider the case in which investors are irrational in that they do not 
update their beliefs upon observing one firm repurchases shares whereas the other 
firm pays dividends. With these small changes in investors’ beliefs, there is no 
pooling equilibrium in which both firms repurchase shares as in the case of efficient 
market because firm L cannot obtain any benefit from sending a false signal to the 
market. 
The second model, developed from Fairchild and Zhang’s (2005) work, is a 
catering model in which two types of firms, a high-quality type and a low-quality 
type, decide to use cash flows to pay dividends or repurchase shares in order to cater 
to investor demand, or alternatively, invest in the new project. The model shows that 
the firm’s decision depends on (1) the gain/loss from investment; (2) the manager’s 
time horizon; (3) the relative magnitudes of dividend and repurchasing premia; and 
(4) the degree of information asymmetry. Both adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems are addressed in this model. 
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Specifically, I demonstrate that the high-quality firm’s manager may pass up 
a positive NPV project in order to cater to investor strong demand for dividends or 
share repurchases (adverse selection problem). On the other hand, the low-quality 
firm’s manager has a strong incentive to return cash flows to shareholders if the 
catering premia are higher than the private benefits from investing in a negative NPV 
project. That is, the moral hazard problem is alleviated under this case. 
Then, I examine the dividend policy of listed firms in Thailand during 2001-
2005. In particular, I focus on testing the two competing hypotheses in dividend 
literature: the signalling hypothesis and the free cash flow hypothesis. This is an 
important area of study because the factors affecting dividends are still little 
understood, especially in an emerging-market context. 
Fuller and Thakor (2002) note that both the signalling hypothesis and the free 
cash flow hypothesis support much of empirical evidence that dividend increases 
(decreases) are good news, causing stock price to increase (decrease). Many 
researchers have conducted empirical tests that distinguish between these 
hypotheses. The signalling hypothesis suggests that announcements of dividend 
changes are associated with stock returns around announcement days (Asquith and 
Mullins, 1983, among others) and that any increase in dividends should signal an 
improvement in future profitability (empirically supported by Aharony and Dotan, 
1994; Healy and Palepu, 1988; Nissim and Ziv, 2001, among others; but not 
supported by Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler, 1997; DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and 
Skinner, 1996, among others). In contrast, the free cash flow hypothesis can be tested 
by considering the relationship between dividend changes, growth opportunities, 
cash flows, and firms’ investment behaviours (see, for example, Denis, Denis, and 
Sarin, 1994; Lang and Litzenberger, 1989; Yoon and Starks, 1995). I employ these 
methods to test these two hypotheses in relation to dividend policy in Thailand. 
Recently, scholars have developed the life-cycle theory of dividends (see, for 
example, DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2006; Fama and French, 2001; Grullon, 
Michaely, and Swaminathan, 2002). This theory contends that mature and 
4 
established firms are more likely to pay dividends relative to young firms that have 
abundant growth opportunities and limited resources. In addition to testing the 
signalling and the free cash flow hypotheses, I also test the life-cycle hypothesis in 
relation to dividend policy in Thailand. 
Much of the existing empirical analysis examines the dividend policy of firms 
in the U.S. or in other developed countries and the findings are inconclusive. 
However, it is being increasingly recognised that dividend policies may be affected 
by the international context in which they occur. This is emphasised by LaPorta, 
López-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2000) who examine dividend policies 
around the world. Research on dividend policies in developing countries (e.g., 
Aivazian, Booth, and Cleary, 2003) and developed countries (e.g., Denis and 
Osobov, 2008) suggests that dividend policies vary in different country 
environments. Hence, further investigations of corporate dividend policies, 
particularly in a developing country, become important. I therefore look at the 
dividend policy of Thai firms. According to Aivazian et al. (2003), Thai stock market 
is classified as underdeveloped and market-oriented. It has a highly concentrated 
ownership structure, i.e., the three largest shareholders owned an average 47% of the 
firms compared to 20% in the U.S.3 These features might lead Thai firms to pursue 
different dividend policies from firms in the U.S. and other countries. To my best 
knowledge, no other study has focused on this emerging market in this context. 
To test the signalling hypothesis, I examine the relation between dividend 
changes and past, current, and future profitability; and the relation between dividend 
changes, earnings, and firm size. To test the free cash flow hypothesis, I examine the 
relation between dividend changes, growth opportunities, cash flow levels, and 
investment behaviours following dividend changes. To test the life cycle hypothesis, 
I examine the relation between dividends and the mix of earned and contributed 
capital. 
See Aivazian, Booth, and Cleary (2003) for more discussions of the distinct feature of Thai firms 
with respect to control and ownership structure, banks and stock market development, taxation and 
other institutional factors. 
5 
3 
Moreover, I examine the reactions of Thai stock market to announcements of 
dividend changes.4 I employ the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) to examine the 
short-run reactions of stock market to these announcements. I also calculate the buy-
and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) to examine the long-run implications of dividend 
news. 
Further, I investigate open market share repurchase (OMR) activities in 
Thailand from December 2001 to January 2007. According to the signalling theory, 
share repurchases can be used to signal to investors that the firm’s stock price is 
currently undervalued, causing the stock price to rise. Prior empirical investigations 
of OMRs in the U.S. (See, e.g., Vermaelen, 1981; Comment and Jarrell, 1991; 
Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermalen, 1995; Stephens and Weisbach, 1998; and 
Grullon and Michaely, 2002) document positive stock price change of around 3% 
surrounding OMR announcements. Recently, research on open market share 
repurchases has received considerable attentions and grown outside the U.S. (see, 
e.g., Brockman and Chung (2001) in Taiwan; Rau and Vermaelen (2002) in the 
U.K.; Zhang (2002) in Japan; Jung et al. (2005) in Korea; Ginlinger and Hamon 
(2007) in Germany). However, these papers have been conducted using data from 
developed countries. Little is known about share repurchase activities in emerging 
countries. Therefore, an investigation of OMRs in Thailand will shed more light on 
existing literature. 
In order to test the signalling hypothesis, I calculate cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR) to examine the stock market response to open market share repurchase 
announcements by listed companies in the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET). In 
addition, I calculate the longer-term CAR to test whether Thai stock market under-
reacts or over-reacts to OMR announcements.5 I find that the mean CAR of Thai 
stock market during the 5-day window (-2, +2) is 4.22%. Following the OMR 
4 Aharony and Swary (1980) and Grullon et al. (2002) demonstrate that an announcement of dividend 
increase (decrease) pushes up (down) stock prices. Michaely, Thaler, and Womack (1995) find that an 
announcement of dividend omission has a larger impact on stock prices than that of dividend 
initiation. 
5 Ikenberry, Lakonishok, Vermaelen (1995) examine OMRs in the U.S. during 1980-1990 and find 
that stock market, especially value stocks, underreacts to the OMR announcements. 
6 
announcements, the stock prices of repurchasing firms show a positive drift of 7.53% 
and 5.10% over the windows (+3, +120) and (+3, +160) respectively. These findings 
suggest that the stock prices of repurchasing firms are undervalued and OMR 
announcements are perceived as good news but the stock market initially underreacts 
to information conveyed through open-market share repurchase announcements. 
Further, I test whether the managers of repurchasing firms exhibit ability to 
time the market. Following Cook, Krigman, and Leach (2004), I compare the actual 
cost of repurchasing portfolio with the costs of various benchmark portfolios. The 
results show that the actual repurchasing cost is lower than the costs of benchmark 
portfolios, suggesting that the managers of repurchasing firms have substantial 
ability to time the market. 
The rest of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the literature 
related to the payout policy. Chapter 3 presents two theoretical models that 
demonstrate why firms pay dividends or repurchase shares. Chapter 4 empirically 
examines the dividend changes in Thailand. Chapter 5 investigates the open-market 
share repurchase activities in Thailand. Chapter 6 concludes the thesis and provides 
recommendations for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Literature Review 
2.1 Dividend Literature 
Why firms pay dividends have long been a puzzle and one of the most 
important issues in corporate finance. In a celebrated paper, Miller and Modigliani 
(1961) proposed that dividend policy is irrelevant. That is, it is not important how the 
firm’s cash will be sliced and distributed to shareholders since firm value is not 
affected by dividend policy. 
The Miller and Modigliani’s dividend irrelevance proposition is nevertheless 
based on a number of assumptions in an ideal world without taxes, information 
asymmetry, incomplete contracts, institutional constraints, and transaction costs. In 
practice, the dividend policy does matter because the market is not perfect and many 
factors are crucial and must be considered when management and the board of 
directors make decisions about the level of dividends and/or how much to repurchase 
shares which in turn affect the value of the firm. 
Much of dividend literature has attempted to explain why firms pay dividends 
and among the most popular theories that have been tested are the signalling 
hypothesis and the free cash flow hypothesis. Other theories include the dividend-
clientele hypothesis, the life-cycle theory of dividends, and the catering theory of 
dividends. 
2.1.1 Signalling Hypothesis 
The signalling theory is based on the notion that management is better 
informed about the firm’s value than outside shareholders. The managers may have 
good news about their firm’s future profitability but the current stock prices do not 
8 
reflect this because investors have access only to public information (Grullon and 
Ikenberry, 2000). 
Traditional signalling theory shows that payouts convey favourable 
information about firm’s prospects. The best known signalling models are those of 
Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rock (1985), and John and Williams (1985). These 
models suggest that managers who foresee better performance can send positive 
signal to the market by paying out dividends today because they are confident that 
future capital requirements can be financed by future earnings. On the other hand, 
managers who do not expect any improvement in profitability are refrained from 
doing so because they might have to forego profitable investments or raise costly 
external funds in the future. 
Bhattacharya (1979) develop a two-period model in which manager 
maximises existing shareholders’ wealth and shareholders have a single-period 
planning horizon. At date zero, manager invests in a project and also committed to 
pay dividends. At date one, the cash flow from the investment at date zero is realised 
and used to pay dividends. The crucial assumption of this model is that if the cash 
flow at date 1 is insufficient to meet the committed dividends, the firm will have to 
raise external funds, which is costly due to the high transaction costs and much 
costlier than benefits from signalling by dividends at date zero. Hence, it is not 
worthwhile for a firm with bad project to send a (false) signal to shareholders by 
announcing dividends. Only does a firm with good project signal its quality via a 
dividend announcement. 
Miller and Rock (1985) develop a signalling model through the sources and 
uses of funds. In their model, a dividend announcement serves merely as a signal 
about the firm’s current earnings, which, in turn, the market uses as a basis for 
estimating the firm’s future earnings. The cost of signalling by increasing dividends 
is the forgone use of funds in productive investment. Hence, in equilibrium, good 
firms are able to announce dividends to signal that their earnings are good enough to 
justify dividends whereas it is not worthwhile for bad firms to do so since adverse 
9 
consequences from losing investment opportunities far outweigh benefits from short-
run stock price appreciation. 
As noted by Allen and Michaely (2003), the signalling models of 
Bhattacharya (1979) and Miller and Rock (1985) do not explain why firms do not 
signal their quality at a lower cost by repurchasing shares instead of paying 
dividends. John and Williams (1985)’s model partially answers this question. At time 
zero, managers invest in a project and simultaneously announce dividends. The 
asymmetric information between managers and shareholders is the firm future cash 
flow and, accordingly, the firm’s present value. At time one, cash flow from the 
investment is realised, and dividends are paid to shareholders. Shareholders must pay 
a tax on dividend but not on capital gain. It is assumed that the firm’s shareholders 
have liquidity needs so that they must sell some of their shares either cum-dividend 
or ex-dividend and managers always act to maximise current shareholders’ wealth. 
By signalling with dividends, managers can increase the share price and 
thereby reduce dilution of the current stockholders. For stockholders of more 
valuable firms, the marginal benefit from reducing dilution is greater than the 
marginal cost of tax on dividends. The opposite is true for stockholders of less 
valuable firms. Consequently, managers of more valuable firms signal their inside 
information with larger dividends. Hence, it is the cost of tax on dividends, if it is 
high enough, that separates good firms from bad firms. This is a reason why firms 
pay dividends rather than repurchase shares. 
2.1.2 Free Cash Flow Hypothesis 
The Free Cash Flow Hypothesis is primarily based on the argument that there 
is a conflict of interest between managers and shareholders. That is, rather than act in 
shareholders’ best interests, managers could allocate the firm’s resource to benefit 
themselves (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Managers’ selfish behaviours can include 
lavish spending on luxurious office and unjustifiable mergers and acquisitions. 
Hence, free cash flows can create overinvestment problem because they may be used 
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to fund negative NPV projects. To mitigate the overinvestment problem, Easterbrook 
(1984) and Jensen (1986) suggest that firms return cash to shareholders either by 
paying dividends or repurchasing shares, thereby reducing the amount of cash that 
will be wasted by managers. 
An implication of the free cash flow hypothesis is that firms that are mature 
with high free cash flow tend to have overinvestment problem. Thus, rather than 
signalling their better profitability, a dividend increase by these firms may convey 
information that the overinvestment problem is alleviated, causing stock price to 
increase. Conversely, a dividend decrease by such firms conveys information to the 
market that more negative NPV projects will be undertaken, causing stock price to 
decline. 
2.1.3 Empirical Tests of Signalling Hypothesis 
Lintner (1956) was one of the first researchers offering empirical support to 
the signalling hypothesis. He finds that managers tend to increase dividends when 
they are confident that cash flows in the future will be sufficient to cover the higher 
rate of payments and that managers decrease dividends only when the cash flows are 
insufficient to justify the present dividend rate. 
Examining the market reactions to dividend change announcements, Pettit 
(1972) find that the market reacts dramatically to dividend cuts or substantial 
dividend increases, but not very strong to moderate dividend increases. These results 
of asymmetric market reactions to dividend changes are consistent with Lintner’s 
(1956) finding that managers are reluctant to decrease dividends. In addition, Pettit 
finds that substantial information about the firm’s earnings is conveyed by 
announcements of dividend changes and that a dividend announcement may convey 
significant information to the market beyond that already contained in 
contemporaneous earnings numbers. Hence, Pettit’s findings lend support to the 
signalling hypothesis. 
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To test the hypothesis that dividends contain information about the future 
earnings of the firm, Watts (1973) examine the relationship between unexpected 
changes in dividend and changes in future earnings of 310 U.S. firms between 1947 
and 1966. On average, his regressions suggest a positive relationship between the 
unexpected dividend changes and future earnings changes. However, the relationship 
is not strong, i.e., the average size of future earnings changes is very small. Further, 
he examines the relationship between stock price changes and unexpected dividend 
changes. Despite a positive relationship between these variables, Watts conclude that 
the informational content of dividend changes is trivial because even the one with 
superior information about dividend changes cannot use this information to earn 
abnormal returns. 
Charest (1978) study the efficiency of stock market with respect to quarterly 
dividend announcements. His findings show significant abnormal returns 
surrounding and following a dividend increase announcement. Since his study does 
not control for the information conveyed by contemporaneous earnings 
announcements, Charest concludes that his findings do not necessarily indicate that 
dividend announcements do convey valuable information to shareholders. 
Aharony and Swary (1980) argue that the disagreement among previous 
empirical studies stems from a difficulty in identifying the information content of 
dividends. That is, dividend and earnings announcements are often made 
simultaneously. To better examine whether dividends contain information, therefore, 
they analyse only the cases where dividend announcement date differs from earnings 
announcement date by at least 11 days. Employing such a methodology, they find 
that stock market reacts positively to dividend increases but negatively to dividend 
decreases, and that the market reactions to dividend increases and decreases are not 
symmetrical. In particular, abnormal returns around dividend decreases are of much 
greater magnitude than those around dividend increases. Further, Aharony and Swary 
find that firms announcing both earnings and dividend increases in the same quarter 
earned significant positive abnormal returns at the earnings announcement dates 
regardless of whether these earnings announcements precede or follow the dividend 
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increase announcements. Therefore, they conclude that their findings strongly 
support the hypothesis that a dividend change does provide useful information about 
the firm’s future prospects beyond that provided by earnings numbers. 
Asquith and Mullins (1983) analyse a sample of 168 firms that either pay the 
first dividend in their corporate history or resume paying a dividend after a hiatus of 
at least 10 years. Their findings demonstrate that a dividend initiation provides a 
large and significant positive excess return. Compared with dividend increases, 
dividend initiations cause larger stock market reactions. However, the average size of 
dividend initiations is also larger than dividend increases. Adjusting for the size of 
dividend changes, dividend increases appear to generate as large as or larger excess 
returns than do dividend initiations. The finding that the announcement return is 
significantly related to the magnitude of dividend change is consistent with the 
signalling theory. Overall, their results support the view that dividends convey 
valuable information to investors. 
In an examination of 131 firms that initiated dividends, Healy and Palepu 
(1988) find that earnings of these firms increased rapidly in the past and continued to 
increase for the two years following dividend initiations, the evidence consistent with 
the signalling theory. However, the results from their analysis of 172 firms that 
omitted dividends show that earnings of these firms declined in the year of dividend 
omission announcements but significantly improved in subsequent years, the 
findings in contrast with the signalling hypothesis. 
Aharony and Dotan (1994) test whether quarterly dividend announcements 
convey useful information about future earnings beyond that provided by quarterly 
earnings announcements. In particular, they examine the association between 
unexpected changes in quarterly dividends and unexpected earnings in subsequent 
quarters. Their results indicate that firms that increased (decreased) dividends 
experience higher (lower) unexpected earnings in subsequent periods than do firms 
that did not change dividends. These findings are consistent with the signalling 
hypothesis. 
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Bernheim and Wantz (1995) test the dividend signalling theory under various 
tax regimes. In particular, they examine whether abnormal returns to dividend 
change announcements are higher when factors such as tax rates, bond ratings, and 
capacity utilisation suggest that the marginal costs of dividend signalling are high. 
They find that announcement returns increase with dividend tax rate, decrease with 
bond ratings, and increase with capacity utilisation, the findings in support of the 
signalling hypothesis. 
Analysing a sample of 145 NYSE companies whose earnings decline after 
nine or more consecutive years of growth to study the signalling content of 
dividends, DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (1996) find no evidence that dividend 
increases are associated with subsequent earnings surprises. They also test whether 
dividend increases help separate firms with relatively good earnings prospects from 
firms with relatively poor earnings prospects. However, they find no evidence in 
support of this separating equilibrium hypothesis. In a further examination of 
managers’ letters to stockholders, they find that most managers are overly optimistic 
about their firm’s future prospects. Hence, they conclude that dividends are not 
reliable signals about the firms’ future prospects because of managerial over-
optimism and modest cash commitments from dividend increases. 
Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997) investigate a large sample of 1,025 
firms and 7,186 firm-year observations to determine whether dividend changes have 
information content about earnings. They find that dividend-increasing firms 
experienced significantly positive earnings growth in one year before (year -1) and in 
the year in which dividend change takes place (year 0), but show insignificant 
earnings growth in subsequent years. In addition, the magnitude of dividend increase 
is not significantly related to the future earnings. In contrast, dividend-decreasing 
firms experienced a decline in earnings in year -1 and year 0, but show a significant 
increase in earnings in year 1. 
Further, Benartzi et al. find some evidence that dividend-increasing firms are 
less likely to experience decreases in subsequent earnings than firms that keep 
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dividends unchanged, despite similar earnings growth for these two groups. Overall, 
their findings show no support for the signalling hypothesis. That is, dividend 
changes do not signal the future but rather the past and concurrent earnings. If there 
is any information content of dividend change, it is about the permanent shift in 
earnings as suggested by Lintner (1956). 
In contrast with Benartzi et al. (1997), Nissim and Ziv (2001) argue that 
dividend changes indeed convey new information about future profitability. They 
note that Benartzi et al. (1997) do not find significant relationship between dividend 
changes and future earnings primarily because two specification issues related to the 
estimation of unexpected earnings: measurement error and omitted correlated 
variables. To address these issues, Nissim and Ziv deflate earnings change by the 
book value of common equity rather than the firm’s market value, and add the ratio 
of earnings to the book value of equity (ROE) in their regression models. As a result, 
they find that dividend changes are positively related to earnings changes in each of 
the two years following the dividend change, and that dividend changes are 
positively related to the level of future profitability. Accordingly, they conclude that 
their findings lend support to the signalling hypothesis. 
As a response to Nizzim and Ziv’s (2001) findings, Grullon et al. (2005) 
employ a large sample of 2,778 firms, 14,235 dividend increases, 947 dividend 
decreases, and 23,334 no-change events to re-examine the relation between dividend 
changes and changes in future profitability. Controlling for the nonlinear patterns in 
earnings behaviour, Grullon et al. find no significant relation between dividend 
changes and future earnings changes, a finding in contrast with that of Nizzim and 
Ziv (2001). In addition, they find that dividend changes are negatively correlated 
with future changes in profitability (return on assets). In a further investigation of 
whether the models including dividend changes improve the earnings forecasts, they 
find that the models that include dividend changes do not outperform the models that 
do not include dividend changes. Therefore, they conclude that dividends changes do 
not signal changes in future earnings and profitability. 
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Comparing dividend policies of U.S. and Japanese firms, partitioned into 
keiretsu-member, hybrid, and independent firms, Dewenter and Warther (1998) find 
that U.S. firms experience stronger stock market reactions to dividend initiation and 
omission announcements than do Japanese firms. In addition, they find a significant 
relation between announcement return and dividend yield for U.S. firms, but 
insignificant relation between these variables for Japanese firms. Moreover, they find 
that, in response to poor earnings performance, U.S. firms are more reluctant to omit 
and cut dividends than Japanese firms. According to these results, they conclude that 
Japanese firms, particularly keiretsu-member firms, are subject to less information 
asymmetry and agency conflicts than U.S. firms. 
Using data of Japanese firms to test the signalling hypothesis, Fukuda (2000) 
find that dividend-increasing firms experience significant earnings growth in one 
year before and in the dividend-change year but experience earnings declines in 
subsequent years. In contrast, earnings of dividend-decreasing firms and dividend-
omitting firms decline in the year before dividend announcement but subsequently 
recover. Further, he finds that the stock market reacts positively to dividend increases 
and initiations but negatively to dividend decreases and omissions although these 
market reactions are contradicted by the subsequent earnings performance. He 
concludes that it is possible investors are overly optimistic about the future earnings 
and overreact to dividend increases and initiations, and that his findings do not 
support the signalling hypothesis. 
Kato, Loewenstein, and Tsay (2002) test the signalling hypothesis and the 
free cash flow hypothesis of dividend policy in Japan. Their results indicate that the 
announcement return is positively related to the magnitude of dividend change and to 
Tobin’s Q ratio, but negatively related to firm size. Also, dividend changes are 
related to cash flows from operations, financing, and investment activities. Dividend-
increasing firms have higher earnings, lower debt ratios, and higher investments after 
dividend announcements. In contrast, dividend-decreasing firms have lower earnings, 
higher debt ratios, and lower investments. In particular, they demonstrate that 
dividend changes not only signal the past and the current earnings but also the future 
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earnings, the findings consistent with the signalling theory. However, they find that 
average announcement return of firms with higher Q value is higher than that of 
firms with lower Q value, a result inconsistent with the free cash flow hypothesis. 
Overall, their findings support the signalling hypothesis rather than the free cash flow 
hypothesis. 
Harada and Nguyen (2005) also examine dividend policy of Japanese firms. 
They argue that the information content of dividends depends on the context in 
which the dividend changes take place. In particular, they find that firms that 
increase dividends in a favourable context (i.e., a positive earnings trend) have 
significantly higher earnings growth than firms that increase dividends in an 
unfavourable context (i.e., a poor earnings trend). Additionally, in an unfavourable 
condition, firms that are reluctant to cut dividends (i.e., keeping their dividends 
unchanged) subsequently underperform firms that cut dividends in the first place. 
Considering the context of dividend changes, Harada and Nguyen find a significant 
association between dividend changes and subsequent earnings changes. Hence, they 
conclude that their findings are broadly supportive of the signalling hypothesis. 
Li and Zhao (2008) study how informational asymmetries affect firms’ 
dividend policy. Using analyst earnings forecast errors and the dispersion in analyst 
forecasts to measure the degree of information asymmetry between managers and 
investors, they find that firms with more transparent information environments pay 
more dividends, a finding in contrast with the signalling hypothesis. They further 
examine the relation between the quality of a firm’s information environment and 
total payout that include both dividends and share repurchases but do not find a 
positive relation between the degree of information asymmetries and total payout. 
Hence, their results are not consistent with the signalling hypothesis. 
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2.1.4 Empirical Tests of Free Cash Flow Hypothesis 
An implication of the free cash flow hypothesis is that cash-rich firms that are 
mature with scarce investment opportunities tend to have overinvestment problem. 
Thus, a dividend increase announcement by these firms should be accompanied with 
a positive stock market reaction since it is a signal to shareholders that management 
will not wastefully use corporate cash flows. Lang and Litzenberger (1989) focus on 
testing this feature of the free cash flow hypothesis, and contrast it with the signalling 
theory. Empirically, they use Tobin’s Q ratio to determine the group of overinvesting 
firms. Particularly, the Tobin’s Q less than one implies overinvestment problem 
while the Tobin’s Q more than one indicate that a firm is undertaking the value-
maximising level of investment. 
Using a sample of 429 regular dividend changes between 1979 and 1984, 
Lang and Litzenberger find that the average announcement return of large dividend 
change is significantly higher for firms with low Tobin’s Q than for firms with high 
Tobin’s Q. This evidence is consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis that 
dividend increases by overinvesting firms signal management’s intention to mitigate 
overinvestment problem, thereby causing larger stock market reaction. Further, their 
analysis of changes in analysts’ earnings forecasts surrounding dividend 
announcements indicate that the effect of dividend announcements on earnings 
expectation is not statistically significant, a finding inconsistent with a prediction of 
signalling hypothesis. Overall, their results are more consistent with the free cash 
flow hypothesis than the signalling hypothesis. 
In an examination of 55 self-tender offers and 60 special dividend 
announcements between 1979 and 1989, Howe, He, and Kao (1992) find no 
significant association between announcement returns and Tobin’s Q, a finding in 
contrast with that of Lang and Litzenberger (1989). In more refined tests, they 
regress the announcement returns against the firm’s cash flow before the event and 
an interaction term between Tobin’s Q and cash flow. However, the results fail to 
capture a significant relation between announcement returns and the firm’s potential 
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to overinvest. Therefore, their findings offer no evidence supporting the free cash 
flow hypothesis. 
Yoon and Stark (1995) employ Tobin’s Q to test whether the information 
conveyed by dividend change announcements is more consistent with the signalling 
theory or the free cash flow hypothesis. Examining a sample of 4,179 dividend 
changes between 1969 and 1988, they find that the stock price reaction to dividend 
change announcements is more consistent with the signalling hypothesis. Their 
results show that the average abnormal return of low-Q firms is significantly higher 
than that of high-Q firms for dividend increases. However, there is no difference in 
the magnitude of stock price reactions between these two groups after controlling for 
the size of dividend change, the dividend yield, and the market value of the firm. 
This result is in contrast with that of Lang and Litzenberger (1989) who find a 
significantly higher stock price reaction for low-Q firms than for high-Q firms. 
Their examination of the firms’ capital expenditures after dividend changes 
indicates that there are significant increases (decreases) in capital expenditures 
following dividend increases (decreases) for firms regardless of their investment 
opportunities, the results inconsistent with the free cash flow hypothesis. They 
further examine the revisions of analysts’ forecast for current earnings and find that 
dividend change announcements cause analysts to revise their forecast for current 
earnings in the manner consistent with the signalling hypothesis. Overall, Yoon and 
Stark’s (1995) findings are more consistent with the signalling hypothesis than the 
free cash flow hypothesis. 
Using a sample of 6,777 dividend changes between 1962 and 1988 to 
examine the relation between dividend change announcements and stock price 
reactions, Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1994) find that abnormal returns around dividend 
changes are positively related to the magnitude of dividend changes and to the level 
of dividend yield, but unrelated to Tobin’s Q. In addition, their results indicate that 
analysts revise their forecasts of future earnings following dividend change 
announcements and that low-Q firms actually increase (decrease) capital 
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expenditures following dividend increases (decreases). Collectively, their findings 
support the signalling hypothesis rather than the free cash flow hypothesis. 
Investigating 570 special dividends, 7,417 regular dividend increases, and 
207 self-tender offers, Lie (2000) find that firms tend to have excess funds before the 
payout announcements and that the stock price reaction to these announcements is 
significantly related to excess funds and the firm’s investment opportunities, as 
measured by Tobin’s Q, for self-tender offers and large special dividends but not for 
regular dividend increases and small special dividends. Overall, his results are 
consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis, i.e., cash payouts help curtail potential 
overinvestment by managers. 
Chen, Jian, and Xu (2009) investigate dividend policies of listed firms in 
China from 1990 to 2004. Specifically, they aim at exploring why some Chinese 
listed firms pay outs high dividends, despite the weak investor’s protection in China. 
Their evidence shows that high dividend payments are used to divert corporate cash 
to controlling shareholders who receive substantial discount of non-tradable shares 
during the IPO. Thus, dividends may not be used only for signalling profitability or 
mitigating agency costs of free cash flow but also for tunnelling purpose in China. 
2.1.5 Maturity Hypothesis and the Life­cycle Theory of Dividends 
In a comprehensive investigation of a large sample of 7,642 dividend change 
announcements between 1967 and 1993, Grullon, Michaely, Swaminathan (2002) 
find that profits of dividend-increasing firms do not increase but instead decline after 
dividend increases, while those of dividend-decreasing firms show a tendency to 
recover after dividend decreases rather than decline further, the findings in contrast 
with the signalling hypothesis. In addition, they find that dividend-increasing firms 
do not increase their capital expenditures in the years after dividend increases. 
Moreover, the systematic risk of dividend-increasing firms significantly declines 
around dividend increase announcements, resulting in a significant decline in their 
cost of capital. Grullen et al. indicate that this decline in systematic risk is a 
20 
significant determinant of the positive stock price reaction to dividend increases. 
Further, they find a permanent increase in the dividend payout ratios of dividend-
increasing firms. The result that these firms can maintain higher dividends is 
consistent with Lintner’s (1956) finding that managers attempt to smooth dividends. 
Following these findings, Grullon et al. propose the maturity hypothesis, positing 
that a firm tends to increase dividends as it move from a growth phase to a more 
mature phase. As a growth firm becomes mature, its investment opportunities 
decline, which, in turn, would lead to an increase in the firm free cash flows. A 
mature firm then pays out these free cash flows in the form of dividends or share 
repurchases. Therefore, a dividend increase may signal not only a change in the 
firm’s fundamental but also a commitment of management not to overinvest. 
2.1.6 Dividend Clientele Hypothesis 
Allen, Bernado, and Welch (2000) contend that firms pay dividends because 
dividends attract institutional investors, who pay less dividend tax than do retail 
investors. Typically, institutional investors are more likely than retail investors to 
conduct “due diligence” to find out whether a firm is efficiently run. Moreover, 
institutions have been increasingly involved in corporate governance in recent years. 
Therefore, institutional holdings can increase firm values because they are better able 
to monitor and control management actions. In particular, Allen et al. develop a 
signalling model to show that management can use dividends to signal that the firm 
is good because paying dividends increase the likelihood that firm quality will be 
detected by the institutions. Therefore, bad firms will not find it worthwhile to pay 
dividends to mimic good firms because bad firms do not want their quality to be 
detected. 
Grinstein and Michaely (2005) examine the relation between institutional 
holdings and payout policy in the U.S. between 1980 and 1996. They find that 
institutions prefer dividend-paying firms to non-dividend-paying firms. However, 
within dividend-paying firms, institutions are not attracted to firms that pay high 
dividends, a finding inconsistent with the prediction of Allen et al. (2000) that high 
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dividends attract institutional holdings. In addition, they find that firms that 
repurchase more shares attract institutions, and that institutions prefer regular 
repurchasers to nonregular ones. Moreover, their findings indicate that higher 
institutional holdings do not lead to higher dividends, repurchases, or total payout. 
Collectively, their results do not support the notion that high dividends attract 
institutions or higher institutional holdings cause firms to increase payout. 
Baba (2009) investigates the impact of the increase presence of foreign 
investors on dividend policies of a sample of 847 Japanese firms listed on the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange. He finds that a higher level of foreign ownership raises the 
probability of dividend payouts and dividend increases but lowers the probability of 
no dividend changes and dividend decreases. Thus, these results demonstrate that 
foreign investors have significant influence on dividend payout decisions of Japanese 
firms. 
2.1.7 Catering Theory of Dividends 
In a seminal paper, Baker and Wurgler (2004a) propose the catering theory of 
dividends, stating that manager’s decision to pay dividends is driven by the premium 
investors place on dividend-paying firms. That is, managers cater to investors by 
paying dividends when investors put a premium on dividend payers, but not paying 
dividends when investors prefer non-dividend payers. They develop a model in 
which the manager trades off between a short-run stock price affected by investor 
demand for dividends and a long-run fundamental value determined by investment 
policy. The model predicts that the propensity to pay dividends is increasing in the 
dividend premium (i.e., the difference between the current stock prices of payers and 
nonpayers) and decreasing in the fundamental cost of dividends (e.g., costly external 
finance or taxes). 
Li and Lie (2006) extend Baker and Wurgler’s (2004a) dividend catering 
model by including dividend increases and decreases. They argue that while Baker 
and Wurgler’s (2004a) model might explain why some firms initiate or omit 
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dividends, it cannot explain why firms change dividend level. In addition, 
insignificant relationship between announcement returns and dividend premiums in 
Baker and Wurgler (2004a) casts doubts about the validity of the catering theory. 
Consequently, Li and Lie assume that investors categorise firms into groups not only 
on whether they pay dividends but also on the dividend level. Li and Lie find that 
both the probability of dividend increases and decreases and the magnitude of 
dividend changes are related to dividend premium. In particular, when the dividend 
premium is high, firms are more likely to increase dividend and when the dividend 
premium is low, firms are more likely to decrease dividends and repurchase shares. 
Moreover, they find that the announcement returns for dividend increases are 
positively related to the dividend premium while the announcements returns for 
dividend decreases are negatively related to the dividend premium. 
In a recent study, Ferris, Jayaraman, and Sabherwal (2009) test the catering 
theory of dividends across a sample of twenty-three countries. They find that, 
compared with that in civil law countries, dividend policy in common law countries 
is more driven by investor’s demand for dividends because shareholders in common 
law countries have a higher level of legal protection, requiring the managers to be 
more responsive to investor’s demand for dividends while, in civil law countries, the 
managers are less responsive to minority shareholders’ demand because they are 
disciplined by large controlling shareholders who have less interest in exploring the 
market misevaluations of their firms’ stock prices due to dividend policy. 
2.1.8 Propensity to Pay Dividends 
Fama and French (2001) study the propensity to pay dividends of U.S. firms 
between 1926 and 1999. They find that the percentage of firms paying dividend 
declines substantially after 1978, i.e., the proportion of dividend payers reaches its 
peak of 66.5% in 1978 but falls to only 20.8% in 1999. Their evidence indicates that 
the lower proportion of dividend payers is, in part, due to a surge in new listings of 
small firms with low profitability but high investment opportunities that never pay 
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dividends. In sum, they demonstrate that U.S. firms have become less likely to pay 
dividends, regardless of their characteristics. 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2006) test the life-cycle theory by 
examining whether the probability to pay dividends is related to the 
earned/contributed capital mix, as measured by retained earnings to total equity 
(RE/TE) or retained earnings to total assets (RE/TA). Typically, firms with low 
RE/TE (RE/TA) tend to be in the growth stage and reliant on external capital while 
firms with high RE/TE (RE/TA) tend to be more mature with high accumulated 
profits, thus making them good candidates to pay dividends. Consistent with the life-
cycle theory, their evidence indicates that the earned/contributed capital mix has a 
positively significant relation with the probability that a firm pays dividends, 
controlling for firm size, current and lagged profitability, growth, total equity, cash 
balances, and dividend history. This relation also holds for the probability that a firm 
initiates or omits dividends. In addition, DeAngelo et al. document a substantial 
increase in firms with negative retained earnings from 11.8% in 1978 to 50.2% in 
2002, a finding that further explains why U.S. firms have lower propensity to pay 
dividends during such period as documented by Fama and French (2001). 
Ferris et al. (2006) investigate whether U.K. firms have lower propensity to 
pay dividends. They find that the number of U.K. firms paying dividends declines 
from 75.9% in 1988 to 54.5% in 2002 and that the number of new lists paying 
dividends declines from 60.2% to 28.6% during the same period. Controlling for firm 
size and profitability, they find that the decreases in dividend payers appear to be 
concentrated over the 1998-2002 period. To explain this change in dividend policies, 
Ferris et al. examine dividend premium of U.K. firms and find that catering 
incentives appeared to shift in the U.K. during the late 1990s. They conclude that this 
change in catering incentives most likely explain why fewer U.K. firms pay 
dividends. 
In a recent paper, Denis and Osobov (2008) examine cross-sectional and 
time-series evidence on the propensity to pay dividends in several developed 
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financial markets (the U.S., Canada, the U.K., Germany, France, and Japan) over the 
period 1989-2002. Like Fama and French (2001), they find that the likelihood of 
paying dividends is associated with firm size, growth opportunities, and profitability. 
In all six countries, the likelihood of paying dividends is strongly associated with the 
ratio of retained earnings to total equity. The fraction of firms that pay dividend is 
high when this ratio is high and low when retained earnings are negative. Consistent 
with the U.S. evidence reported by DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (2004), their 
evidence in six countries shows that aggregate dividends do not decline overtime but 
concentrated among the largest and most profitable firms, the finding consistent with 
the life-cycle theory’s prediction that the distribution of free cash flow is the primary 
determinant of dividend policy. In addition, they test the catering theory by 
examining the relation between the propensity to pay dividends and the Baker and 
Wurgler’s (2004a, b) dividend premium. Their evidence, however, fails to provide 
much support for the catering theory of dividends outside the U.S. 
Eije and Megginson (2008) examine dividends and share repurchases in the 
European Union from 1989 to 2005. They find that the number of European firms 
paying dividends declined while the total dividends and share repurchases increased 
dramatically over such period. In addition, they find the positive relation between 
financial reporting frequency and corporate payout policies. That is, the financial 
reporting frequency of EU companies has increased from 1.2 to 2.4 times per year, 
which is positively associated with higher payouts. 
Andreas, Betzer, Goergen, and Renneboog (2009) investigate dividend 
policies of 220 German firms from 1984 to 2005. They document that, compared to 
UK and US firms, German firms pay out a lower proportion of their cash flows but a 
higher proportion of their published earnings as dividends. The authors find that 
dividend payout ratios of German firms are based on cash flows rather than 
published earnings and that dividend policies of German firms are more flexible than 
those of UK and US firms; that is, German firms are more willing to cut or omit 
dividends as they experience a temporary decline in profitability. Overall, dividend 
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payouts in Germany tend to be subject to a high degree of discreteness as opposed to 
smoothness observed in the US and the UK. 
2.2 Share Repurchase Literature 
Several potential explanations for the positive announcement returns and the 
manager’s motives associated with share repurchases have been provided in the 
finance literature. These include signalling hypothesis, free cash flow hypothesis, 
capital structure adjustment hypothesis, financial flexibility hypothesis, dividend 
substitution hypothesis, options funding hypothesis, wealth redistribution hypothesis, 
and takeover deterrence hypothesis. Recent studies also examine managerial timing 
ability, which is associated with market underreaction hypothesis. 
2.2.1 Signalling Hypothesis 
One of the most leading explanations for the positive abnormal returns to 
share repurchase announcements and why firms repurchase shares in academic 
literature is the signalling hypothesis, which is based on the notion that the 
management is better informed about the firm’s value than outside shareholders. The 
information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders can lead to the occasions 
where managers have good news about future profitability but prevailing stock prices 
do not reflect this because investors have access only to public information (Grullon 
and Ikenberry, 2000). 
Traditional signalling theory shows that payouts convey favourable 
information about firm’s prospects. Bhattacharya (1979) and Miller and Rock (1985) 
suggests that managers who foresee better performance can send positive signal to 
the market by paying out dividends today because they are confident that future 
capital requirements can be financed by future earnings. On the other hand, managers 
who do not expect any improvement in profitability are refrained from doing so 
because they might have to forego profitable investments or raise costly external 
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funds in the future. Therefore, the signalling theory also suggests that managers can 
use a share repurchase announcement to signal information about future cash flows 
and firm undervaluation (see, e.g., Dann, 1981; Ofer and Thakor, 1987; 
Constantinides and Grundy, 1989). 
An implication of the signalling hypothesis is that, if management’s principal 
motive is to signal their optimism about the firm’s future profitability, repurchasing 
firms should experience improvement in future earnings and cash flows. However, 
the empirical tests of the signalling hypothesis provide mixed results. For example, 
Choi and Chen (1997) study the difference in the private information conveyed by 
the announcement of a share repurchase tender offer and of a regular dividend 
increase. They find that a share repurchase tender offer leads to higher earnings 
forecasts by analysts than does a regular dividend increase. In addition, they find a 
permanent decline in the firm’s systematic risk following a share repurchase tender 
offer. Thus, when the managers foresee a relatively large increase (decrease) in the 
firm’s earnings (risk), a share repurchase tender offer may be adopted rather than a 
regular dividend increase. 
Nohel and Tarhan (1998) examine the performance of a sample of 242 tender 
offers between 1978 and 1991. Their results show that there is a significant 
improvement in the performance of repurchasing firms following share repurchase 
announcements. However, the improvement in performance comes from deployment 
of existing assets rather than from new investment opportunities. In addition, their 
results show a decline in systematic risk following share repurchases. The changes in 
systematic risk are negatively related to the announcement period abnormal returns 
but positively related to long-run returns. These findings suggest that the long-run 
performance is driven by a decline in systematic risk rather than by increased 
operating cash flows. 
Examining a sample of 185 announcements of open-market repurchase 
programmes between 1978 and 1986, Bartov (1991) find that analysts revise upward 
their earnings forecasts for repurchasing firms and that the earnings for repurchasing 
27 
firms improve during the announcement year. Likewise, Lie (2005b) document that 
operating performance of repurchasing firms improves following 4,729 
announcements of open-market share repurchase programmes from 1981 to 2000. 
In contrast, Jagannathan and Stephens (2003) examine open-market 
repurchase announcements over the period 1991 to 1995 but find no evidence of 
improved operating performance following repurchases. Further, the earnings of 
repurchasing firms fall in the years after these events. Likewise, Grullon and 
Michaely (2004) examine a sample of 4,443 open-market share repurchase 
announcements of U.S. firms for the period 1980 to 1997 but find no evidence that 
repurchasing firms experience an improvement in future profitability relative to their 
peers. On the contrary, some performance measures indicate that repurchasing firms 
underperform their peers. In addition, analysts revise their expectations downward 
after the announcements of share repurchase programme. Accordingly, Jagannathan 
and Stephens (2003) and Grullon and Michaely (2004) conclude that the signalling 
hypothesis cannot explain the positive market reaction around open market share 
repurchase announcements. 
The mixed results of improvement in operating performance after the 
announcements of open market share repurchases raise an important question 
whether the managers really intend to signal that their firms are undervalued as often 
cited as a main reason why they announce share repurchase programmes. To test 
whether managers possess private information about the firm’s prospects, Lee, 
Mikkelson, and Partch (1992) examine managerial trading around share repurchase 
tender offers. They find that managers increase buying and reduce selling of their 
firm’s shares prior to fixed-price tender offers that do not follow takeover-related 
events, and that managers tend to decrease selling shares prior to fixed-price tender 
offers that are followed by takeover-related events, suggesting that managers intend 
to signal their private information to the market. However, Lee et al. do not detect 
any unusual managerial trading before Dutch auction offers. 
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D’Mello and Shroff (2000) examine whether repurchasing firms are in fact 
undervalued relative to their “economic value” (EV), which is estimated as the sum 
of book values and discounted future abnormal earnings. Their findings indicate that, 
at the beginning of the fiscal year in which the tender offer is announced, the 
estimate of EV of 74 percent of the repurchasing firms is higher than the prevailing 
stock price; the median magnitude of undervaluation prior to the repurchase is 
substantial (30%) when compared to the tender premium (21%); and the 
announcement-period market reaction (12%). Therefore, their results suggest that 
repurchasing firms are undervalued relative to their EV perceived by managers. This 
is consistent with the notion that managers want to use share repurchase programmes 
to signal the undervaluation of their firms’ share prices. Further, D’Mello and Shroff 
analyse the insiders’ trading made in the pre-repurchase year of fixed-price tender 
offers. They find that insiders of undervalued firms are net buyers whereas insiders 
of overvalued firms are net sellers. This trading pattern is more pronounced in the 
six-month period before the announcement date. Also, the analysts revise their 
earnings forecasts upward following a repurchase announcement. Consistent with 
findings by Lee et al. (1992), these results suggest that managers announce share 
repurchase programmes to reveal their favourable private information. 
2.2.2 Free Cash Flow Hypothesis 
If managers do not intend to signal undervaluation, so what explains the 
positive announcement returns of share repurchases? Another favourable explanation 
is the Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, the 
agency cost between managers and shareholders increases as the firm has higher free 
cash flows because managers are more likely to overinvest the firm’s excess cash in 
negative NPV projects. Therefore, a share repurchase programme is good news for 
shareholders because it decreases the likelihood that the managers will burn the 
corporate cash flows. 
Numerous studies have focused on testing the signalling hypothesis versus 
the free cash flow hypothesis of share repurchases. For example, Howe, He, and Kao 
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(1992) examine the announcements of tender offer share repurchases and specially 
designated dividends (SDDs) to determine whether the free cash flow hypothesis has 
explanatory power for the positive price response surrounding such corporate 
announcements. They divide the sample consisting 55 tender-offer repurchases and 
60 SDDs using Tobin’s Q ratio into low-Q (over-investing) and high-Q (value-
maximising) firms. Howe et al. find that the market’s reaction to share repurchases 
and SDDs is approximately the same for both high-Q and low-Q firms. Further, they 
test whether low-Q firms with greater free cash flows have higher announcement 
returns. Nevertheless, the free cash flow measure adds little to the explanation of 
these returns. Therefore, these results are consistent with the signalling hypothesis 
rather than the free cash flow hypothesis. 
As previously discussed, Grullon and Michaely (2004) find no evidence that 
repurchasing firms experience improvement in future profitability relative to their 
peers. On the contrary, some performance measures indicate that repurchasing firms 
underperform their peers. In addition, analysts revise their expectations downward 
after the announcements of share repurchase programme. Nevertheless, their 
empirical findings provide support for the free cash flow hypothesis. They find that 
repurchasing firms reduce their current level of capital expenditures and research and 
development (R&D) expenses. In addition, the level of cash reserves significantly 
decline. Moreover, the market reaction to share repurchase announcements is 
stronger among those firms that are more likely to overinvest. These findings 
indicate that firms increase their cash payouts in response to a decline in their 
investment opportunities. Finally, they investigate the relation between the change in 
the cost of capital and the long-term drift observed after share repurchase 
announcements. They find that the long-term drift is negatively associated with 
declining in risk and the cost of capital of repurchasing firms. 
Chan, Ikenberry, and Lee (2004) evaluate both the initial market reaction and 
the longer-term price performance using a comprehensive sample of over 5,000 
repurchases announced in the U.S. in the 1980s and the 1990s. They find some 
support for the signalling hypothesis. Prior to a repurchase announcement, the market 
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receives negative information shocks in the form of negative earnings surprises. Over 
a four-year window after the announcement, however, earnings surprises tend to be 
positive and significant. Controlling for size and book-to-market effects, they find 
that the mean four-year abnormal buy-and-hold return is as high as 23.56%. This 
suggests that real, unanticipated information is revealed after repurchase 
announcements and that the initial market reaction is biased and incomplete. Chan et 
al. find limited support for the free cash flow hypothesis. Their evidence shows that 
repurchasing firms tend to have above average free cash flows compared to their 
industry peers, and the long-run drift is greater for high free cash flow firms 
compared to low free cash flow firms. However, the gains for high free cash flow 
firms are not linked to the actual share repurchases in order to disgorge the firms’ 
free cash flows to shareholders. 
Espenlaub, Lin, Strong, and Wang (2006) test the free cash flow and 
signalling hypotheses by using a sample of 5,159 repurchase announcements by 301 
U.K. firms during September 1997 to July 2003. They find that the profitability of 
repurchasing firms does not improve after actual share repurchases, but the capital 
expenditures and cash reserves decrease. In addition, they find no relation between 
repurchase size and post-event operating performance. Overall, their results are 
inconsistent with the signalling hypothesis but in line with the free cash flow 
hypothesis. 
Li and McNally (2007) examine the role of firm characteristics and insider 
private information in affecting Canadian firms’ repurchase decision and the 
associated announcement period stock returns. They find that firms are more likely to 
buy back shares if they have greater free cash flows, lower market-to-book ratios, 
poor prior stock performance, and large insiders’ shareholdings. In addition, they 
find that the announcement period returns are strongly and positively related to the 
private information possessed by company insiders about the agency cost of free 
cash flows. 
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2.2.3 Choice between Dividends and Share Repurchases 
Modigliani and Miller’s (1961) seminal work demonstrates that, in a perfect 
capital market, the vale of the firm is independent of the firm’s payout policy, 
implying that dividends and share repurchases are perfect substitutes. Since the 
market is imperfect, however, the firm’s choices between paying dividends and 
repurchasing shares affect the firm’s value differently. At least with respect to the tax 
efficiency, firms should repurchase shares rather than pay dividends because share 
repurchases, generally treated by tax authorities as capital gains, are taxed at a lower 
rate than dividends. However, it has been a puzzle why firms pay dividends despite 
its tax disadvantage relative to share repurchases, as an alternative means of cash 
distribution to stockholders. 
Several researchers attempt to explain this puzzle from theoretical 
perspective. For example, Ofer and Thakor (1987) develop a signalling model in 
which managers can signal their firms’ true values by using either a dividend or a 
share repurchase (tender offer) or both. Dividends and share repurchases are costly 
because they may require external financing in the future when the firms need to 
make investments. In addition, share repurchases causes the risk-averse manager to 
have a higher risk exposure due to increased holdings of his or her own firm’s shares. 
These differing signalling cost structures between dividends and share repurchases 
define the usefulness of each signal in different situations. The model shows that 
when the difference between the true value of an undervalued firm and its market 
value is relatively low, the firm chooses to signal by dividends because the 
associated signalling cost is relatively lower than that of a share repurchase. 
However, when the true value of the firm is much higher than its market value, the 
firm chooses to signal by share repurchases because a relatively large dividend is 
needed for informationally consistent signalling. Thus, only a firm that perceives a 
relatively large undervaluation will repurchase its shares, whereas a firm with a small 
undervaluation will pay dividends. Ofer and Thakor conclude that both dividends 
and repurchases will generally be used as signals and neither dominates the other 
under all circumstances. 
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Brennan and Thakor (1990) develop a model explaining why dividends are 
better form of payout compared with share repurchases. When some shareholders are 
better informed about the prospects of the firm than others, a share repurchase 
programme will allow them to take advantage of this information asymmetry. That 
is, they can repurchase shares at the prices lower than the fundamental value. 
Consequently, uninformed investors will be worse off. When firms distribute cash in 
the form of dividends, both informed and uninformed investors will do equally 
because they receive a pro rata amount. As a result, uninformed investors prefer 
dividends to share repurchases. 
Hausch and Seward (1993) develop a model to show the properties of 
stochastic (e.g., a share repurchase) and deterministic (e.g., a cash dividend) payout 
policies. In their model, the firm’s choice of signalling with a dividend or a share 
repurchase depends on the firm’s absolute risk aversion. Since decreasing absolute 
risk aversion means that the firm has more cash available and lower cost of using a 
share repurchase, the high-quality firm can distinguish itself from the low-quality 
firm using a share repurchase programme. 
Chowdhry and Nanda (1994) propose that it is the fact that a tender offer 
repurchase causes large stock price increase that makes it unattractive means of 
payout. As a result, firms distribute some cash in the form of dividends despite the 
tax disadvantage. The authors develop a model in which the firm may choose not to 
repurchase shares despite the tax advantage. In this model, it is assumed that 
managers have more information about the value of the firm’s assets in place than 
outsiders; dividends increase with the level of accumulated cash; and the expected 
level of dividends or the size of share repurchase next period is positively related to 
the level of dividends in the current period and to the level of unexpected earnings 
next period. With these assumptions, the model shows that firms that repurchase less 
often will have higher stock price reaction associated with a share repurchase 
announcement. 
33 
Jain, Shekhar, and Torbey (2009) examine the choice of payout initiation 
adopted by 1,886 IPO firms over the period 1990-2000. Their results indicate that 
dividends and share repurchases are used by different types of firms under different 
circumstances. In particular, they find that most IPO firms prefer share repurchases 
to dividends as payout initiation mechanism. IPO firms are more likely to choose 
repurchases over dividends when they have strong demand for external funds, 
venture capital backing, and high product market competition. On the other hand, 
IPO firms prefer dividends to repurchases when investor demand for dividends is 
high and when they have reached a certain maturity stage. 
2.2.4 Models on Open­Market Share Repurchases 
Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996) explain an open-market share repurchase 
announcement as an option to exchange market value of the firm’s stock for its true 
value. The share repurchase programmes allow managers to use the firm resource 
along with their insider information to benefit long-term shareholders by buying back 
shares when they perceive the stock as undervalued. 
Similarly, Oded (2005) consider an open-market share repurchase as an 
option to repurchase shares. He constructs two versions of signalling model to 
explain why firms announce open-market repurchase programmes. In his single-
firm-type version, the firm receives an option to buy back shares once it announces a 
share repurchase programme. The value of the option is its opportunity to use private 
information to repurchase shares in the future. The firm will exercise the option to 
buy only if the stock price is undervalued. Since the outside shareholders (bidders) 
know they are exposed to adverse selection, they are unwilling to pay high prices and 
lowering their bids, causing stock price to decline. In a competitive market, the 
option value and the loss from the decrease in share price exactly offset each other in 
present value. Hence, a share repurchase programme does not generate an 
announcement return. In the model comprising two types of firms, a good firm has 
higher expected value and higher variance than a bad firm. When good firm 
announces a share repurchase programme, it is long the option to repurchase whereas 
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the market is short this option. It is assumed that the current stock prices are set such 
that, for good firm, the losses of short-term shareholders exactly offset the gains of 
long-term shareholders. If bad firm mimics, its long-term shareholders will only 
receive the option value of a bad firm, which is lower because of lower variance, and 
the gains from this option cannot offset the losses of short-term shareholders. Thus, a 
bad firm is better off not announcing share repurchase programme. 
Bhattacharya and Dittmar (2004) develop a cheap talk model to explain a 
situation where an undervalued firm uses an open market share repurchase 
programme as a costly or costless signal, depending on whether the firm actually 
repurchases it own shares. They show that, under costless signalling, an undervalued 
firm can separate itself from an overvalued firm by attracting scrutiny from 
speculators. Hence, the overvalued firm will not mimic because it does not gain from 
being discovered. Under costly signalling, which involves spending money, an 
undervalued firm can separate itself from an overvalued firm because it is costlier for 
the overvalued firm to mimic. Thus, it is evident that an undervalued firm would like 
to separate itself by using costless signal rather than costly signal. Bhattacharya and 
Dittmar demonstrate that a separation by costless signal works only if the benefits 
from scrutiny are high enough. That is, the firm is deeply undervalued and largely 
ignored, thereby increasing potential trading profit for a speculator. 
2.2.5 Financial Flexibility Hypothesis 
Since an open-market repurchase programme does not commit the firm to 
repurchase shares, it provides more flexibility than dividend announcement, which is 
irrevocable and commit the firm to maintain or raise level of dividend payments in 
the future. A recent survey of financial executives by Brav, Graham, Harvey, and 
Michaely (2005) shows that many managers now favour share repurchase 
programme because of its flexibility. This flexibility allows managers to alter payout 
in response to the availability of good investment opportunities. Also, managers 
believe that share repurchases can be used to time the market, to increase earnings 
per share, or to offset stock option dilution. 
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Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000) examine firms’ decisions to pay 
out cash flows in the form of dividends or open-market share repurchases. They find 
that share repurchases and dividends are used at different times by different kinds of 
firms. While dividends grow smoothly, share repurchases vary considerably with the 
business cycle. Firms with higher permanent operating cash flows are more likely to 
pay dividends while firms with higher temporary, non-operating cash flows are more 
likely to repurchase shares. Thus, the flexibility feature of share repurchase 
programme is one reason why firms choose to repurchase shares rather than pay 
dividends. 
Likewise, Guay and Harford (2000) hypothesise that firms increase dividends 
to distribute relatively permanent cash flows and repurchase shares to distribute 
transient cash flows. They find that the cash flow shocks followed by substantial 
dividend increases are more permanent than those followed by share repurchases or 
small dividend increases or by no payout at all, and that the market updates its 
assessment about the permanence of the cash flow shock when the payout method 
does not match its expectations. These findings indicate that managers use payout 
methods to signal information about the permanence of the cash-flow shock. Finally, 
these authors conclude that both payout methods send fundamentally different 
signals and that neither dominates the other. 
Lie (2005) examines the effect of financial flexibility and the level and 
certainty of operating performance on firms’ choices to change dividends, pay 
special dividends, and repurchase shares. He finds that the current income 
improvement is higher for firms that increase dividends than for firms that 
repurchase shares, while the past volatility of operating income are lower and 
subsequent volatility of operating income declines more significantly for firms that 
increase dividends or pay special dividends than for firms that repurchase shares. 
These results suggest that managers prefer share repurchases when faced with a 
volatile income because share repurchases do not commit payouts in the future, 
thereby providing more flexibility than dividend increases or special dividends. 
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2.2.6 Dividend Substitution Hypothesis 
Due to the dramatic growth of share repurchases over recent years, it is 
possible that firms have been substituting dividends with share repurchases. Bagwell 
and Shoven (1989) argue that the surge in share repurchases in the mid-1980s 
indicates that firms have substituted repurchases for dividends in order to lower tax 
from cash dividend payments. Subsequent tests of substitution hypothesis produce 
mixed results, however. For example, Jagannathan et al. (2000) find that dividends 
are paid out of permanent cash flows while share repurchases are paid out of 
temporary cash flows and that share repurchases do not appear to replace dividends 
but rather they complement dividend role in paying out short-term cash flows. 
Fama and French (2001) report that, from 1978 to 1999, the proportion of 
firms paying cash dividends falls from 66.5% to 20.8%. One reason stems from 
changing characteristics of publicly traded firms; i.e., a number of small firms with 
low profitability and strong growth opportunities have been increasingly listed in the 
U.S. stock market. Interestingly, firms have become less likely to pay dividends 
whatever their characteristics. However, Fama and French find no evidence that 
declining dividends has been replaced with increasing share repurchases. Rather, 
most repurchasing firms are dividend paying firms. 
A recent study by Ferris et al. (2006) shows that U.K. firms have a lower 
propensity to pay dividends, i.e., the number of U.K. firms paying dividends declines 
from 75.9% in 1988 to 54.5% in 2002. However, the authors find no evidence that 
U.K. firms substitute share repurchases for dividends. On the contrary, Grullon and 
Michaely (2002), examining the corporate payout policy in the U.S. over the period 
1972 to 2000, show that (1) share repurchases have become an important form of 
payout for U.S. corporations; (2) share repurchases have replaced dividends; and (3) 
share repurchases has helped stabilise the average payout ratio of firms despite the 
decline in the dividend payout ratio. In addition, Grullon and Michaely find that 
dividend forecast errors are negatively correlated with share repurchase activity, a 
result consistent with the predictions of the substitution hypothesis. Moreover, they 
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find that the market reaction around the announcement of dividend decreases is 
significantly less negative for repurchasing firms than for non-repurchasing firms. 
This evidence further supports the notion that share repurchases and dividends are 
close substitutes. 
2.2.7 Options Funding Hypothesis 
Recently, there is much evidence that managers buy back shares in order to 
offset the dilution effect of stock options granted by the firms. For example, 
Weisbenner (2000) document that, while share repurchases have risen during 1990s, 
the use of stock options has also increased. For the S&P 500 firms, the stock option 
grants rose from 1.0% of shares outstanding in 1994 to 1.6% of shares outstanding in 
1998. Over four-year period, the size of stock option programmes grew over 40%, 
with outstanding stock options representing 6.3% of shares outstanding at the end of 
1998. Weisbenner shows that an increase in stock option grants is positively related 
to an increase in share repurchases and total payouts but an increase in executive 
stock options increase the likelihood that firms cut total cash distribution. In addition, 
Weisbenner finds that firms gradually repurchase shares over the life of options in 
order to offset the dilution effects caused by past stock option grants. This evidence 
is corroborated by Weston and Siu (2003) who find that a primary motive of 
repurchasing firms in the 1990s was to offset the dilution effects of the exercise of 
stock options. 
Fenn and Liang (2001) examine data on more than 1,100 non-financial firms 
during 1993-1997 to find out how corporate payout policy is affected by managerial 
stock options. They find a positive relation between managerial stock options and 
payouts by firms with high agency problem, i.e., firms with high free cash flows but 
low investment opportunities. This result suggests that managerial stock options help 
mitigate the agency cost of free cash flows. In addition, Fenn and Liang find a 
positive relation between managerial stock options and share repurchases, a finding 
suggest that the growth in share repurchases is driven by managerial stock options. 
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Kahle (2002) examine open market share repurchases over the period 1993-
1996 to determine the effect of stock options on firm’s decision to repurchase shares 
and stock market reaction to share repurchase announcements. Kahle find that firms 
repurchase shares in order to fund employee stock options programmes. However, 
the market appears to recognise this corporate motive and, as a result, reacts less 
positively to share repurchases announced by firms with high numbers of employee 
stock options. 
2.2.8 Wealth Redistribution Hypothesis 
Share repurchases can lead to the wealth transfer between informed 
shareholders and uninformed shareholders when the stock prices are lower than their 
fundamental values because the informed shareholders will gain from buying 
undervalued shares from uninformed investors. Brennan and Thakor (1990) argue 
that the wealth redistribution between informed and uninformed shareholders in a 
share repurchase programme creates different incentives between larger shareholders 
and small shareholders in acquiring the information. That is, with a fixed cost of 
information acquisition, large shareholders have a greater incentive to collect the 
information than small shareholders because large shareholders can obtain more 
trading profits. As a result, wealth is likely to be transferred from small shareholders 
to large shareholders in a share repurchase programme. 
Maxwell and Stephens (2003) argue that a share repurchase programme not 
only transfers wealth from uninformed to informed shareholders, but also transfers 
wealth from bondholders to shareholders. They find that share repurchases lead to 
positive stock returns but negative bond returns. In addition, they find that bond 
returns are more negative and stock returns are more positive for large repurchase 
programmes. Moreover, bond ratings are more likely to be downgraded than 
upgraded following share repurchase announcements, and downgrades are more 
likely for firms announcing large repurchase programmes. 
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In a recent paper, Jun, Jung, and Walking (2009) test the signalling 
hypothesis and wealth transfer hypothesis surrounding share repurchase 
announcements using a sample of 366 open market stock repurchases from 1991 to 
2002. Consistent with Maxwell and Stephens (2003), they find positive returns for 
shareholders but negative returns for bondholders during share repurchase 
announcements. However, the wealth losses for bondholders are significant only in 
the case where share repurchases are associated with options funding while the gains 
are most likely to be transferred to shareholders of firms with non-investment grade 
debt. In addition, share repurchases announced by firms with poor governance cause 
greater losses for bondholders but higher returns for shareholders. 
2.2.9 Takeover Deterrence Hypothesis 
Managers can buy back shares via fixed-price tender offers or Dutch auctions 
to fend off takeover attempts. However, open-market repurchases do not appear to 
fulfil such purpose because of their much smaller in size and higher uncertainty in 
acquiring the shares from outside shareholders. 
Denis (1990) examines the use of special dividends or share repurchases in 
response to hostile corporate control activity. In share repurchases, managers may 
choose not to sell their shares in the tender offer, while in special dividend plans, 
managers typically receive additional shares instead of cash. Both types of payouts 
can result in the concentration of voting power in the hands of managers and, 
consequently, high rate of success in maintaining target firm independence. This 
evidence indicates that announcements of defensive repurchases are typically 
associated with negative changes in wealth of target firm shareholders while special 
dividend plans are associated with abnormal wealth increases for target firm 
shareholders. 
Bagwell (1992) constructs a model in which the firm uses share repurchase as 
a takeover deterrence. The model demonstrates that, in an upward sloping supply 
curve for shares, a share repurchase by target firm can increase takeover cost to the 
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acquirer; that is, shareholders with the lowest stock valuations are most likely to 
tender their shares first while remaining shareholders with higher stock valuations 
may not be willing to tender shares, thereby raising the cost of takeover. 
Persons (1994) develops a model of repurchase tender offers in which firms 
choose between the Dutch auction and the fixed price offers. The model shows that 
Dutch auction repurchases are more effective in fending takeovers because they 
eliminate the uncertainty about how many shares will be repurchased while fixed 
price repurchases are more effective signals of undervaluation because the concavity 
of fixed price tender offers makes it more costly for overvalued firms to send a false 
signal to the market 
Billett and Xue (2007) examine whether the open market share repurchases 
have the deterrent effect on takeovers. Specifically, they test whether firms 
repurchase shares when the probability of becoming the target is high before the 
firms receive actual bids. Their results show that firms repurchase shares to defend 
takeover. In addition, firms repurchase shares to distribute temporary non-operating 
cash flows rather than permanent operating cash flows. 
2.2.10 Tax Hypothesis 
According to Miller and Modigliani (1961), dividends and share repurchases 
are equivalent in a perfect capital market. In real world, however, dividends are 
generally taxed more heavily than capital gains. Hence, share repurchases are 
apparently superior to dividends. Nevertheless, dividends continue to be a significant 
means of corporate payouts. This has long been an enigma in corporate finance. 
Bernheim (1991) argues that a good firm can separate from a bad firm 
because dividends are taxed more heavily than share repurchases. In his model, the 
firm adjusts the proportion of the total payout in the form of dividends as opposed to 
repurchases in order to control the amount of taxes paid. A good firm can choose 
optimal amount of taxes to provide the signal to the market. 
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Chowdhry and Nanda (1994) and Lucas and McDonald (1998) consider 
models where there is a tax disadvantage to dividends and adverse selection cost to 
repurchase. In their models, the payout policy depends on whether managers think 
the firm is overvalued or undervalued relative to the current market price. 
Allen, Bernado, and Welch (2000) explain why firms prefer dividends to 
share repurchases. Because institutions are taxed relatively less than individual 
investors, dividends attract institutional investors. Typically, institutions are more 
likely than retail investors to conduct “due diligence” to find out whether a firm is 
well run. In addition, institutions have been increasingly involved in corporate 
governance in recent years. Therefore, the presence of institutional holdings can 
increase firm values because of signalling effects, agency cost effects, or both. Allen 
et al. develop a signalling model to show that management can use taxable dividends 
to signal that the firm is good because paying dividends increase the likelihood that 
firm quality will be detected by the institutions. Bad firms will not find it worthwhile 
to mimic good firms because they do not want their quality to be detected. In 
addition, Allen et al. develop an agency model to show that dividends attract 
informed institutions whose presence ensures that management will manage the firm 
efficiently. If management underperforms, institutions will facilitate takeovers by 
selling large blocks of shares or even become directly involved in the corporate 
governance process. This model shows that dividends are smoothed because 
dividend reductions would induce some actions by institutional shareholders. 
2.2.11 Capital Structure Adjustment Hypothesis 
Manager may use share repurchases to adjust the firm’s capital structure by 
increasing the leverage. While repurchase tender offers can provide an immediate 
and a dramatic change in capital structure, open market repurchases, which are much 
smaller in size and take several months or years to complete, do not appear to have a 
significant effect on capital structure. Therefore, open market share repurchases are 
unlikely to be motivated by capital structure explanation. 
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2.2.12 Liquidity Effects and Managerial Timing Ability 
Several papers focus on examining the liquidity effects of share repurchases 
and timing ability of managers. However, these papers provide mixed results. For 
example, Barclay and Smith (1988) examine bid-ask spreads of 153 open market 
share repurchase announcements from 1970 to 1978. They find that the bid-ask 
spreads are higher in the year following the announcements than in the year 
preceding the announcements. Therefore, they conclude that open-market share 
buyback programmes deteriorate the liquidity of shares. 
Consistent with Barclay and Smith (1988), Brockman and Chung (2001), 
investigating the timing of open market repurchases and the impact on firm liquidity 
using the data from the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong, find that the bid-ask spreads 
widen during repurchase periods. In addition, they find that the managers of 
repurchasing firms exhibit substantial timing ability and that adverse selection costs 
increase substantially as investors respond to the presence of informed managerial 
trading. 
On the contrary, Cook, Krigman, and Leach (2004), using 64 firms’ 
voluntarily disclosed repurchasing trading data during 1993 and 1994 to examine the 
timing and execution of open market repurchases of U.S. firms, document that 
repurchase trading increases market liquidity. In particular, they compare days when 
repurchase trades are executed to surrounding non-repurchase days and find that 
quoted spreads are narrower on repurchase days than on days immediately preceding 
and following a repurchase. For NASDAQ firms, spreads narrow substantially by 
more than 11 cents per share, compared to a pre-repurchase announcement trading 
period. 
Further, Cook et al. examine other short-term motives for the daily 
repurchase decision including cost minimisation, price support, and the strategic use 
of firm-specific information. To evaluate the success of the cost-minimisation 
strategy, they compare the cost of the realised repurchase portfolio with several naïve 
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accumulation strategies and find mixed results. The larger firms (NYSE firms) 
generally perform very well from a cost-minimisation perspective while the smaller 
firms (NASDAQ firms) tend to pay relatively high prices for their shares. Consistent 
with price support perspective, the results show that firms repurchase following price 
drops and prices stabilise following repurchase trades. Finally, Cook et al. examine 
whether firms repurchase shares to take profit from firm-specific information and 
find that firms repurchase shares when prices have fallen but find no clear evidence 
that repurchasing firms are able to time the market. In addition, firms significantly 
decrease repurchase activity in the five-day window around firm-specific 
announcements, suggesting that firms avoid trading on short-term information. 
Investigating 36,848 repurchases made by 352 French firms, Ginglinger and 
Hamon (2007) find that the share repurchases have an adverse effect on liquidity as 
measured by bid-ask spread or depth. Further, they examine whether the managers of 
French firms exhibit timing ability, i.e., the managers use private information to 
repurchase stock before the share price rises. They find that French firms buy back 
shares following the falling in share prices, but there is no significant increase in 
stock prices afterward. Overall, their results indicate that share repurchases in France 
largely reflect managerial motives to stabilise share prices rather than take advantage 
of decline in share prices. 
2.2.13 Market Underreaction Hypothesis 
In an efficient stock market, the share prices of firms adjust immediately to 
the information as soon as it is revealed to the market participants. This implies that 
the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders can be resolved at the 
announcements of share repurchase programme. If the market is efficient, however, 
there is no reason why an undervalued firm will buy back shares after the 
announcements since the share price already increases to its fundamental value and 
the firm cannot earn any capital gain from share repurchases. Several empirical 
studies indicate that the market is slow to react to the information conveyed by the 
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managers via open-market repurchase announcements so that the managers have 
incentives to buy back shares even after the announcements. 
Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermalen (1995) argue that the positive initial 
return of 2-3% around share repurchase announcements is not much greater than the 
daily standard deviation of returns of many stocks, and that, if managers repurchase 
shares because of mispricing, they should react when they perceive a substantially 
larger undervaluation. Hence, Ikenberry et al. hypothesise that the market 
underreacts to share repurchase announcements, leading prices to adjust slowly over 
time. They refer to this as the underreaction hypothesis. Empirically, Ikenberry et al. 
examine a sample of 1,239 open market share repurchases announced between 1980 
and 1990. They find that the average market response to the announcements is only 
3.5%, but the average four-year buy-and-hold return measured after the initial 
announcements is more than 12%. For the high book-to-market firms, or value 
stocks, the average four-year buy-and-hold return is substantially high at 45.3%. For 
the low book-to-market firms, or growth stocks, no abnormal returns are observed in 
the long run. Therefore, at least with respect to value stocks, this evidence supports 
the underreaction hypothesis and consistent with manager’s claims of stock 
undervaluation. 
To re-examine the underreaction hypothesis, Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and 
Vermaelen (2000) study open market share repurchases in Canada from 1989 to 
1997. They report similar evidence of long-run abnormal return as in the U.S., i.e., 
average excess return over three-year period after the repurchase announcements in 
Canada is about 7% per year. Dividing the sample into value and growth stocks, they 
find that, over three-year period following the announcements, average excess 
returns is 9.1% per year for value stocks and 3.3% per year for growth stocks. This 
evidence suggests that the market ignores most of the information conveyed through 
open market repurchase announcements. 
McNally (2002) study the open market repurchases in Canada using the data 
from 1989 to 1998. He finds average abnormal return of 1.3% around the 
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announcements. However, the average abnormal return over two years following the 
announcements is very large at 25% or 11.8% per annum, suggesting that the stock 
was undervalued at the time of announcements and that the market did not learn the 
full extent of undervaluation from the share repurchase announcements. 
Underreaction hypothesis is further corroborated by Chan, Ikenberry, and Lee 
(2004) who evaluate cross-sectional differences in both the initial market reaction 
and longer-horizon performance using a comprehensive sample of over 5,000 
repurchases announced in the U.S. between 1980 and 1996. They find that the initial 
market reaction is positive but not complete and the long-run return is positively 
significant. That is, the market receives negative information shocks in the form of 
negative earnings surprises before a share repurchase announcement. Over a four-
year window following the announcement, earnings surprises tend to be positive and 
significant with the mean four-year abnormal buy-and-hold return of 23.56%. This 
evidence suggest that the initial market reaction is biased and incomplete. 
Market underreaction is also observed in similar corporate events such as 
dividend changes. Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan (2002) find that the initial 
positive market reaction to a dividend increase can be explained by the subsequent 
decline in systematic risk. Over the next three years following dividend increase 
announcements, the dividend-increasing firms with the largest decline in systematic 
risk experience the largest price increases. This evidence suggests that the market 
initially underreacts to dividend increase announcements. 
Kadiyala and Rau (2004) study four different corporate events (seasoned 
equity offerings, stock-financed acquisitions, share repurchases, and cash-financed 
acquisitions) in order to distinguish two behavioural hypotheses: underreaction and 
overreaction. Consistent with underreaction hypothesis, their evidence shows that the 
long-run abnormal returns reflect investors’ tendency to underreact, first to short-
term information available prior to the event and then to information conveyed by the 
event itself. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that overreaction hypothesis can 
explain long-run abnormal returns to any of these four events. 
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From a theoretical perspective, Isagawa (2002) develop a signalling model 
explaining stock price behaviour associated with open-market share repurchase 
activities in an inefficient market. The model shows that, when the market is not 
completely efficient, stock price of a firm would be undervalued after share 
repurchase announcements. This is caused by the market misperception (noises) of 
the true value of the firm. In other words, the market underreacts to the information 
conveyed by managers via open market repurchase announcements. Consequently, 
the firm can earn capital gains from this market misperception by repurchasing its 
outstanding shares at bargain prices until the market misperception disappears. 
Capital gains that the firm earns from share repurchases constitute the positive long-
run stock returns. Therefore, the firm has a strong incentive to actually repurchase 
shares even though a share repurchase announcement is not a firm commitment. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Theoretical Models 
This chapter presents two theoretical models related to corporate payout 
policy. The first model, developed in spirit of Isagawa (2000), presents a situation in 
which the managers of high-quality and low-quality firms decide whether to payout 
excess cash in the form of dividends or share repurchases, or, alternatively, to invest 
in a real project from which they can get private benefits. The model aims to 
demonstrate that a share repurchase may be used to signal undervaluation, to time the 
market, or to mitigate agency cost of free cash flows. The second model, developed 
from Fairchild and Zhang’s (2005) work, is a catering model in which the managers 
of high-quality and low-quality firms decide whether to use free cash flows to pay 
dividends or repurchase shares in order to cater to investors’ demand, or to invest in 
a real project from which they can take private benefits. This model shows that the 
manager’s catering motive to pay dividends or repurchase shares can create adverse 
selection problem but, at the same time, can help mitigate overinvestment problem. 
3.1 Signalling/Timing/FCF Model 
3.1.1 Introduction 
I first consider a situation in which the stock price is deviating from its 
fundamental value and the manager is deciding whether to return excess cash to 
investors in the form of dividends or share repurchases. The manager of an 
undervalued firm (firm H) can announce a share repurchase programme to signal the 
market that his firm’s stock price is currently undervalued, whereas the manager of 
an overvalued firm (firm L) may attempt to mimic and thus send a false signal to the 
market. In this model, the manager’s compensation is tied to both short-term and 
long-term firm’s market values, and the manager’s equity stake does increase if he 
decides to repurchase shares. I analyse the model in two versions: (1) the market 
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reacts immediately and strongly to share repurchase announcements; and (2) the 
market underreacts to share repurchase announcements. 
In the first version, the results show that repurchasing shares is firm H’s 
dominant strategy because firm H wants to signal to the market that it is undervalued 
while firm L’s decision depends on the relative magnitudes of a pooling gain (i.e., 
announcing a share repurchase programme) and a capital loss from buying back 
overvalued shares. Consequently, there exist a separating equilibrium in which firm 
H repurchases shares while firm L pays dividends and a pooling equilibrium in which 
both firms repurchase shares. However, firm H cannot obtain any gain from 
repurchasing shares because the stock price increases immediately to its fundamental 
value. 
In the second version, under the assumption that the market underreacts to 
share repurchase announcements, the results indicate that repurchasing shares is a 
dominant strategy for firm H because it can always repurchase shares at a pooling 
price, which is lower than fundamental value, while firm L will not mimic because it 
cannot obtain any short-term benefit from sending a false signal to the market, and 
doing so will decrease its long-term firm value. Thus, there exists a unique separating 
equilibrium in which firm H repurchases shares while firm L pays dividends. 
Subsequently, in spirit of Isagawa (2000), I develop a signalling model in 
which the manager considers whether to payout excess cash in the form of dividends 
or repurchases, or, alternatively, invest it in a new project. Isagawa (2000) develops a 
signalling model in which the manager chooses between open-market share 
repurchases and a real investment from which the manager receives private benefits. 
He then derives a separating equilibrium in which the manager with a high private 
benefit chooses to invest in a new project while the manager with a low private 
benefit chooses to repurchase shares. While Isagawa’s (2000) model provides a key 
insight regarding the overinvestment problem, it appears to be incomplete in that: (1) 
it does not include a cash dividend, which is a primary means of corporate payout; 
(2) it considers only the case in which the managerial compensation is tied only to 
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the firm’s long-term fundamental value; and (3) it does not consider an increase in 
managerial equity stake after shares are repurchased. 
Thus, my model includes both forms of corporate payout, dividends and share 
repurchases. It also considers the case in which the managerial compensation is tied 
to both the short-term firm value immediately after the manager announces his 
investment/payout policy and the long-term firm value after the return from 
investment is realised or the excess cash is returned to investors in the form of 
dividends or share repurchases. In addition, it considers an increase in managerial 
equity stake after shares are repurchased. 
I focus on the case in which the return on investment for firm H is positive 
whereas the return on investment for firm L is negative. That is, firm H has a better 
prospect while firm L has a worse prospect. The model is then analysed in three 
possible cases: (1) the manager assigns equal weight to his short-term and long-term 
payoffs; (2) the manager maximises only his short-term payoff; and (3) the manager 
maximises only his long-term payoff. 
As before, the model in analysed in two versions: (1) the market reacts 
immediately and strongly to share repurchase announcements; and (2) the market 
underreacts to share repurchase announcements. The model demonstrates that, 
regardless of the managerial weight parameter, paying dividends is a dominated 
strategy for firm H. In the first version, there exist three equilibria: (1) a pooling 
equilibrium in which both firms repurchase shares if the private benefit is too low for 
both firms; (2) a separating equilibrium in which firm H invests in a new project 
while firm L repurchases shares if the private benefit is large enough for firm H but 
too low for firm L; and (3) a pooling equilibrium in which both firms invest in the 
new project if the private benefit is sufficiently high for both firms. In the second 
version, there exist two equilibria: (1) a separating equilibrium in which firm H 
invests in a new project while firm L repurchases shares if the private benefit is large 
enough for firm H but too low for firm L; and (2) a pooling equilibrium in which 
both firms invest in the new project if the private benefit is sufficiently high for both 
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firms. Note that, if the market underreacts to share repurchases, I do not obtain a 
pooling equilibrium in which both firms repurchase shares because firm L has no 
incentive to mimic firm H. 
The model further demonstrates that, if the manager’s objective is to 
maximise his short-term payoff, firm L’s manager has a strong incentive to make a 
false signal by announcing a share repurchase programme while firm H’s manager 
will undertake a positive NPV project if the private benefit is large enough but 
repurchase shares if the private benefit is too small (adverse selection problem). 
Thus, I obtain a pooling equilibrium in which both firms repurchase shares and a 
pooling equilibrium in which both firms invest in the new project. Conversely, if the 
manager’s objective is to maximise his long-term payoff, firm H’s manager will 
choose to repurchase (undervalued) shares or invest in a positive NPV project from 
which he can also obtain private benefits, whereas firm L’s manager chooses to 
invest excess cash in an unprofitable project if the private benefit is sufficiently large 
(moral hazard problem) but chooses to repurchase shares if the private benefit is 
small. The model also shows that the higher the long-term managerial weight, the 
lower the private benefits the manager requires for undertaking the new project. 
I further consider the case in which a share repurchase may be used by 
managers to mitigate overinvestment problem. Assuming that both firms have 
negative NPV projects, I derive a separating equilibrium in which firm H repurchases 
shares while firm L invests in the new project when the private benefit from 
investment is too low for both firms. The result that the firm with a low private 
benefit repurchases shares in order to commit not to take a negative NPV project is 
consistent with that in Isagawa (2000). 
3.1.2 The Model: Dividends versus Share Repurchases 
Consider a market consisting of two all-equity firms whose type i ∈{H , L}, 
where H represents a high-quality type and L represents a low-quality type. A high-
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quality firm is characterised by better future prospects than a low quality firm. All 
participants are risk-neutral and the interest rate is zero. 
At date 0, each firm has N shares outstanding, of which the manager has 
NM shares, and the outsiders have NS shares. Hence, N = NM + NS , and the 
N
managerial equity stake is α = M . In addition, each firm i has present values of 
N 
future cash flows Yi , with YH > YL , and there is information asymmetry between 
managers and shareholders regarding these present values of future cash flows. At 
this date, the market cannot observe firm type and thus assigns an equal probability 
to each firm being type H or L . 
At date 1, each firm has excess cash flow X and the manager of each firm 
simultaneously decides between two payout modes. Firstly, he can invest the cash 
flow at zero NPV in the financial market, using the proceeds to pay a dividend X at 
date 2. Secondly, each firm can use the cash flow to repurchase some shares. 
At date 2, types are revealed and payouts occur. 
I consider a signalling game in which I solve for the Bayesian equilibria. 
Hence, I must specify the manager i' s objective function, and the market’s posterior 
beliefs upon observing the managers’ date 1 decision. Under the dividend policy, the 
manager’s equity stake remainsα throughout both dates. The manager’s equity stake 
in the firm does increase, however, if the manager repurchases (and destroys) shares. 
I define a post-repurchase managerial equity stake as β , where β >α . 
The managerial payoff function is defined as 
Π i =αw1Vˆ1 + βw2V2 , (M1) 
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where α represents the managers’ (exogenously given) equity stake in the firm, 
Vˆ1 represents the date 1 market value of the firm (which is determined by the date 1 
signal), and V2 represents the date 2 fundamental value of the firm. Further, w1
represents the weight that the manager assigns to the date 1 value of the firm, and w2 
represents the weight that the manager assigns to the date 2 value of the firm. If 
manager i decides to use cash flow X to repurchase shares (with the repurchased 
shares destroyed), he increases his equity stake to β . 
3.1.2.1 Market Reacts Strongly to Share Repurchase Announcements 
In order to solve the equilibrium, I need to specify the market’s posterior 
beliefs once it observes the payout signals from both firms. In a Bayesian 
equilibrium, the firms’ equilibrium strategies are consistent with these beliefs. 
Rasmusen (2001, pp.54-56) suggests a three-step procedure for checking a Nash 
equilibrium: 
(1) Propose a strategy combination. 
(2) See what beliefs the strategy combination generates when players updates 
their beliefs in responses to each others’ moves. 
(3) Check that, given those beliefs together with the strategies of the other 
player, each player is choosing a best response for himself. 
(i) Market’s Posterior Beliefs 
The market’s posterior beliefs once it observes the manager’s payout policy 
{sH , sL } at date 1 are defined as follows: 
(1) If both firms use identical policy {D, D}or {R, R} , the market cannot 
update its beliefs, and continues to assign equal probability to each firm being high 
or low-quality type. 
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(2) If the market observes {R, D} , it believes that the firms are {H , L} . That 
is, the market believes that the firm announcing a share repurchase programme is 
currently undervalued. 
(ii) The Managerial Payoffs 
Figure 3.1: Dividend and Repurchase Signalling Game

(Market Reacts Strongly to Share Repurchase Announcements)

L 
D R 
H 
D (a), (b) (c), (d) 
(e), (f) (g), (h) R 
The normal-form game for this case can be depicted in figure 3.1 above and the 
corresponding managerial payoffs are shown in following lemma 1. 
Lemma 1: The effects of payout policy on expected managerial payoffs are as 
follows: 
a) Both firms pay dividends 
∏H {D, D}=α

w1 

 
YH + YL + 2X  + w2 (YH + X )

 (a) 
  2   
∏ L {D, D}= α

w1 

 
YH + YL + 2X  + w2 (YL + X )

 (b) 
  2   
b) Firm H pays dividends while firm L repurchases shares

∏ {D, R}= α[w (Y + X )+ w (Y + X )] (c)
H 1 L 2 H 
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H∏ L {D, R}= α

w1 (YH + X ) + w2 


Y + X 
YL 

 (d) 
  YH   
c) Firm H repurchases shares while firm L pays dividends

∏H {R, D}= α[w1 (YH + X )+ w2 (YH + X )]. (e)

∏ML {R, D}= α[w1 (YL + X )+ w2 (YL + X )] (f) 
d) Both firms repurchase shares 
∏ {R, R}= α
 
w 
 YH + YL + 2X 
 
+ w 
 YH + YL + 2X 
 
Y 
 
(g) H 
 
1 
 2  
2 
 YH + YL 

 
H 
 
∏ L {R, R}= α 
 
w1 
 YH + YL + 2X 
 
+ w2 
 YH + YL + 2X 
 
YL 
 
(h) 
  2   YH + YL   
Proof: See Appendix A 
(iii) Equilibrium Analysis 
Having obtained all the managerial payoffs, I can now solve the equilibrium 
strategies of both firms. I first consider the case in which the manager balances his 
short-term and long-term payoffs (w1 = w2 = 1/ 2) . 
Proposition 1: Repurchasing shares is a dominant strategy for firm H. Firm L will 
also choose to repurchase shares if 
 YH −YL 
 > X 
 YH −YL 

 
but choose to pay 
 2   YH + YL  
 Y − Y   Y − Y  
dividends if  H L  < X  
H L 
 . Consequently, there exist a separating  2   YH + YL  
equilibrium in which firm H repurchases shares while firm L pays dividends and a 
pooling equilibrium in which both firms repurchase shares. 
Proof: See Appendix A. 
It is obvious that firm H will always choose to repurchase shares because it receives 
capital gains from buying back undervalued shares. In addition, firm H can signal its 
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type by repurchasing shares if firm L chooses to pay dividends. Firm L’s payout 
 YH − YL  decision depends on the relative magnitudes of a pooling gain	   at date 1 
 2  
  Y −Y  L Hand a capital loss X   at date 2 from buying back overvalued shares. 
  YH + YL  
In separating equilibrium{R, D}, the market value of firm H increases to 
Y + X while the market value of firm L decreases to Y + X at date 1. The market H	 L 
values of both firms at date 2 are the same as those at	 date 1. In pooling 
equilibrium{R, R}, the market values of both firms at date 1 are  YH + YL + 2X  . At 
 2  
 Y + Y + 2X  
date 2, the market value of firm H increases to	  
H L 
YH because firm H 
 YH + YL  
earns a capital gain from buying back undervalued shares at a pooling price at date 1, 
 Y + Y + 2X  
while the market value of firm L decreases to  
H L 
YL as a result of buying 
 YH + YL  
back overvalued shares at a pooling price at date 1. 
Corollary 1: If the manager’s objective is to maximise his short­term 
payoff (w1 = 1, w2 = 0) , there exists a pooling equilibrium in which both firms 
repurchase shares. On the other hand, if the manager’s objective is to maximise his 
long­term payoff (w1 = 0, w2 = 1) , there exists a separating equilibrium in which firm 
H repurchases shares while firm L pays dividends. 
Proof: It follows from proposition 1 that, regardless of the managerial weight 
parameter, firm H’s manager will always choose to repurchase (undervalued) shares. 
To maximise his short-term payoff, firm L’s manager will choose to repurchase 
 YH − YL  shares because he receives a pooling gain   . To maximise his long-term 
 2  
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payoff, however, firm L’s manager will choose to pay dividends rather than 
  Y −Y  L Hrepurchase (overvalued) shares, causing a capital loss X   at date 2. 
  YH + YL  
The effects of equilibrium strategies on firm values are the same as those in 
proposition 1. In pooling equilibrium{R, R}, the market values of both firms at date 1 
 Y + Y + 2X  
are  H L  . At date 2, the market value of firm H increases to 
 2  
 Y + Y + 2X 
 H L Y because firm H earns a capital gain from buying back   H 
 YH + YL  
 Y + Y + 2X  
undervalued shares while the market value of firm L decreases to 
H L YL 
 YH + YL  
as a result of buying back overvalued shares. In separating equilibrium{R, D}, the 
market value of firm H increases to Y + X while the market value of firm LH 
decreases to Y + X at date 1. The market values of both firms at date 2 are the same L 
as those at date 1. 
3.1.2.2 Market Underreacts to Share Repurchase Announcements 
In this section, I present a case in which the market underreacts to share 
repurchase announcements. Specifically, the market does not update its beliefs 
regarding firm types once they observe one firm repurchases shares and the other 
pays dividends. Therefore, the manager of undervalued firm can make use of this 
market underreaction and earn capital gains by buying back outstanding shares at a 
bargain price. That is, the manager announces a share repurchase programme in 
order to time the market. 
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(i) Market’s Posterior Beliefs 
The market’s posterior beliefs once it observes the manager’s payout policy 
{sH , sL } at date 1 are defined as follows: 
(1) If both firms use identical policy {D, D}or {R, R} , the market cannot 
update its beliefs, and continues to assign equal probability to each firm being high 
or low-quality type. 
(2) If the market observes {R, D} or {D, R}, the market does not update its 
beliefs and continues to assign equal probability to each firm being high or low-
quality type. 
(ii) Managerial Payoffs 
Figure 3.2: Dividend and Repurchase Signalling Game 
(Market Underreacts to Share Repurchase Announcements) 
L 
D R 
H 
D (i), (j) (k), (l) 
(m), (n) (o), (p) R 
The normal-form game for this case can be depicted in figure 3.2 above and the 
corresponding managerial payoffs are shown in following lemma 2. 
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Lemma 2: If the market underreacts to share repurchase announcement, the 
expected managerial payoffs are as follows: 
a) Both firms pay dividends 
H L∏H {D, D}=α

w1 

 
Y + Y + 2X 
 + w2 (YH + X )

 (i) 
  2   
∏ L {D, D}= α

w1 

 
YH + YL + 2X  + w2 (YL + X )

 (j) 
  2   
b) Firm H pays dividends while firm L repurchases shares 
∏H {D, R}=α

w1 

 
YH + YL + 2X  + w2 (YH + X )

 (k) 
  2   
∏ L {D, R}= α 
 
w1 
 YH + YL + 2X 
 
+ w2 
 YH + YL + 2X 
 
YL 
 
(l) 
  2   YH + YL   
c) Firm H repurchases share while firm L pays dividends 
∏H {R, D}= α 
 
w1 
 Y + Y 
2 
L + 2X 
 
+ w2 
 YH
Y 
+ Y 
+ Y 
+ 2X 

 
YH 
 
(m) H L 
    H L   
∏ L {R, D}= α

w1 

 
YH + YL + 2X  + w2 (YL + X )

 (n) 
  2   
d) Both firms repurchase shares 
∏ {R, R}= α
 
w 
 YH + YL + 2X 
 
+ w 
 YH + YL + 2X 
 
Y 
 
(o) H 
 
1 
 2  
2 
 YH + YL 

 
H 
 
∏ L {R, R}= α

w1 

 
YH + YL + 2X  + w2 


YH + YL + 2X YL 

 (p) 
  2   YH + YL   
Proof: See Appendix A 
Proposition 2: Repurchasing shares is a dominant strategy for firm H but a 
dominated strategy for firm L. Hence, there exists a unique separating equilibrium in 
which firm H repurchase shares while firm L pays dividends. 
Proof: See Appendix A 
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If the market does not update its beliefs upon observing separating strategy 
{R, D} or {D, R}, firm H’s manager can repurchase shares at the pooling price, which 
is lower than its fundamental price, while firm L’s manager will not repurchase 
shares because he cannot obtain any pooling gain at date 1 and doing so will decrease 
his firm value at date 2. Note that the separating equilibrium in proposition 2 is the 
same as that in corollary 1 when the manager maximises his long-term 
payoff (w1 = 0, w2 = 1) . 
In separating equilibrium{R, D}, the market values of both firms at date 1 are 
 YH + YL + 2X  still the same as those at date 0   because of the market underreaction 
 2  
to share repurchase announcements. At date 2, the market value of firm H increases 
 Y + Y + 2X  
to  H L Y because firm H earns a capital gain from buying back H Y + Y  H L  
 Y −Y  
undervalued shares X  H L  , whereas the market value of firm L decreases to its Y + Y  H L  
true value Y + X .L 
3.1.3 The Model: Dividends, Share Repurchases, and Real 
Investment 
The outline of the model is essentially the same as in section 3.1.2 except that 
the manager can choose to invest the cash flow X in a new project at date 1 and doing 
so gives him a private benefit B > 0 between date 1 and date 2. The sequence of the 
model is summarised again here as follows: 
At date 0, each firm has N shares outstanding, of which the manager has 
NM shares, and the outsiders have NS shares. Hence, N = NM + NS . In addition, 
each firm i has present value of future cash flows Yi , with YH > YL . At this date, the 
market cannot observe firm type, and thus assigns an equal probability to each firm 
being type H or L . 
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At date 1, each firm has excess cash flow X. The manager of each firm 
simultaneously decides payout/investment policies. Firstly, each type can invest cash 
flow X at zero NPV in the financial market, using the proceeds to pay a dividend X 
at date 2. Secondly, each firm can use cash flow X to repurchase some shares. 
Thirdly, each firm can invest cash flow X in a new project. This provides an income 
at date 2 of X (1+ ri ), where rH > 0 and rL < 0 (that is, type H firm has a positive 
NPV project available, while type L firm has a negative NPV project available). I 
take as given that rH + rL = 0; that is, the positive and negative NPV projects exactly 
balance each other, and, on average, the projects have zero NPV. (One will observe 
that this assumption greatly simplifies the analysis). Further, it is assumed that if the 
manager decides to invest in a new project, he will receive a private benefit (B > 0) 
between date 1 and date 2. 
At date 2, types are revealed, the cash flow from the project is realised, and 
payouts occur. 
At date 3, the manager receives private benefits if he decided to invest in the 
new project at date 1. 
The managerial payoff function in (M1) is amended as 
Π i =αw1Vˆ1 + βw2V2 + w3 B , (M2) 
where w1 + w2 + w3 = 1 , B > 0 is the private benefit received at date 3 if the manager 
chooses to invest in the new project and B = 0 if he chooses to pay dividends or 
repurchase shares; w3 is the weight the manager assigns to the date-3 private benefit. 
All the other parameters are the same as those in (M1). 
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3.1.3.1 Market Reacts Strongly to Share Repurchase Announcements 
(i) Market’s Posterior Beliefs 
Recall that, in order to solve the firms’ equilibrium strategies, one needs to 
specify the market’s posterior beliefs and, in Bayesian equilibrium, the equilibrium 
outcomes are consistent with these beliefs. The market’s posterior beliefs once it 
observes the manager’s payout/investment policies {sH , sL } are specified as follows: 
(1) If both firms use identical policy {D, D},{R, R} , or {I , I}, the market 
cannot update its beliefs, and continues to assign equal probability to each firm being 
high or low-quality type. 
(2) If the market observes {R, D}, it believes that the firms are {H , L} . 
(3) If the market observes {R, I} , it believes that the firms are {H , L} . 
(4) If the market observes {D, I} , it believes that the firms are {L, H} . 
(ii) Managerial Payoffs 
The normal-form game for this case can be depicted in figure 3.3 and the 
corresponding managerial payoffs are shown in following lemma 3. 
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Figure 3.3: Payout/Investment Signalling Game

(Market Reacts Strongly to Share Repurchase Announcements) 
(1), (2) (3), (4) (5), (6) 
(7), (8) (9), (10) (11), (12) 
(13), (14) (15), (16) (17), (18) 
RD I 
R 
L 
D 
H 
I 
Lemma 3: The effects of payout/investment policies on expected managerial payoffs 
are as follows: 
a) Both firms pay dividends 
∏H {D, D}=α

w1 

 
YH + YL + 2X  + w2 (YH + X )

 (1) 
  2   
∏ L {D, D}= α
 
w1 
 YH + YL + 2X 
 
+ w2 (YL + X )
 
(2) 
  2   
b) Firm H pays dividends while firm L repurchases shares

∏H {D, R}= α[w1 (YL + X )+ w2 (YH + X )] (3)

∏ L {D, R}= α

w1 (YH + X ) + w2 


YH
Y 
+ X 
YL 

 (4) 
  H   
c) Firm H pays dividends while firm L invests in the new project

∏H {D, I}=α[w1 (YL + X )+ w2 (YH + X )] (5)

∏L {D, I}=α[w1(YH + X (1+ rH ))+ w2 (YL + X (1+ rL ))]+ w3 B (6) 
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d) Firm H repurchases shares while firm L pays dividends 
∏H {R, D}= α[w1 (YH + X )+ w2 (YH + X )]. (7) 
∏L {R, D}=α[w1(YL + X )+ w2 (YL + X )] (8) 
e) Both firms repurchases shares 
∏H {R, R}= α

w1 

 
YH + YL + 2X  + w2 

 
YH + YL + 2X 
YH 

 (9) 
  2   YH + YL   
∏ {R, R}= α
 
w 
 YH + YL + 2X 
 
+ w 

 
YH + YL + 2X Y 
 
(10)L  1 2   L  
  2   YH + YL   
f) Firm H repurchases shares while firm L invests in the new project 
∏H {R, I}=α[w1 (YH + X )+ w2 (YH + X )] (11) 
∏L {R, I}=α[w1(YL + X (1+ rL ))+ w2 (YL + X (1+ rL ))]+ w3 B (12) 
g) Firm H invests in the new project while firm L pays dividends 
∏H {I , D}=α[w1 (YH + X (1+ rH ))+ w2 (YH + X (1+ rH ))]+ w3 B (13) 
∏L {I , D}=α[w1(YL + X )+ w2 (YL + X )] (14) 
h) Firm H invests in the new project while firm L repurchases shares 
∏H {I , R}=α[w1 (YL + X (1+ rL ))+ w2 (YH + X (1+ rH ))]+ w3 B (15) 
H∏L {I , R}=α

w1(YH + X ) + w2 

 
Y + X 
YL 

 (16) 
  YH   
i) Both firms invest in the new project 
∏H {I , I}=α



w1 

 
YH + YL + 2X 

 + w2 (YH + X (1+ rH ))

 + w3 B (17) 
  2   
∏L {I , I}=α 


 
w1
 YH + YL + 2X 



+ w2 (YL + X (1+ rL ))
 
+ w3B (18) 
  2   
Proof: See Appendix A. 
64 
(iii) Equilibrium Analysis 
To make analysis tractable, I assume the following assumption6 
w2 XrH > w1
 YH −YL 
 > w2 X 
 YH −YL 

 
, (a1) 
 2   YH  
where w1 > 0and w2 > 0 . Assumption (a1) ensures that firm H will invest in the new 
project if firm L invests in the new project and that firm L has an incentive to mimic 
if firm H repurchases shares. 
I first consider each firm’s best responses when managers balance weight parameters 
at three dates (w1 = w2 = w3 = 1/ 3). 
Lemma 4: Paying dividends is a dominated strategy for firm H. Firm H’s best 
responses to firm L’s strategies are as follows: 
a) If firm L pays dividends, firm H will choose to invest in the new project. 
b) If firm L repurchases shares, firm H will choose to repurchase shares 
if B <α



 
YH −YL  + X 

 
YH −YL 


 but choose to invest in the new project 
 2   YH + YL  
 YH −YL   YH −YL  if B ≥α   + X   . 
 2  

 YH + YL 

 
c) If firm L invests in the new project, firm H will also invest in the new project. 
Proof: See Appendix A. 
Without this assumption, the permutations significantly increase, thus making analysis much more 
complex. 
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6
It is obvious that firm H’s manager will not choose to pay dividends because he can 
get a capital gain from repurchasing shares at a bargain price or a capital gain from 
undertaking a positive NPV project from which he can also take private benefits. If 
firm L pays dividends or invests in a new project and firm H chooses to separate by 
announcing a share repurchase programme, the stock price of firm H will increase 
immediately to its fundamental value so that firm H will not obtain any gain from 
buying back shares.7 Hence, given assumption (a1), firm H will respond by 
undertaking a new project if firm L pays dividends or invests in a new project as 
shown in lemma 4a) and lemma 4c). 
Lemma 4b) indicates that, given that firm L repurchases shares, firm H will respond 
by taking a positive NPV project rather than repurchase shares if the private benefit 
 YH − YL  exceeds the information asymmetry cost	   and the opportunity cost of not 
 2  
 Y −Y  
repurchasing undervalued shares X  H	 L  .Y + Y  H L  
Lemma 5: Firm L’s best responses to firm H’s strategies are as follows: 
a) If firm H repurchases shares,	 firm L will repurchase shares if 
B <α 


 YH −YL 
 − X 
 YH −YL 

− 2XrL 
 
but invest in the new project 
 2   YH + YL   
if B ≥α



 
YH −YL  − X 

 
YH −YL 
 − 2XrL 

 .

 2   YH + YL  

This is pointed out by Isagawa (2002) that, in an efficient market, it is difficult to explain why a firm 
would choose to repurchase its shares after the stock price goes up in response to a share repurchase 
announcement. 
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7 
b)	 If firm H invests in the new project, firm L will repurchase shares if 
B <α 


 YH −YL 
 − X 
 YH −YL 


− XrL 
 
but invest in the new project 
 2   YH   
if B ≥α 


 YH −YL 
 − X 
 YH −YL 


− Xr 
 
.

 2  

 YH  
L 


Proof: See Appendix A. 
Intuitively, lemma 5a) indicates that, if firm H repurchases shares, firm L will choose 
to undertake an unprofitable project rather than repurchase shares if the private 
benefit nets the capital loss from investment is higher than the pooling gain (if it 
otherwise chooses to repurchase shares) nets the loss from repurchasing overvalued 
shares at a pooling price. 
Lemma 5b) indicates that, if firm H invests in a new project, firm L will choose to 
invest in a negative NPV project rather than repurchase shares if the private benefit 
nets the capital loss from investment is higher than the gain from sending a false 
signal to the market (i.e., announcing a share repurchase programme) nets the capital 
loss from repurchasing overvalued shares at firm H’s stock price. 
Proposition 3: If the manager balances his payoffs (w1 = w2 = w3 = 1/ 3), there exist 
following equilibria: 
a)	 A pooling equilibrium in which both firms repurchase shares if 
B <α 

 
YH −YL  + X 
 YH −YL 


 
and B <α 

 
YH −YL  − X 
 YH −YL 


− 2Xr 
 
. 
 2  

 YH + YL 

  2  

 YH + YL  
L 
 
b)	 A separating equilibrium in which firm H invests in the new project while 
firm L repurchase shares if 
 YH −YL   YH −YL   YH −YL   YH −YL   α  + X   ≤ B <α   − X   − XrL  . 
 2  

 YH + YL 

  2  

 YH   
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c) A pooling equilibrium in which both firms invest in the new project 
if B ≥α 


 YH −YL 
 − X 

 
YH −YL 


 − XrL 
 
.

 2   YH  

Proof: Proof comes directly from lemma 4 and lemma 5. 
In this proposition, I obtain a separating equilibrium in which firm H invests in a new 
project while firm L repurchases shares if (1) the private benefit is large enough for 
firm H to offset both the information asymmetry cost and the (opportunity) cost of 
not buying back undervalued shares; and (2) the private benefit net the capital loss of 
undertaking a negative NPV project is lower than the gain from sending a false 
signal to the market (i.e., announcing a share repurchase programme) net the loss 
from buying back overvalued shares for firm L. 
The effects of separating equilibrium{I , R}on firm values are as follows. At date 1, 
the market value of firm H decreases to YL + X (1+ rL ) while the market value of firm 
L increases to YH + X . At date 2, as all the information is revealed, the market value 
of firm H increases to YH + X (1+ rH ) because of a capital gain from investing in a 
 Y + X  
positive NPV project while the market value of firm L drops to	  
H 
YL as a 
 YH  
result of buying back overvalued shares at firm H’s stock price at date 1. 
Corollary 2: If the manager assigns more weight to short­term 
payoff (e.g., w1 = 0.6, w2 = 0.3, w3 = 0.1) , there exist following equilibria: 
a) A pooling equilibrium in which both firms repurchase shares if 
H L	 H LB < 3α

(YH −YL )+ X 

 
Y −Y 


 and B < 3α

(YH −YL )− X 

 
Y −Y 
 − 2XrL 

 . 
 

 YH + YL 

  

 YH + YL   
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b)	 A separating equilibrium in which firm H invests in the new project while 
firm L repurchase shares if 
H L	 H L3α

(YH −YL )+ X 
 Y −Y 



 
≤ B < 3α

(YH −YL )− X 
 Y −Y 


− XrL 
 
. 
  YH + YL    YH   
c)	 A pooling equilibrium in which both firms invest in the new project 
H Lif B ≥ 3α

(YH −YL )− X 
 Y −Y 


− XrL 
 
.

  YH  

Proof: See Appendix A. 
When the manager places more weight on short-term payoff, I obtain the same 
equilibria as those in the case where the manager balances his payoffs at three dates. 
Note that, for a pooling equilibrium in which both firms invest in the new project to 
be achieved, the manager requires higher private benefits as he places higher weight 
on short-term payoff. The effects of equilibria on firm values are the same as those in 
the case where the manager balances his payoffs. 
Corollary 3: If the manager assigns more weight to long­term 
payoff (e.g., w1 = 0.1, w2 = 0.3, w3 = 0.6) , there exist following equilibria: 
a)	 A pooling equilibrium in which both firms repurchase shares if 
α  YH −YL   YH −YL   B < 
6 


 
2 
 + 3X 

 
YH + YL 
 + 2XrL  and

 

α 


 
YH −YL  − 3X 

 
YH −YL 
 − 4XrL 

 .B < 
6  2  
YH + YL   
b)	 A separating equilibrium in which firm H invests in the new project while 
firm L repurchase shares if 
α  YH −YL   YH −YL   α  YH −YL   YH −YL   
6 


 
2 
 + 3X 

 YH + YL 
 + 2XrL 

 ≤ B < 
6 


 
2 
 − 3X 

 
YH 
 − 3XrL 

 
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c) A pooling equilibrium in which both firms invest in the new project 
α 



 YH −YL 
 − 3X 
 YH −YL 


− 3XrL 
 
.if B ≥ 
6  2   YH   
Proof: See Appendix A. 
When the manager places more weight on long-term payoff, the same equilibria as 
those in the case where the manager balances his payoffs are obtained. Note that, for 
a pooling equilibrium in which both firms invest in the new project to be achieved, 
the manager requires lower private benefits as he places higher weight on long-term 
payoff. The effects of equilibria on firm values are the same as those in the case 
where the manager balances his payoffs. 
3.1.3.2 Market Underreacts to Share Repurchase Announcements 
In this version, I consider the case in which firm H’s manager attempts to 
signal that his firm is currently undervalued by announcing a share repurchase 
programme but investors underreact to share repurchase announcements. That is, 
investors fail to recognise that managers are buying back shares in order to time the 
market. 
(i) Market’s Posterior Beliefs 
The market’s posterior beliefs once it observes the manager’s 
payout/investment policies {sH , sL } at date 1 are the same as in prior section except 
that investors do not update their beliefs once they observe the signal 
{R, D} or {D, R}, but continue to assign equal probability to each firm being high or 
low-quality type. 
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(ii) Managerial Payoffs 
Figure 3.4: Payout/Investment Signalling Game 
(Market Underreacts to Share Repurchase Announcements) 
L 
D R IH 
D 
R 
I 
(19), (20) (21), (22) (23), (24) 
(25), (26) (27), (28) (29), (30) 
(31), (32) (33), (34) (35), (36) 
The normal-form game for this case can be illustrated in figure 3.4 above and the 
corresponding managerial payoffs are shown below. 
a) Both firms pay dividends 
∏H {D, D}=α 
 
w1
 YH + YL + 2X 
 + w2 (YH + X )
 
(19) 
  2   
H L∏ L {D, D}= α
 
w1 
 Y + Y + 2X 

 
+ w2 (YL + X )
 
(20) 
  2   
b) Firm H pays dividends while firm L repurchases shares 
∏H {D, R}=α

w1 

 
YH + YL + 2X  + w2 (YH + X )

 (21) 
  2   
H L H L∏L {D, R}=α

w1( 
Y + Y + 2X 
) + w2 


Y + Y + 2X 


YL 

 (22) 
 2  YH + YL   
c) Firm H pays dividends while firm L invests in the new project 
∏H {D, I}=α[w1 (YL + X )+ w2 (YH + X )] (23) 
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∏L {D, I}=α[w1(YH + X (1+ rH ))+ w2 (YL + X (1+ rL ))]+ w3 B (24) 
d) Firm H repurchase shares while firm L pays dividends 
L L∏H {R, D}=α 

 
w1( 
YH + Y 
2 
+ 2X 
) + w2 


 
YH 
Y 
+ 
H
Y 
+
+ 
YL 
2X 



 
YH 

 
(25) 
∏L {R, D}=α 
 
w1
 YH + YL + 2X 
 + w2 (YL + X )
 
(26) 
  2   
e) Both firms repurchase shares 
∏ {R, R}= α 
 
w 
 Y + Y + 2X 

 
+ w 
 Y + Y + 2X 

 
Y 
 
(27)H L H L
H 1 2   H

  2   YH + YL   
∏ L {R, R}= α

w1 
 YH + YL + 2X 
 
+ w2 


YH + YL + 2X YL 

 (28) 
  2   YH + YL   
f) Firm H repurchases shares while firm L invests in the new project 
∏H {R, I}=α[w1 (YH + X )+ w2 (YH + X )] (29) 
∏L {R, I}=α[w1(YL + X (1+ rL ))+ w2 (YL + X (1+ rL ))]+ w3 B (30) 
g) Firm H invests in the new project while firm L pays dividends 
∏H {I , D}=α[w1 (YH + X (1+ rH ))+ w2 (YH + X (1+ rH ))]+ w3 B (31) 
∏L {I , D}=α[w1(YL + X )+ w2 (YL + X )] (32) 
h) Firm H invests in the new project while firm L repurchases shares 
∏H {I , R}=α[w1 (YL + X (1+ rL ))+ w2 (YH + X (1+ rH ))]+ w3 B (33) 
H∏L {I , R}=α 
 
w1(YH + X ) + w2 
 Y + X 

 
YL 
 
(34) 
  YH   
i) Both firms invest in the new project 
H L∏H {I , I}=α 

w1
 Y + Y + 2X 




+ w2 (YH + X (1+ rH ))
 
+ w3 B (35) 
  2   
H L∏L {I , I}=α 


 
w1
 Y + Y + 2X 




+ w2 (YL + X (1+ rL ))
 
+ w3B (36) 
  2   
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(iii) Equilibrium Analysis 
Lemma 6: Paying dividends is a dominated strategy for firm H. Firm H’s best 
responses to firm L’s strategies are as follows: 
a) If firm L pays dividends, firm H will choose to invest in the new project. 
b) If firm L repurchases shares, firm H will choose to repurchase shares 
H L 
H 



−Y Y




 



 


YH 

− 

YLB < +
if
 but choose to invest in the new project
X
 

+
2
 Y
 YL 



Y 
X H 
 −
+ 


 


B H L 
H 
c) If firm L invests in the new project, firm H will choose to invest in the new 



project. 
−Y Y


Proof: See Appendix A. 
≥ 
Note that lemma 6 is the same as lemma 4. That is, firm H’ best responses to firm L’s 
strategies under the case of inefficient market are not different from those under the 
case of efficient market. 
Lemma 7: Firm L’s best responses to firm H’s strategies are as follows: 
(a) If firm H repurchases shares, firm L will choose to pay dividends 
YLif
 


.

+
2
 Y
 YL 


if

if

<
≥
B

B

YH 
YH 
−

2

− 
2 
YL 
YL 
−
2
XrL but choose to invest in the new project





−
2
XrL 


.






α






α















α








α
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(b) If firm H invests in the new project, firm L will choose to repurchase shares 
if B <α



 
YH −YL  − X 


YH −YL  − XrL 

 but choose to invest in the new 
 2   YH   
 YH −YL   YH −YL   project if B ≥α   − X   − XrL  .

 2  

 YH  

Proof: See Appendix A. 
Lemma 7a) demonstrates that, given that firm H repurchases shares, firm L will not 
mimic because the market underreacts to share repurchase announcements. Its better 
choice is either to invest cash flow in financial market at zero NPV at date 1 and pay 
dividends at date 2 or to invest cash flow in the new project if the private benefit net 
the capital loss from investment is higher than the benefit from announcing a 
dividend payment.8 Note that lemma 7b) is the same as lemma 5b). 
Proposition 4: If the manager balances his payoffs (w1 = w2 = w3 = 1/ 3), there exist 
following equilibria: 
a)	 A separating equilibrium in which firm H invests in the new project while 
firm L repurchases shares 
 YH −YL   YH −YL   YH −YL   YH −YL   if α  + X   ≤ B <α   − X   − XrL  . 
 2   YH + YL   2   YH   
b)	 A pooling equilibrium in which both firms invest in the new project 
if B ≥α





 
YH 
2 
−YL 


 − X 


 
YH
Y 
− 
H
YL 


 − XrL 


 . 
Proof: Proof comes directly from lemma 6 and lemma 7. 
Recall that the market does not update its beliefs regarding firm types once it observes one firm pays 
dividends while the other repurchases shares under the case of inefficient market. 
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If the market underreacts to share repurchase announcements, firm L has no incentive 
to make a false signal because it cannot receive any benefit from doing so. Note that 
proposition 4a) is the same as proposition 3b) and proposition 4b) is the same as 
proposition 3c). However, in inefficient market, I do not obtain a pooling equilibrium 
in which both firms repurchase shares as in proposition 3a). 
In separating equilibrium{I , R}, the market value of firm H decreases to 
YL + X (1+ rL ) while the market value of firm L increases to YH + X at date 1. At 
date 2, the market value of firm H increases to YH + X (1+ rH ) because of a capital 
gain from investing in a positive NPV project while the market value of firm L drops 
 Y + X  
to  
H 
YL as a result of buying back overvalued shares at firm H’s stock price 
 YH  
at date 1. In pooling equilibrium{I , I}, the market values of both firms at date 1 
 YH + YL + 2X  are   . At date 2, the market value of firm H increases to 
 2  
YH + X (1+ rH ) while the market value of firm L decreases to YL + X (1+ rL ) . 
Corollary 4: If the manager assigns more weight to short­term 
payoff (e.g., w1 = 0.6, w2 = 0.3, w3 = 0.1) , there exists a pooling equilibrium in which 
H Lboth firms invest in the new project if B ≥ 3α

(YH −YL )− X 


Y −Y 
 − XrL 

 . 
  YH   
Proof: See Appendix A. 
If the managers focuses on taking short-term benefits but the market underreacts to 
share repurchases, firm H will not obtain any positive market reaction by 
repurchasing shares while firm L will not choose to repurchase shares because it 
receives no benefit from sending a false signal to the market. Thus, I obtain a pooling 
equilibrium in which both firms choose to invest in a new project if the private 
benefit is sufficiently high. Note that, for this pooling equilibrium {I , I} to be 
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achieved, the manager requires higher private benefits as he places more weight on 
short-term payoff. In pooling equilibrium{I , I}, the market values of both firms at 
 YH	 + YL + 2X  date 1 are   . At date 2, the market value of firm H increases to 
 2  
YH + X (1+ rH ) while the market value of firm L decreases to YL + X (1+ rL ) . 
Corollary 5: If the manager assigns more weight to long­­term 
payoff (e.g., w1 = 0.1, w2 = 0.3, w3 = 0.6) , there exist following equilibria: 
a)	 A separating equilibrium in which firm H invests in the new project while 
firm L repurchases shares if 
α  YH −YL   YH −YL   α  YH −YL   YH −YL   
6 


 
2 
 + 3X 

 YH + YL 
 + 2XrL  ≤ B < 6 


 
2 
 − 3X 

 
YH 
 − 3XrL  
    
b) A pooling equilibrium in which both firms invest in the new project 
α 


 
YH −YL  − 3X 

 
YH −YL 
 − 3XrL 

 .if B ≥

6  2   YH  

Proof: See Appendix A. 
When the manager places more weight on long-term payoff, I obtain the same 
equilibria as in the case where the manager balances his payoffs. Note that, for a 
pooling equilibrium in which both firms invest in the new project to be achieved, the 
manager requires lower private benefits as he places more weight on long-term 
payoff. The effects of equilibria on firm values are the same as those in the case 
where the manager balances his payoffs. 
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3.1.4 Share Repurchase is used to Mitigate Overinvestment Problem 
In this section, I consider the case in which a share repurchase may be used to 
mitigate the agency cost of free cash flows as in Isagawa (2000). Accordingly, it is 
assumed that the returns from investment are negative for both firms and that firm H 
has a more negative NPV project than firm L (i.e., rH < rL < 0). 
To make analysis tractable, I make the following assumption 
−αXrL < w3B < −αXrH , (a2) 
where w3 > 0 . Assumption (a2) indicates that the private benefit cannot offset the 
loss from investment for firm H but can offset the loss from investment for firm L. 
Re-analysing the managerial payoffs in lemma 3, I derive the following outcomes. 
Lemma 8: Paying dividends is a dominated strategy for firm H. Firm H’s best 
responses to firm L’s strategies are as follows: 
a) If firm L pays dividends, firm H will choose to repurchase shares.

b) If firm L repurchases shares, firm H will choose to invest in the new project

if B ≥α



 
YH −YL  + X 


YH −YL  − XrH − XrL 

 , but choose to repurchase 
 2   YH + YL   
shares if B <α



 
YH −YL  + X 


YH −YL  − XrH − XrL 

 . 
 2   YH + YL   
c) If firm L invests in the new project, firm H will invest in the new project if 
B ≥α 


 YH −YL 
 − XrH 
 
but repurchase shares if B <α 


 YH −YL 
 − XrH 
 
. 
 2    2   
Proof: See Appendix A. 
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Lemma 8a) show that, given that firm L pays dividends, firm H will choose to 
repurchase shares rather than invest in the new project because the private benefit 
cannot offset the loss from undertaking a negative NPV project (assumption (a3)). 
Lemma 8b) indicates that, given that firm L repurchases shares, firm H will choose to 
invest in a NPV project (moral hazard problem) rather than repurchase shares if the 
private benefit exceeds the information asymmetry cost 

 
YH −YL  − XrL 
 
at date 1 
 2   
and the opportunity cost of not repurchasing undervalued shares and the loss from 
  Y −Y   Lproject investment 
 
X 
 YH
H 
+ YL 


− XrH 
 
at date 2. 
lemma 8c) show that, given that firm L invests in the new project, firm H will choose 
to repurchase shares rather than invest in the new project if the private benefit net the 
loss from undertaking a negative NPV project is lower than the gain from 
announcing a share repurchase programme. 
Lemma 9: Firm L’s best responses to firm H’s strategies are as follows: 
a) If firm H repurchases shares, firm L will choose to invest in the new project 
if B ≥α




 YH 
2 
−YL 


 − X 



 
Y
YH
H 
+
−Y
Y
L
L 


 − 2XrL 

 , but choose to repurchase shares 
  
if B <α 


 YH −YL 
 − X 
 YH −YL 


− 2XrL 
 
. 
 2   YH + YL   
b) If firm H invests in the new project, firm L will invest in the new project if 
B ≥α


 YH −YL 
 − X 


YH −YL 

 − XrL 

 but choose to repurchase shares 
 2   YH   
if B <α



 
YH −YL  − X 


YH −YL  − XrL 

 .

 2   YH  

Proof: See Appendix A. 
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Proposition 5: If the manager balances his payoffs (w1 = w2 = w3 = 1/ 3), there exist 
following equilibria: 
a) A pooling equilibrium in which both firms repurchase shares if 
B <α



 
YH −YL  − X 


YH −YL  − 2XrL 

 
 2   YH + YL   
b) A separating equilibrium in which firm H repurchases shares while firm L 
invests in the new project if 
 Y −Y   Y −Y    Y −Y  α  H L  − X  
H L 
 − 2XrL  ≤ B <α  
H L  − XrH 
 2   YH + YL    2   
c) A pooling equilibrium in which both firms invest in the new project if 
B ≥α 


 YH −YL 
 − XrH 


 2  

Proof: Proof comes directly from lemma 8 and lemma 9. 
Note that, in proposition 5, there is a separating equilibrium in which firm H chooses 
to repurchase shares while firm L invests in the new project. The result that an 
undervalued firm repurchases shares in order to commit not to take a negative NPV 
project (i.e., a share repurchase helps mitigate agency cost of free cash flows) is 
consistent with Isagawa (2000). In this separating equilibrium{R, I}, the market 
value of firm H increases to its fundamental value Y + X while the market value of H 
firm L decreases to YL + X (1+ rL ) at date 1, and, the market values of both firms at 
date 2 are the same as those at date 1. 
Corollary 6: If the manager assigns more weight to short­term 
payoff (e.g., w1 = 0.6, w2 = 0.3, w3 = 0.1) , there exist following equilibria: 
a) A pooling equilibrium in which both firms repurchase shares if 
H LB < 3α

(YH −YL )− X 
 Y −Y 


− XrL 


  YH  
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b) A pooling equilibrium in which both firms invest in the new project if 
H LB ≥ 3α

(YH −YL )− X 


Y −Y 
 − 2XrL 



  YH + YL  

Proof: See Appendix A. 
When the manager focuses on taking short-term benefits, both firms will announce a 
share repurchase programme in order to increase their short-term stock prices. Thus, 
there exists a pooling equilibrium in which both firms repurchase shares. However, if 
the private benefit is sufficiently high, both firms will undertake negative NPV 
projects. For a pooling equilibrium in which both firms invest in the new project to 
be achieved, the manager requires higher private benefits as he places more weight 
on short-term payoff. 
In pooling equilibrium{R, R}, the market values of both firms at date 1 
 Y + Y + 2X  
are  H L  . At date 2, the market value of firm H increases to 
 2  
 Y + Y + 2X   Y + Y + 2X 
 H L Y while the market value of firm L decreases to  H L Y .  H   L 
 YH + YL   YH + YL  
In pooling equilibrium{I , I}, the market values of both firms at date 1 
 YH + YL + 2X  are   . At date 2, the market value of firm H decreases to 
 2  
YH + X (1+ rH ) while the market value of firm L decreases to YL + X (1+ rL ) . 
Corollary 7: If the manager assigns more weight to long­term 
payoff (e.g., w1 = 0.1, w2 = 0.3, w3 = 0.6) , there exist following equilibria: 
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a) A pooling equilibrium in which both firms repurchase shares if 
α  YH −YL   YH −YL   B <   + 3X   − 2XrH  and 6  2   YH + YL   
α  YH −YL   YH −YL   B < 
6 


 
2 
 − 3X 

 
YH + YL 
 − 4XrL 

 
b)	 A separating equilibrium in which firm H invests in the new project while 
firm L repurchases shares if 
α 


 
YH −YL  + 3X 

 
YH −YL 
 − 2XrH 

 ≤ B < 
α 


 
YH −YL  − 3X 


YH −YL  − 3XrL 

 
6  2   YH + YL   6  2   YH   
c) A separating equilibrium in which firm H repurchases shares while firm L 
α 


 
YH −YL  − 3X 

 
YH −YL  − 4XrL 

invests in the new project if B ≥ 
6  2  
YH + YL   
Proof: See Appendix A. 
Both firms will not choose to invest in negative NPV projects unless the private 
benefit exceeds the benefit from announcing a share repurchase programme and the 
loss from investment. There is no pooling equilibrium in which both firms invest in 
the new project under this case. The manager requires lower private benefits for 
undertaking the new project as he places higher weight on the long-term payoff. 
In pooling equilibrium{R, R}, the market values of both firms at date 1 
 YH + YL + 2X  are   . At date 2, the market value of firm H increases to 
 2  
 Y	 + Y + 2X   Y + Y + 2X 
 H L Y while the market value of firm L decreases to  H L Y .  H	   L 
 YH + YL   YH + YL  
In separating equilibrium{I , R}, the market value of firm H decreases 
to YL + X (1+ rL ) while the market value of firm L increases to YH + X at date 1. At 
date 2, the market value of firm H decreases to YH + X (1+ rH ) while the market 
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 Y + X  
value of firm L drops to  
H 
YL as a result of buying back overvalued shares. 
 YH  
In separating equilibrium{R, I}, the market value of firm H increases to its 
fundamental value Y + X while the market value of firm L decreases to H 
YL + X (1+ rL ) at date 1, and the market values of both firms at date 2 are the same as 
those at date 1. 
3.1.5 Summary of Equilibrium Strategies 
The equilibrium strategies, the effects on firm value, and the intuitions behind the 
results of this model are summarised in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1 Summary of Equilibrium Strategies (Model 1)

Equilibrium 
Effects on Firm 
Value (H, L) Intuition 
01 VV − 12 VV − 
Case 1. Dividend vs. Repurchase (efficient market) 
• 1/ 221 == ww {R, D} 
{R, R} 
( + , - ) 
( 0 , 0 ) 
( 0 , 0 ) 
( + , - ) 
Firm H wants to signal its type while firm L weighs the pooling 
gain at date 1 and the loss from buying back overvalued shares at 
date 2. In efficient market, firm H cannot obtain any gains from 
buying back shares because stock price increases immediately to 
fundamental value. 
• 01, 21 == ww {R, R} ( 0 , 0 ) ( + , - ) Firm H wants to signal its true value but firm L mimics to obtain 
pooling benefit. Firm H can repurchase undervalued shares while 
firm L experiences a loss from buying back overvalued shares. 
• 10, 21 == ww {R, D} ( + , - ) ( 0 , 0 ) Firm H can repurchase undervalued shares to increase long-term 
firm value. Firm L does not mimic since it has overvalued shares. 
Case 2. Dividend vs. Repurchase (market underreaction to share repurchases) 
• 1/ 221 == ww {R, D} ( 0 , 0 ) ( + , - ) Firm H can repurchase undervalued shares because of market 
underreaction to share repurchase announcements while firm L 
receives no benefit from mimicking. 
• 01, 21 == ww {D, D} 
{D, R} 
{R, D} 
{R, R} 
( 0 , 0 ) 
( 0 , 0 ) 
( 0 , 0 ) 
( 0 , 0 ) 
( + , - ) 
( + , - ) 
( + , - ) 
( + , - ) 
There exist multiple equilibria since the market does not update 
its beliefs at date 1 once observing {R, D} or {D, R}. 
• 10, 21 == ww {R, D} ( 0 , 0 ) ( + , - ) Firm H can repurchase undervalued shares because of market 
underreaction to share repurchase announcements while firm L 
does not want to repurchase overvalued shares. 
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Table 3.1 Summary of Equilibrium Strategies (Model 1) (Continued)

Equilibrium 
Effects on Firm 
Value (H, L) Intuition 
01 VV − 12 VV − 
Case 3. Dividend/Repurchase/Investment (efficient market) 
• 1/ 3321 === www {R, R} 
{I, R} 
{I, I} 
( 0 , 0 ) 
( - , + ) 
( 0 , 0 ) 
( + , - ) 
( + , - ) 
( + , - ) 
Firm H invests in the new project if the private benefit is higher 
than the cost of information asymmetry and the gain from 
repurchasing shares while firm L repurchases shares if the private 
benefit is lower than the gain from sending a false signal and the 
loss from repurchasing shares. 
• 0.10.3,0.6, 321 === www {R, R} 
{I, R} 
{I, I} 
( 0 , 0 ) 
( - , + ) 
( 0 , 0 ) 
( + , - ) 
( + , - ) 
( + , - ) 
Both firms are more likely to repurchase shares. The manager 
requires higher private benefit in order to invest in the new 
project as he places higher weight on short-term payoff. 
• 0.60.3,0.1, 321 === www {R, R} 
{I, R} 
{I, I} 
( 0 , 0 ) 
( - , + ) 
( 0 , 0 ) 
( + , - ) 
( + , - ) 
( + , - ) 
Both firms are more likely to invest in the new projects. The 
manager requires lower private benefit in order to invest in the 
new project as he places higher weight on long-term payoff. 
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Table 3.1 Summary of Equilibrium Strategies (Model 1) (Continued)

Equilibrium 
Effects on Firm 
Value (H, L) Intuition 
01 VV − 12 VV − 
Case 4. Dividend/Repurchase/Investment (market underreaction to share repurchases) 
• 1/ 3321 === www {I, R} 
{I, I} 
( - , + ) 
( 0 , 0 ) 
( + , - ) 
( + , - ) 
Firm H chooses to invest in a positive NPV project while firm L 
repurchases shares if private benefit is lower than the gain from 
sending a false signal and the loss from repurchasing shares but 
invests in the new project otherwise. 
• 0.10.3,0.6, 321 === www {I, I} ( 0 , 0 ) ( + , - ) If the market underreacts to share repurchase announcements, 
firm L cannot get any benefit from sending false signal to the 
market. Thus, there is no pooling equilibrium in which both firms 
repurchase shares. To invest in the new project, the manager 
requires higher private benefit as he places higher weight on 
short-term payoff. 
• 0.60.3,0.1, 321 === www {I, R} 
{I, I} 
( - , + ) 
( 0 , 0 ) 
(+ , - ) 
( + , - ) 
Firm H chooses to invest in a positive NPV project while firm L 
repurchases shares if private benefit is lower than the gain from 
sending a false signal and the loss from repurchasing shares. To 
invest in the new project, the manager requires lower private 
benefit as he places higher weight on long-term payoff. 
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Table 3.1 Summary of Equilibrium Strategies (Model 1) (Continued)

Equilibrium 
Effects on Firm 
Value (H, L) Intuition 
01 VV − 12 VV − 
Case 5. Dividend/Repurchase/Investment ( Hr < 0)< Lr 
• 1/ 3321 === www {R, R} 
{R, I} 
{I, I} 
( 0 , 0 ) 
( + , - ) 
( 0 , 0 ) 
( + , - ) 
( 0 , 0 ) 
( - , - ) 
Firm H commits not to take a negative NPV project if the private 
benefit is low (i.e., a share repurchase mitigates overinvestment 
problem) but invests in a negative NPV project if the private 
benefit is high (moral hazard problem). Firm L chooses to invest 
in a new project to take private benefit. 
• 0.10.3,0.6, 321 === www {R, R} 
{I, I} 
( 0 , 0 ) 
( 0 , 0 ) 
( + , - ) 
( - , - ) 
Myopic managers want to announce a share repurchase 
programme to increase their short-term firm values. However, 
they choose to invest in negative NPV projects if the private 
benefit is high enough. To invest in the new project, the manager 
requires higher private benefit as he places higher weight on 
short-term payoff. 
• 0.60.3,0.1, 321 === www {R, R} 
{I, R} 
{R, I} 
( 0 , 0 ) 
( - , + ) 
( + , - ) 
(+ , -) 
( + , - ) 
( 0 , 0 ) 
Both firms choose not to invest in negative NPV projects unless 
the private benefit is sufficiently high. To invest in the new 
project, the manager requires lower private benefit as he places 
higher weight on long-term payoff. 
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3.2 Catering Model 
In this section, I develop a catering model in which two types of firms, a 
high-quality type and a low-quality type, decide to use free cash flows to pay 
dividends or repurchase shares in order to cater to investors’ demand, or 
alternatively, invest in the new project. It is assumed that the investors place 
premium for firms paying dividends or repurchasing shares, and react immediately to 
a dividend announcement but slowly to a share repurchase announcement. The 
model demonstrates that the firm’s payout/investment decision depends on: (1) the 
gain/loss from investment; (2) the manager’s time horizon; (3) the relative 
magnitudes of dividend and repurchasing premia; and (4) the degree of information 
asymmetry. Both adverse selection and moral hazard problems are addressed in this 
model. Specifically, I demonstrate that the high-quality firm’s manager may pass up 
a positive NPV project in order to cater to investors’ strong demand for dividends or 
share repurchases (an adverse selection problem). Thus, paying dividends or 
repurchasing shares is inefficient for the high-quality firm. On the other hand, the 
low-quality firm’s manager has a strong incentive to return free cash flows to 
shareholders if the catering premia are higher than the private benefits from investing 
in a negative NPV project. Therefore, the moral hazard problem is alleviated under 
this case. 
3.2.1 Introduction 
In a frictionless market, Miller and Modigliani’s (1961) dividend irrelevance 
theorem indicate that the value of the firm is independent of the firm’s payout policy, 
implying that dividends and share repurchases are perfect substitutes. In practice, 
however, the choices of payouts differently affect the firm’s market value. For 
instance, in February 2006, UBS announced that its net profit in the fourth-quarter of 
2005 more than tripled and it would increase its payout to shareholders to 3.80 francs 
a share from 3.00 francs a share in 2004 and buy back as much as an additional five 
billion francs of shares after a buy back valued at 3.6 billion francs. However, UBS 
shares fell 1.50 francs, or 1.1%, after the announcement. Analysts reasoned that 
87 
“investors were disappointed that UBS hadn’t increased its dividends even further.” 
(Wall Street Journal, February 15, 2006). 
As demonstrated by the above article, the payout policy is not irrelevant. In 
the case of UBS, its shareholders appear to exhibit high demand for dividends. 
Considering the investor demand for dividends as a key determinant for corporate 
payout policy, Baker and Wurgler (2004a, b) propose a catering theory of dividends, 
stating that manager’s decision to pay dividends is driven by the premium investors 
place on dividend paying firms. That is, managers cater to investors by paying 
dividends when investors put a premium on dividend payers, and by not paying 
dividends when investors prefer non dividend payers. They develop a model in 
which the manager trades off between a short-run stock price affected by investors’ 
demand for dividends and a long-run fundamental value determined by investment 
policy. The model predicts that the propensity to pay dividends is increasing in the 
dividend premium, the difference between the current stock prices of payers and 
nonpayers, and decreasing in the fundamental cost of dividends (e.g., costly external 
finance or taxes). 
Fairchild and Zhang (2005) further develop Baker and Wurgler’s (2004a, b) 
model, incorporating the repurchasing premium placed by investors as an important 
factor the managers consider in issuing their payout policy. Their model 
demonstrates that the firm’s incentives to cater through dividends or repurchases, or 
to retain cash flows to invest in a positive NPV project depends on the manager’s 
time horizon and the relative magnitudes of dividend and repurchasing premia. 
I extend Fairchild and Zhang’s (2005) work by developing a model in which 
the managers of two firm types, a high-quality firm and a low-quality firm, are using 
the free cash flows to pay dividends, repurchase shares, or invest in the new project. I 
focus on the case in which the high-quality type has a positive NPV project while the 
low-quality type has a negative NPV project (that is, the high-quality type has a 
better prospect while the low-quality type has a worse prospect). 
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Observing the management signals, investors update their beliefs regarding 
the firm types as well as the firm future profitability. However, the investors are 
irrational in that they do not update their beliefs when observing one firm pays 
dividends and the other repurchases shares. Moreover, they react strongly and 
immediately to dividend announcements but with time lag to share repurchase 
announcements. 
I first analyse the case in which the managers receive no private benefit from 
investment. Thus, it is obvious to notice that in equilibrium the low-quality firm 
chooses not to invest in an unprofitable project. The low-quality firm’s decision 
depends on the relative magnitudes of dividend premium and repurchase premium. 
For the high-quality firm, it weighs the gain from investment, the loss from 
separation (because of the market’s mistaken belief that it is the low-quality type if it 
decides to invest), and the relative sizes of dividend and repurchasing premium. Note 
that, the firm’s payout choice in this model is largely affected by the manager’s 
catering motive rather than by the manager’s signalling or timing motive as in the 
previous model. 
Then, I analyse the case in which the managers receive private benefit from 
investment. I demonstrate that, if the catering premia are sufficiently high and the 
private benefits are too low, the high-quality firm may pass up a positive NPV 
project in order to cater to investors’ demand for dividends or share repurchases (an 
adverse selection problem) while the low-quality firm may return free cash flows to 
shareholders (the agency cost of free cash flows is mitigated). 
3.2.2 The Model 
I develop Fairchild and Zhang’s (2005) model as follows. 
Consider a three-period economy consisting of two all-equity firms whose 
types i = {H , L}, where H denotes a high-quality type and L denotes a low-quality 
type. The interest rate is zero and all participants are risk-neutral in this economy. 
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Date 0: Each firm i has a one-period project in place, which will generate a cash 
flow of I for certainty at date 1, and also a three-period project, which may succeed 
or fail with equal probability. If it succeeds, it will generate a date-3 cash flow 
of Z H ; if it fails, it will generate a date-3 cash flow of Z L , 
Z H + Z L 
where Z H > Z L and = Z . The market cannot observe the firm types, and it 
2 
assigns equal probability to each firm being H or L. Hence, the market values of both 
firms at this date are the same: V = V = I + Z .0H 0L 
Date 1: A new project becomes available. This project requires an investment I . 
That is, the manager must use all cash flow from the one-period project to finance 
this new project. This new project will provide a date-2 cash flow X H for firm H and 
X L for firm L, where X H > I > X L . That is, firm H has a positive NPV project 
available whereas firm L has a negative NPV project available for investment. It is 
assumed that there is information asymmetry between the managers and the investors 
regarding the availability of this project. Specifically, the investors do not expect the 
firms to reinvest the cash flow I in any real project, but to invest it in financial 
securities, providing zero NPV. 
Rather than invest in the new project, the managers can pay dividends or 
repurchase shares. Following Baker and Wurgler (2004a, b), I assume that investors 
place a premium on dividend paying firms. In addition, as in Fairchild and Zhang 
(2005), investors also place a premium on repurchasing firms. Moreover, I assume 
that the investors react immediately to dividend announcements but respond with 
time lag to share repurchase announcements.9 That is, there is no catering premium at 
9 Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) report that the market underreacts to open market 
share repurchases, with the average abnormal four-year buy-and-hold return of 12% after initial 
announcements. The market underreaction to open market share repurchases can be considered in the 
framework of behavioural finance. For example, market over- and under-reaction to corporate news 
features in the investor-sentiment model of Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998), and the investor-
psychological-bias model of Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998). 
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date 1 if the manager decides to repurchase shares ( λ1 
R = 0 ).Further, the repurchasing 
premium at date 2 is assumed to be higher than the dividend premium at date 1 
( λR 2 > λ1 
D ). 
The manager makes his date-1 reinvestment/payout decision to maximise his 
payoff Mi , which is specified as 
Mi = w1V1 + w2V2 + w3B , (1) 
where V1 and V2 are the expected market values of the firm at date 1 and date 2 
respectively; w1, w2 , w3 represent the managerial weight parameter at date 1, date 2, 
and date 3 respectively; and B > 0 is the private benefits from investment received at 
date 3 if the manager decides to invest at date 1. 
3.2.3 Market’s Posterior Beliefs 
I specify the market’s posterior beliefs as it observes the firms’ strategy 
combination (sH , sL ) , where si = {D, R, I}, as follows: 
a) Observing both firms playing identical strategies (I , I ) , (D, D) or (R, R), the 
market cannot distinguish the firm types and continues to assign equal 
probability to each firm being type H or L. 
b) Observing (R, D) , the market distinguishes firm types as (H , L) . 
c) Observing one firm invests in the new project while the other firm pays 
dividends or repurchases shares, the market believes that the firm investing in 
the new project is type L and the other firm is type H. 
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Date 2: If the managers invested in the new project at date 1, the cash flow is now 
realised. If the manager did not invest at date 1 but instead repurchased shares, the 
firm value increases to V2 = V1 + λ2 
R , where λ2
R represents the date-2 repurchasing 
premium. If the manager paid dividends at date 1, the firm value stays unchanged. 
Note that, there is no dividend premium at date 2 because the investors already 
placed the entire dividend premium at date 1. 
Date 3: The manager receives private benefit from investment if he decided to invest 
at date 1. 
3.2.4 Managerial Payoffs 
In this catering game, each firm has three policy decisions: invest in the new 
project, pay dividends, or repurchase shares, denoted by si = {I , D, R} respectively. 
Therefore, there are nine strategy combinations (sH , sL ) to be analysed as follows. 
i) Both firms invest in the new project 
At date 1, the market observes (I , I ) and cannot separate the firm types. Hence, the 
market values of both firms at date 1 are still the same as those at date 0. 
V = V = I + Z .1H 1L 
At date 2, the cash flow from the date-1 investment is realised. The market continues 
to believe that the date-3 project will succeed or fail with equal probability. Hence, 
the market values of both firms are 
V2H = Z + X
H . 
V2L = Z + X
L . 
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Substituting firm market values at date 1 and date 2 into equation (1) yields 
HMH (I , I ) = w1 (I + Z )+ w2 (Z + X )+ w3B (2) 
LM L (I , I ) = w1 (I + Z )+ w2 (Z + X )+ w3B (3) 
ii) Both firms pay dividends 
At date 1, the market observes (D, D)and cannot separate the firm types. However, 
the investors place the catering premium, λ1
D 
, to the firms paying dividends. Hence, 
the market values of both firms are 
V = V = I + Z + λD 1H 1L 
At date 2, the market continues to believe that the date-3 project will succeed or fail 
with equal probability. Hence, the market values of both firms are 
V = V = I + Z + λD 2H 2L 
Substituting firm market values at date 1 and date 2 in equation (1) yields 
DMH (D, D) = w1 (I + Z + λ )+ w2 (I + Z + λD ) (4) 
DML (D, D) = w1 (I + Z + λ )+ w2 (I + Z + λD ) (5) 
iii) Both firms repurchase shares 
Observing (R, R), the market cannot distinguish the firm types. However, it reacts to 
the share repurchase announcement with time lag. Therefore, the market values of 
both firms at date 1 are still the same as those at date 0. 
V1H = V1L = I + Z . 
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At date 2, the market does not update its belief regarding the probability of success 
of the date-3 project. However, it places the catering premium for repurchasing 
firms. Thus, the market values of both firms are 
V = V = I + Z + λR 2H 2L 
Substituting firm market values at date 1 and date 2 in equation (1) yields 
MH (R, R) = w1 (I + Z )+ w2 (I + Z + λR ) (6) 
ML (R, R) = w1 (I + Z )+ w2 (I + Z +λR ) (7) 
iv) Firm H invests in the new project while firm L pays dividends 
The investors observe (I , D)and distinguish the firm types as (L, H ) . Therefore, the 
market values of both firms at date 1 are 
V = I + Z L 1H 
V = I + Z H + λD 1L 
At date 2, the cash flow from the date-1 project is realised for high-quality type. The 
market values of both firms are 
V = Z L + X H 2H 
V = I + Z H + λD 2L 
Substituting firm market values at date 1 and date 2 in equation (1) yields 
L L HMH (I , D) = w1 (I + Z )+ w2 (Z + X )+ w3B (8) 
ML (I , D) = w1 (I + Z H + λD )+ w2 (I + Z H + λD ) (9) 
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v) Firm H invests in the new project while firm L repurchase shares 
The investors observe (I , R)and distinguish the firm types as (L, H ) . Therefore, the 
market values of both firms at date 1 are 
V = I + Z L 1H 
V = I + Z H 1L 
At date 2, the cash flow from the date 1 project is realised for the high-quality type. 
The market values of both firms are 
V = Z L + X H 2H 
V = I + Z H + λR 2L 
Substituting firm market values at date 1 and date 2 in equation (1) yields 
L L HMH (I , R) = w1 (I + Z )+ w2 (Z + X )+ w3B (10) 
ML (I , R) = w1 (I + Z H )+ w2 (I + Z H + λR ) (11) 
vi) Firm H pays dividends while firm L invests in the new project 
The investors observe (D, I ) and distinguish the firm types as (H , L) . Therefore, the 
market values of both firms at date 1 are 
V = I + Z H + λD 1H 
V = I + Z L 1L 
At date 2, the cash flow from the date-1 project is realised for low-quality type. The 
market values of both firms are 
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V = I + Z H + λD 2H 
V = Z L + X L 2L 
Substituting firm market values at date 1 and date 2 in equation (1) yields 
MH (D, I ) = w1 (I + Z H + λD )+ w2 (I + Z H +λD ) (12) 
L L LM L (D, I ) = w1 (I + Z )+ w2 (Z + X )+ w3B (13) 
vii) Firm H repurchases shares while firm L invests in the new project 
The investors observe (R, I )and distinguish the firm types as (H , L) . Thus, the 
market values of both firms at date 1 are 
V = I + Z H 1H 
V = I + Z L 1L 
At date 2, the cash flow from the date-1 project is realised for low-quality type. The 
values of both firms are 
V = I + Z H + λR 2H 
V = Z L + X L 2L 
Substituting firm values at date 1 and date 2 in equation (1) yields 
MH (R, I ) = w1 (I + Z H )+ w2 (I + Z H + λR ) (14) 
L L LM L (R, I ) = w1 (I + Z )+ w2 (Z + X )+ w3 B (15) 
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viii) Firm H repurchases shares while firm L pays dividends 
Observing (R, D) , the investors distinguish firm types as (H , L) and attach a catering 
premium immediately to dividend paying firm but with time lag to repurchasing 
firm. Thus, the market values of both firms at date 1 are 
V = I + Z H 1H 
V = I + Z L + λD 1L 
At date 2, the values of both firms are 
V = I + Z H + λR 2H 
V = I + Z L + λD 2L 
Substituting firm market values at date 1 and date 2 in equation (1) yields 
MH (R, D) = w1 (I + Z H )+ w2 (I + Z H + λR ) (16) 
L D LM L (R, D) = w1 (I + Z + λ )+ w2 (I + Z + λD ) (17) 
ix) Firm H pays dividends while firm L repurchases shares. 
Observing (D, R) , investors distinguish firm types as (L, H )and attach the catering 
premium immediately to dividend paying firm but with time lag to repurchasing 
firm. Thus, the market values of both firms at date 1 are 
V = I + Z L + λD 1H 
V = I + Z H 1L 
At date 2, the values of both firms are 
V = I + Z L + λD 2H 
V = I + Z H + λR 2L 
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Substituting firm market values at date 1 and date 2 in equation (1) yields 
MH (D, R) = w1 (I + Z L +λD )+ w2 (I + Z L + λD ) (18) 
H HML (D, R) = w1 (I + Z )+ w2 (I + Z + λR ) (19) 
3.2.5 Equilibrium Analysis 
The normal-form of this dividend and repurchase catering game is illustrated in 
Figure 3.5 and all the managerial payoffs are summarised below. 
Figure 3.5: Dividend and Repurchase Catering Game 
D R I 
D 
R 
I 
(4), (5) (18), (19) (12), (13) 
(16), (17) (6), (7) (14), (15) 
(8), (9) (10), (11) (2), (3) 
ML 
MH 
( ) ( ) (ZwZIwI IM H 21, ++= ) w BX H 3++ (2) 
( ) ( ) (ZwZIwI IM L 21, ++= ) w BX L 3++ (3) 
( ) (H ZIwD DM += 1, ) (D ZIwλ +++ 2 D )λ+ (4) 
( ) (L ZIwD DM += 1, ) (D ZIwλ +++ 2 D )λ+ (5) 
( ) ( ) (H ZIwZIwR RM +++= 21, R )+ λ (6) 
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ML (R, R) = w1 (I + Z )+ w2 (I + Z +λR ) (7) 
L L HMH (I , D) = w1 (I + Z )+ w2 (Z + X )+ w3B (8) 
ML (I , D) = w1 (I + Z H + λD )+ w2 (I + Z H + λD ) (9) 
L L HMH (I , R) = w1 (I + Z )+ w2 (Z + X )+ w3B (10) 
ML (I , R) = w1 (I + Z H )+ w2 (I + Z H + λR ) (11) 
MH (D, I ) = w1 (I + Z H + λD )+ w2 (I + Z H +λD ) (12) 
L L LM L (D, I ) = w1 (I + Z )+ w2 (Z + X )+ w3B (13) 
MH (R, I ) = w1 (I + Z H )+ w2 (I + Z H + λR ) (14) 
L L LM L (R, I ) = w1 (I + Z )+ w2 (Z + X )+ w3 B (15) 
MH (R, D) = w1 (I + Z H )+ w2 (I + Z H + λR ) (16) 
L D LM L (R, D) = w1 (I + Z + λ )+ w2 (I + Z + λD ) (17) 
L D LMH (D, R) = w1 (I + Z +λ )+ w2 (I + Z + λD ) (18) 
H HML (D, R) = w1 (I + Z )+ w2 (I + Z + λR ) (19) 
Having obtained all the managerial payoffs, I first analyse the case in 
which w1 = w2 = w3 = 1/ 3 . To simplify the analysis, I specify the following 
assumption 
D L(w1 + w2 )λ > w2 (X − I )+ w3B (a1) 
Lemma 1 Investing in the new project is dominated strategy for firm L. Firm L’s 
best responses to firm H’s strategies are as follows: 
a) Given that firm H pays dividends, firm L will pay dividends if 
λD ≥ (Z H − Z L )+ λ
R 
but repurchase shares if λD < (Z H − Z L )+ λ
R
. 
2 2 
b) Given that firm H repurchases shares, firm L will pay dividends if 
λD ≥ (Z H − Z L )+ λ
R 
but repurchase shares if λD < (Z H − Z L )+ λ
R
. 
2 2 
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c) Given that firm H invests in the new project, firm L will pay dividends if 
D λ 
R
D λ 
R

λ ≥ but repurchase shares if λ < .

2 2 
Proof: See Appendix B. 
Lemma 1a) and 1b) demonstrate that, if firm H pays dividends or repurchases shares, 
firm L will choose to pay dividends if the dividend premium is higher than the sum 
of the information asymmetry and repurchasing premium but repurchase shares 
otherwise. Lemma 1c) demonstrates that, if firm H invests in the new project, firm L 
will choose to pay dividends if the dividend premium is higher than the repurchasing 
premium but repurchase shares otherwise. 
Lemma 2 Firm H’s best responses to firm L’s strategies are as follows: 
a) Given that firm L pays dividends, firm H will pay dividends if 
D H L D Hλ ≥ 

 
Z H 
2 
− Z L 


 + 
λ 
2 
R 
and (Z − Z )+ 2λ ≥ (X − I )+ B ; repurchase 
  
D H L R Hshares if λ < 
 Z H 
2 
− Z L 


+ 
λ 
2 
R 
and 2(Z − Z )+ λ ≥ (X − I )+ B ; and 
  
invest in the new project if 
H L D H H L R H(Z − Z )+ 2λ < (X − I )+ Band 2(Z − Z )+ λ < (X − I )+ B . 
b) Given that firm L repurchases shares, firm H will pay dividends if 
D Dλ ≥ 
 Z H 
2 
− Z L 


+ 
λ 
2 
R 
and 2λ ≥ (X H − I )+ B ; repurchase shares if 
  
D H L R Hλ < 

 
Z H 
2 
− Z L 
 + 
λ 
2 
R 
and (Z − Z )+ λ ≥ (X − I )+ B ; and invest in the 
  
D H L R Hnew project if 2λ < (X H − I )+ Band (Z − Z )+ λ < (X − I )+ B . 
Intuitively, lemma 2a) and 2b) demonstrate that, if firm L pays dividends or

repurchases shares, firm H will choose to pay dividends if the dividend premium is
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higher than both the repurchasing premium and the sum of positive NPV and private 
benefit; firm H will choose to repurchase shares if the repurchasing premium is 
higher than both the dividend premium and the sum of positive NPV and private 
benefit; firm H will invest in the new project if the sum of positive NPV and private 
benefit is higher than both the dividend premium and the repurchasing premium. 
Proposition 1 Lemma 1 and lemma 2 provide following strategic equilibria: 
 Z H − Z L  λR 
a) If λD ≥   + , there exists a pooling equilibrium 
 2  2 
H L D H(D, D) if (Z − Z )+ 2λ ≥ (X − I )+ B ; and a separating 
H L D Hequilibrium (I , D)if (Z − Z )+ 2λ < (X − I )+ Band 
H L R H2(Z − Z )+ λ < (X − I )+ B . 
λR D  Z
H − Z L  λR 
b) ≤ λ <   + , there exists a separating 2  2  2 
H L D Hequilibrium (I , D)if (Z − Z )+ 2λ < (X − I )+ B 
H L R Hand 2(Z − Z )+ λ < (X − I )+ B , and a pooling 
H L R Hequilibrium (R, R)if (Z − Z )+ λ ≥ (X − I )+ B . 
D D X Hc) If λ <
λR 
, there exists a separating equilibrium (I , R) if 2λ < ( − I )+ B 
2 
H L R Hand (Z − Z )+ λ < (X − I )+ B ; and a pooling 
H L R Hequilibrium (R, R)if (Z − Z )+ λ ≥ (X − I )+ B . 
Proposition 1a) shows that, if the dividend premium is higher than the sum of 
information asymmetry and repurchasing premium, firm L will unambiguously 
choose to pay dividends while firm H will choose to invest in a new project if the 
capital gain from investing in a positive NPV project exceeds the information 
asymmetry cost and the opportunity cost of not catering investors with dividends; 
however, firm H will choose to pay dividends and pass up a positive NPV project (an 
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adverse selection problem) if the capital gain from investment is lower than the total 
gains from pooling and dividend premium. In a pooling equilibrium (D, D) , the 
market values of both firms are the same (I + Z + λD ) at date 1 and stay unchanged at 
date 2. In a separating equilibrium (I , D) , the market value of firm H decreases to 
H(I + Z L ) while the market value of firm L increases to (I + Z + λD )at date 1. At date 
L2, the market value of firm H increases to (Z + X H ) while the market value of firm 
L is the same as that at date 1. 
Proposition 1b) shows that, if the dividend premium is lower than the sum of 
information asymmetry and repurchasing premium but higher than the repurchasing 
premium, firm H will choose to invest in the new project if the capital gain from 
investment exceeds the information asymmetry cost and the opportunity cost of not 
catering investors with dividends or share repurchases but choose to repurchase 
shares rather than invest in a new project if the capital gain from undertaking a 
positive NPV project is lower than the gains from pooling and repurchasing 
premium. In a separating equilibrium (I , D) , the market value of firm H decreases to 
H(I + Z L ) while the market value of firm L increases to (I + Z + λD )at date 1. At date 
L2, the market value of firm H increases to (Z + X H ) while the market value of firm 
L is the same as that at date 1. In a pooling equilibrium (R, R), the market values of 
both firms are the same (I + Z ) at date 1 and increase to (I + Z + λR )at date 2. 
Proposition 1c) shows that, if the dividend premium is lower than the repurchasing 
premium, firm L will unambiguously choose to repurchase shares whereas firm H 
will choose to invest in a new project if the capital gain from investing in a positive 
NPV project is higher than the information asymmetry cost and the opportunity cost 
of not catering investors with share repurchases. Nevertheless, firm H will choose to 
buy back shares rather than invest in a new project if the capital gain from 
undertaking a positive NPV project is lower than the total gains from pooling and 
repurchase premium. In a separating equilibrium (I , R) , the market value of firm H 
decreases to (I + Z L ) while the market value of firm L increases to (I + Z H )at date 
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L1. At date 2, the market values of firm H and firm L increase to (Z + X H ) and 
(I + Z H + λR )respectively. In a pooling equilibrium (R, R), the market values of both 
firms are the same (I + Z ) at date 1 and increase to (I + Z + λR )at date 2. 
Corollary 1 If the manager is myopic (e.g., w1 = 0.6, w2 = 0.3, w3 = 0.1) , there exist 
following equilibria: 
a) If λD ≥ 

 
Z H − Z L 
 + 
λR 
, there exists a pooling equilibrium 
 2  3 
(D, D) if 9  
Z H − Z L 
 + 9λ 
D≥ 3(X H − I )+ B ; and a separating

 2 

equilibrium (I , D)if 9  
Z H − Z L 
 + 9λ 
D< 3(X H − I )+ B and

 2 

H L R H9(Z − Z )+ 3λ < 3(X − I )+ B . 
b) 
λR 
≤ λD < 


Z H − Z L 
 + 
λR 
, there exists a separating 
3  2  3 
equilibrium (I , D)if 9 
Z H − Z L 
 + 9λ 
D< 3(X H − I )+ B

 2 

H L R Hand 9(Z − Z )+ 3λ < 3(X − I )+ B , and a pooling 
equilibrium (R, R)if 9  
Z H − Z L 
 + 3λ
R ≥ 3(X H − I )+ B .

 2 

c) If λD <
λR 
, there exists a separating equilibrium (I , R) if 9λD < 3(X H − I )+ B 
3 
and 9 


Z H 
2 
− Z L 
 + 3λ
R < 3(X H − I )+ B ; and a pooling equilibrium (R, R)if 
  
and 9 

 
Z H − Z L 
 + 3λ
R ≥ 3(X H − I )+ B .

 2 

Proof: See Appendix B. 
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The equilibria in the case where the manager places higher weight on short-term 
benefits are the same as those in the case where the manager balances his payoffs at 
three dates. However, the manager is more likely to pay dividends than to repurchase 
shares or to invest in the new project. That is, the higher the short-term managerial 
weight, the lower the dividend premium the manager needs for paying dividends. 
Corollary 2 If the manager is farsighted (e.g., w1 = 0.1, w2 = 0.3, w3 = 0.6) , there exist 
following equilibria: 
a) If λD ≥ 

 
Z H − Z L 
 + 
3 
λR , there exist a pooling equilibrium 
 2  4 
H L D H(D, D) if 2(Z − Z )+ 4λ ≥ 3(X − I )+ 6B ; and a separating 
H L D Hequilibrium (I , D)if 2(Z − Z )+ 4λ < 3(X − I )+ 6B and 
H L R H4(Z − Z )+ 3λ < 3(X − I )+ 6B . 
b) 
3 
λR ≤ λD < 


Z H − Z L 
 + 
3 
λR , there exist a separating equilibrium (I , D)if 
4  2  4 
H L D H H L R H2(Z − Z )+ 4λ < 3(X − I )+ 6B and 4(Z − Z )+ 3λ < 3(X − I )+ 6B , 
H L R Hand a pooling equilibrium (R, R)if 2(Z − Z )+ 3λ ≥ 3(X − I )+ 6B . 
D Rc) If λ < 
3 
λ , there exist a separating equilibrium (I , R) if 
4 
D X H R H4λ < 3( − I )+ 6B and 9 
Z H − Z L 
 + 3λ < 3(X − I )+ B ; and a pooling 
 2  
H L R Hequilibrium (R, R)if and 2(Z − Z )+ 3λ < 3(X − I )+ 6B . 
Proof: See Appendix B. 
The equilibria in the case where manager places higher weight on long-term benefits 
are the same as those in the case where manager balances his payoffs. However, the 
manager is less likely to pay dividends than to repurchase shares or to invest in the 
new project. That is, the higher the long-term managerial weight, the higher the 
dividend premium the manager needs for paying dividends. 
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3.2.6 Summary of Equilibrium Strategies 
The equilibrium strategies, the effects on firm value, and the intuitions behind 
the outcomes of this dividend and repurchase catering model are summarised in 
Table 3.2 below. 
105 
Table 3.2 Summary of Equilibrium Strategies (Model 2)

Equilibrium 
Effects on Firm 
Value (H, L) Intuition 
01 VV − 12 VV − 
• 1/ 3321 === www {D, D} 
{I, D} 
{R, R} 
{I, D} 
{R, R} 
{I, R} 
( + , + ) 
( - , + ) 
( 0 , 0 ) 
( - , + ) 
( 0 , 0 ) 
( - , + ) 
( 0 , 0 ) 
( + , 0 ) 
( + , + ) 
( + , 0 ) 
( + , + ) 
( + , + ) 
If 
22 
RLH 
D ZZ λλ  + 
 
 
 
 
 −
≥ , firm L always pays dividends; firm H pays 
dividends if dividend premium is higher than project’s return plus 
private benefit but invests in the new project if dividend premium is 
lower than project’s return plus private benefit. 
If 
222 
RLH 
D 
R ZZ λ
λ
λ 
 + 
 
 
 
 
 − 
<≤ , firm H weighs relative benefits 
between repurchasing shares and investing in a new project while firm 
L weighs relative benefits between paying dividends and repurchasing 
shares. 
If 
2 
R 
D λλ < , firm L always repurchases shares; firm H invests in a new 
project if the repurchasing premium is lower than the project’s return 
plus private benefit but repurchase shares if the repurchasing premium 
is higher than the project’s return plus private benefit. 
106 
Table 3.2 Summary of Equilibrium Strategies (Model 2) (continued)

Equilibrium 
Effects on Firm 
Value (H, L) Intuition 
01 VV − 12 VV − 
• 0.10.3,0.6, 321 === www {D, D} 
{I, D} 
{R, R} 
{I, D} 
{R, R} 
{I, R} 
( + , + ) 
( - , + ) 
( 0 , 0 ) 
( - , + ) 
( 0 , 0 ) 
( - , + ) 
( 0 , 0 ) 
( + , 0 ) 
( + , + ) 
( + , 0 ) 
( + , + ) 
( + , + ) 
If 
32 
RLH 
D ZZ λλ  + 
 
 
 
 
 −
≥ , firm L always pays dividends; firm H pays 
dividends if dividend premium is higher than project’s return plus 
private benefit but invests in the new project if dividend premium is 
lower than project’s return plus private benefit. 
If 
323 
RLH 
D 
R ZZ λ
λ
λ 
 + 
 
 
 
 
 − 
<≤ , firm H weighs relative benefits 
between repurchasing shares and investing in a new project while firm 
L weighs relative benefits between paying dividends and 
repurchasing shares. 
If 
3 
R 
D λλ < , firm L always repurchases shares; firm H invests in a new 
project if the repurchasing premium is lower than the project’s return 
plus private benefit but repurchase shares if the repurchasing premium 
is higher than the project’s return plus private benefit. 
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Table 3.2 Summary of Equilibrium Strategies (Model 2) (continued)

Equilibrium 
Effects on Firm 
Value (H, L) Intuition 
01 VV − 12 VV − 
• 0.60.3,0.1, 321 === www {D, D} 
{I, D} 
{R, R} 
{I, D} 
{R, R} 
{I, R} 
( + , + ) 
( - , + ) 
( 0 , 0 ) 
( - , + ) 
( 0 , 0 ) 
( - , + ) 
( 0 , 0 ) 
( + , 0 ) 
( + , + ) 
( + , 0 ) 
( + , + ) 
( + , + ) 
If R 
LH 
D ZZ λλ 
4 
3 
2  
+ 
 
 
 
 
 −
≥ , firm L always pays dividends; firm H pays 
dividends if dividend premium is higher than project’s return plus 
private benefit but invests in the new project if dividend premium is 
lower than project’s return plus private benefit. 
If R 
LH 
DR ZZ λλλ 
4 
3 
24 
3 
 + 
 
 
 
 
 − 
<≤ , firm H weighs relative benefits 
between repurchasing shares and investing in a new project while firm 
L weighs relative benefits between paying dividends and repurchasing 
shares. 
If RD λλ 
4 
3 
< , firm L always repurchases shares; firm H invests in a new 
project if the repurchasing premium is lower than the project’s return 
plus private benefit but repurchase shares if the repurchasing premium 
is higher than the project’s return plus private benefit. 
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3.3 Summary 
I have developed two theoretical models related to corporate payout policy. 
The first model, developed in spirit of Isagawa (2000), presents a situation in which 
the managers of two firm types, a low-quality firm and a high-quality firm, decide 
whether to use the free cash flows to pay dividends, repurchase shares, or invest in a 
real project. This model demonstrates that a share repurchase programme can be used 
by managers to signal undervaluation, to time the market, or to mitigate 
overinvestment problem. The second model, built on Fairchild and Zhang’ (2005) 
work, is a catering model in which the managers of two firm types, a low-quality 
firm and a high-quality firm, decide whether to use the free cash flows to pay 
dividends or repurchase shares in order to cater to investors’ strong demand for cash 
payout, or, alternatively, invest in a real project. This model shows that payout policy 
is driven by the premium the investors place on the dividend-paying and 
repurchasing firms. 
The first model is analysed in two versions. In model version 1, in which the 
efficient market is assumed, paying dividends is a dominated strategy for firm H 
regardless of the return from the project and the managerial weight parameter. 
Hence, manager of firm H only considers the choice between investing in the new 
positive NPV project from which he also gets private benefits and repurchasing 
undervalued shares to signal his firm type. 
When the manager balances his short-term and long-term payoffs, there exist 
three equilibria: (1) a separating equilibrium in which firm H invests in the new 
project while firm L repurchase shares if the private benefit is large enough for firm 
H but too small for firm L; (2) a pooling equilibrium in which both firms repurchase 
shares if the private benefit is too low for both firms; and (3) a pooling equilibrium in 
which both firms invest in the new project if the private benefit is high enough for 
both firms. 
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When the manager places higher weight on short-term payoff, both firms are 
more likely to repurchase shares than to invest in the new project. If the private 
benefit is sufficiently high, however, both firms will choose to invest in the new 
projects. To invest in the new project, the manager requires higher private benefit 
than that in the case where he balances the payoffs at three dates. On the other hand, 
when the manager places higher weight on long-term payoff, both firms are more 
likely to invest in the new projects. To invest in the new project, the manager 
requires lower private benefit than that in the case where he balances the payoffs at 
three dates. That is, the higher the long-term managerial weight, the lower the private 
benefits the manager needs for undertaking the new project, and vice versa. 
In model version 2, I consider the case in which the investors are irrational in 
that they do not update their beliefs upon observing one firm repurchases shares and 
the other pays dividends. When the manager places equal weight on his short-term 
and long-term payoffs, I obtain a separating equilibrium in which firm H invests in 
the new project while firm L repurchase shares if the private benefit is large enough 
for firm H but too small for firm L, and a pooling equilibrium in which both firms 
invest in the new project if the private benefit is high enough for both firms. Note 
that, I do not obtain a pooling equilibrium in which both firms repurchase shares as 
in version 1 because firm L has no incentive to mimic if the market underreacts to 
shares repurchase announcements. 
When the manager places higher weight on his short-term payoff, there is a 
pooling equilibrium in which both firms invest in the new project. There is no 
pooling equilibrium in which both firms repurchase shares because firm L has no 
benefit from announcing a share repurchase program. Note that, for a pooling 
equilibrium in which both firms invest in the new project to be obtained, the manager 
needs higher private benefits as he places more weight on short-term payoff. 
Conversely, when the manager places higher weight on his long-term payoff, firm H 
always chooses to invest in the new project while firm L repurchases shares if the 
private benefit is too low but invests in the new project if the private benefit is high. 
Thus, there exist a separating equilibrium in which firm H invests in the new project 
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while firm L repurchases shares and a pooling equilibrium in which both firms invest 
in the new projects. Note that, for a pooling equilibrium in which both firms invest in 
the new project to be obtained, the manager needs lower private benefits as he places 
more weight on long-term payoff. 
I further consider the case in which a share repurchase may be used to 
mitigate the agency cost of free cash flows. Assuming that both firms have a negative 
NPV project available, I derive a separating equilibrium in which firm H repurchases 
shares while firm L invests in the new project when the private benefit is low. The 
result that the firm with a low private benefit may repurchase shares in order to 
commit not to undertake a negative NPV project (i.e., a share repurchase helps 
mitigate the agency cost of free cash flows) is consistent with Isagawa (2000). 
The second model is the extension of Fairchild and Zhang’s (2005) model. It 
considers the case in which the managers of two firm types, a high-quality firm and a 
low-quality firm, decide whether to use the free cash flow to pay dividends, 
repurchase shares, or invest in the new project. The manager’s dividend and 
repurchase catering motives are introduced in this model. In particular, it is assumed 
that the investors are irrational in that: (1) they do not update their beliefs upon 
observing one firm repurchases shares and the other pays dividends; (2) they place 
both dividend premium and repurchasing premium on dividend-paying firm and 
repurchasing firm respectively; and (3) they respond immediately to dividend 
announcements but with time lag to share repurchase announcements. 
The model demonstrates that the firm’s payout policy depends on: (1) the 
gain/loss from investment; (2) the manager’s time horizon; (3) the relative 
magnitudes of dividend and repurchasing premia; (4) the degree of information 
asymmetry; and (5) the private benefits from investment. Both adverse selection and 
moral hazard problems are addressed in this model. Specifically, the high-quality 
firm may pass up a positive NPV project if the catering premia are sufficiently high 
(adverse selection problem). The model also shows that the higher weight the 
manager places on the short-term payoff, the lower dividend premium he requires for 
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paying dividends. On the other hand, the higher weight the manager places on the 
long-term payoff, the higher dividend premium he requires for paying dividends. 
Fairchild (2008) suggests that this adverse selection problem may be mitigated by 
communication to investors, reinforced by managerial reputation effects. On the 
other hand, the low-quality firm has a strong incentive to return the free cash flows to 
shareholders if the catering premia are higher than the private benefits from investing 
in a negative NPV project. Hence, the moral hazard problem is mitigated in the latter 
case. 
In sum, I demonstrate that the relationship between managerial motives and 
payout policies is indeed complex. That is, the corporate payout choices can be 
driven by the manager’s motives to signal firm value, to time the market, to cater to 
investors’ demand, to take private benefits, or to mitigate overinvestment problem. I 
believe that my models shed additional light on the dividend puzzle and provide 
direction for future theoretical and empirical research on corporate payout policy. 
In the next chapter, I investigate the dividend changes in Thailand over the 
period 2002-2005. The focus is to test the two competing theories in dividend 
literature: the signalling and the free cash flow hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Empirical Investigation of Dividend Changes in Thailand 
This chapter provides empirical evidence on dividend changes in Thailand 
over the period 2002-2005. To test the signalling and the free cash flow hypothesis, 
which are the focuses of my investigation, I first analyse the changes in profitability 
of sample firms around dividend changes and benchmark them with those of control 
firms. Then, regression analyses are undertaken to examine the relation between 
dividend changes and the past and future profitability, as well as to determine 
significant factors of dividend changes. Next, I investigate the short-run and long-run 
stock price performance of dividend-changing firms, and the relation between 
announcement returns and hypothesised independent variables. Finally, I examine 
investment behaviours of the sample firms following dividend changes. 
4.1 Methodology 
Two main approaches, benchmark analysis and regression analysis, are 
employed in this study to examine whether dividend changes by Thai firms convey 
information about future earnings and profitability. The aim is to test the following 
predictions of the dividend-signalling hypothesis: 
1) Firms that increase (decrease) dividends will have significantly positive 
(negative) unexpected earnings and profitability changes in subsequent years. 
2) The stock market reacts positively to dividend increase announcements but 
negatively to dividend decrease announcements. 
3) The larger the dividend changes, the stronger the stock market reactions. 
To test the first prediction, I first examine the raw earnings changes of 
dividend-changing firms. This approach implicitly assumes that earnings follow 
random walks. Then, I benchmark the earnings growths of dividend-changing firms 
with those of firms in the same industries that keep their dividends unchanged. If the 
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signalling hypothesis is supported, subsequent industry-adjusted earnings growths of 
dividend-increasing (dividend-decreasing) firms should be significantly positive 
(negative). 
Following the suggestion of Barber and Lyon (1996)10, I also compare the 
earnings performance of dividend-changing firms with that of no-change firms that 
experience similar earnings growth between year -1 and year 0 (dividend-change 
year). Similarly, the subsequent performance-adjusted earnings growths of dividend-
increasing (dividend-decreasing) firms should be significantly positive (negative) if 
the signalling hypothesis is true. 
As robustness check of whether dividend changes signal future profitability, I 
repeat the benchmark analyses by examining the ROA changes around dividend 
changes. 
Next, regression analyses are undertaken to examine the relationship between 
dividend changes and future earnings changes. Specifically, I run the simple 
regressions between future earnings change as the dependent variable and dividend 
change as the independent variable. To check the robustness, I repeat the regressions 
replacing earnings changes with ROA changes. 
Subsequently, I determine the factors that have significant association with 
dividend changes. In particular, I regress the dividend change as the dependent 
variable against hypothesised independent variables, i.e., the past ROA changes11 , 
firm size, MTB ratio, cash flow, retained earnings to equity, debt ratio, and past 
dividend yield. To make it easy to follow, the univariate analysis is first used to 
determine the significance of each variable. Then, the multivariate analysis is applied 
to determine significant determinants explaining the size of dividend changes. 
Further, I run the logit regressions on these hypothesised variables to identify the 
10 To detect the firm’s abnormal performance, Barber and Lyon (1996) recommend that sample firms 
be benchmarked with control firms with similar performance. 
11 ROA changes are used instead of earnings changes because ROA changes have more explanatory 
power. 
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significant factors affecting the probability that firms increase or decrease dividends 
(or keep them unchanged). 
To test the second prediction, I employ the standard event methodology to 
measure the initial market reactions to dividend changes. In particular, I measure the 
3-day (-1, +1) cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) surrounding the dividend 
announcement date as follows: 
t=1 
CARi = ∑ ARi,t , (4.1) 
t=−1 
where AR is the abnormal return of each security i on day t, compared with the i,t 
return of the value-weighted SET index. 
I also measure the long-run price performance in order to observe the stock 
market reactions to the firms’ financial performance after dividend changes by 
calculating the market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns as follows: 
b b 
BHARi =∏(1 + Rit ) −∏(1 + Mt ), (4.2) 
t=a t=a 
where R is the return on stock i on month t and M is the return on the SET value-it t 
weighted market portfolio on month t . 
To test the third prediction, I first run the simple regression between CAR 
and the magnitude of dividend changes. I then identify other significant determinants 
of the initial stock market reactions by running multiple regressions between CAR 
and potential explanatory variables such as firm size, market-to-book ratio, and free 
cash flow. 
While I devote a large part of this study to test the signalling hypothesis, I 
also investigate the following implications of the free cash flow hypothesis: 
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1) The stock market reacts more positively to a dividend increase by firms with 
low investment opportunities and high cash flows (which tends to have 
overinvestment problem) than to a dividend increase by firms with high 
investment opportunities and low cash flows. 
2) Dividend increases by low growth firms will be followed by significant 
decreases in subsequent investments. 
The first implication is tested by examining the relationship between CAR 
and proxy for growth opportunities, i.e., market-to-book ratio, controlling for the size 
of dividend changes. The second implication is tested by running regressions 
between subsequent capital expenditures and the dividend changes. 
4.2 The Sample 
The data on dividend policy in Thailand is obtained from various sources 
such as SETSMART (SET Market Analysis and Reporting Tool) via 
www.setsmart.com, the web-based application of the Stock Exchange of Thailand, 
and other two official websites of the Stock Exchange of Thailand: www.set.or.th 
and www.settrade.com. The financial data of sample firms is primarily drawn from 
www.securities.com, the website of Euromoney Institutional Investor PLC., which 
contains comprehensive financial data on emerging markets. The data on historical 
stock prices is retrieved from www.kimeng.co.th, the website of KIMENG Securities 
Thailand (PLC), a securities broker company in Thailand. 
Since I study the dividend changes by the publicly traded firms in the Stock 
Exchange of Thailand (SET) over the period 2002 - 2005, the data on dividends from 
years 2001 to 2005 must be available in order to calculate dividend changes. 
choose to study dividend changes in Thailand in such a period because many Thai 
firms made huge losses and thus omitted dividends during the Asian financial crisis 
between 1997 and 2000 (Please see the monthly dividend yield of Thai stock market 
from January 1990 to December 2007 as shown in Figure 4.1 below). In addition, the 
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I 
choice of the sample period is limited by the requirement that at least 2 years of 
financial data be available before and after the dividend announcement date. 
Figure 4.1: Monthly Dividend Yield in Thailand (Jan 1990 ­ Dec 2007) 
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Source: The Stock Exchange of Thailand 
Figure 4.1 shows that the dividend yield of Thai listed firms was normally in 
the range 1.5% - 4.5% before the Asian financial crisis. However, the dividend yield 
increased dramatically, due to the steep drop in equity prices, shortly after the Thai 
currency was floated in July 1997 and then fell sharply because many firms were 
defunct or omitted dividends during the crisis. The dividend yield started to recover 
in year 2000 and was in its normal range again in year 2001. 
To obtain the dividend change data, I first examine the dividend payments of 
411 firms, excluding financial firms and property funds, listed on the SET12 between 
The other smaller board is the MAI (Market for Alternative Investment), which is for small and 
midsize firms to be traded. 
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2001 and 2005. Specifically, I identify the dividend per share13 paid by these firms 
and calculate the annual percentage changes as follows 
DIV − DIV 
DIV0 =	
0 −1 , (4.3) 
DIV−1 
where DIV0 is dividend per share in the dividend change year (year 0) and DIV−1 is 
dividend per share in one year prior to the dividend change year. 
I also indentify the dividend announcement date, which is defined as the first 
date at which the news about the firm’s board of directors’ approval of dividend 
payment become available on www.settrade.com,14 for the purpose of measuring 
stock market reactions to dividend change announcements. 
To be included in the sample, the dividend data must satisfy the following 
criteria: 
i) The dividend data, including dividend announcement date, must be available 
on SETSMART. 
ii) The firm must pay dividend annually or semi-annually15 (4 firms paying 
quarterly dividends are excluded from the sample). 
iii) The firm must pay dividends at least two consecutive years in the sample 
period in order to calculate dividend changes. 
iv) If there is a stock split during the sample period, dividend per share must be 
adjusted accordingly. 
v) The percentage change in dividends must be at least 10% but not exceed 
500%. The lower bound of 10% ensures that only significant dividend 
13 Using level of annual dividends does not significantly alter the results. 
14 It is a requirement that public companies submit the resolutions of their board of directors to the 
SET within one business day after the meetings. The information is then immediately announced via 
www.settrade.com in “company news” section. 
15 Most listed firms in Thailand pay dividends annually i.e. they make dividend announcements in the 
first quarter of fiscal year, mostly in February or March. 
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changes are included in the sample while the upper bound of 500% eliminates 
the outliers.16 
vi) The dividend announcement is not an initiation or an omission. 
In order to examine the relation between dividend changes and various 
financial variables as well as to measure the short-run and long-run abnormal stock 
returns around dividend changes, additional following criteria must be satisfied: 
vii)	 The firm’s financial data must be available on www.securities.com and the 
daily and monthly stock returns over one year before and two years after 
dividend announcements must be available on www.kimeng.co.th. 
viii)	 No other corporate announcements such as stock splits, stock dividends, 
stock repurchases, mergers and acquisitions, and so on are made within 15 
trading days surrounding dividend announcement date. This is to ensure 
that dividend announcement is not contaminated by non-dividend events so 
that I can correctly detect the abnormal stock returns surrounding dividend 
changes. 
The final sample covers 168 firms and 320 dividend changes, comprising 206 
dividend increases and 114 decreases. 87 dividend announcements are classified as 
no-change announcements. 
4.3 Definitions of Variables 
For each dividend change announcement, I collected from www.kimeng.co.th 
the daily stock and SET index returns during the 3-day window, from one day before 
to one day after the announcement, in order to calculate the market-adjusted 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of dividend changes, and the monthly stock and 
SET index returns from one year before to two years after the announcement in order 
to calculate the market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns (BHARs). 
This criterion removed 5 dividend increases above 500% from the sample. 
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Several variables are employed to test the dividend-signalling hypothesis and 
the free cash flow hypothesis. These variables include dividend change ( ∆DIV0 ), 
earnings change ( ∆Et ), ROA change (∆ROAt ) , firm size (SIZE), market-to-book 
ratio (MTB), cash flow (CF), retained earnings to equity (RTE), debt ratio (DTA), 
dividend yield (YLD), and change in capital expenditures ( ∆CAPEX t ). Each variable 
is defined as follows: 
a) Dividend change ( ∆DIV0 ) is defined as in equation 4.3 above. 
b) Earnings change (∆Et ) 
As a measure of firm’s profitability, earnings change is calculated as 
Et − Et −1∆Et = , (4.4) 
TAt 
where Et and Et−1 are the earnings before extraordinary items in year t and 
year t-1 relative to dividend change year (t=0); and TAt is the book value of 
total assets in year t. 
c) ROA change (∆ROAt ) 
As another measure of firm’s profitability, ROA change is defined as 
∆ROAt = ROAt − ROAt−1 , (4.5) 
where ROAt and ROAt−1 are returns on assets in year t and year t-1 relative to 
dividend change year (t=0), and ROA is defined as operating income 
over book value of total assets. 
120 
d) Firm size (SIZE) 
The natural logarithm of book value of total assets is used as a proxy for firm 
size. 
SIZE = Ln (BV Total Assets). (4.6) 
e) Market-to-book ratio (MTB) 
Following Fama and French (2001), market-to-book ratio is used as a proxy 
for firm’s future investment opportunities. 
 TA − BVE + MVE  
MTB =   (4.7) 
 TA  
where TA is the book value of total assets, BVE is the book value of equity, 
and MVE is the market value of equity. 
f) Cash flow (CF) 
Following Lehn and Poulsen (1989) and Denis et al. (1994), cash flow is 
defined as follows 
CF = (Operating income before depreciation ­ interest expenses ­
taxes ­ preferred dividends ­ common dividends)/ Book value 
of total assets. (4.8) 
g) Retained earnings to book value of equity (RTE) 
According to DeAngelo et al (2006) and Denis and Osobov (2008), retained 
earnings to book value of equity (RTE), a measure of equity capital that is 
earned from the firm’s earnings performance rather than contributed by 
shareholders, is a significant factor affecting firm’s dividend policy. 
Therefore, I wish to test its significance on dividend policy in Thailand. 
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RTE = Retained earnings/Book value of equity. (4.9) 
h) Debt ratio (DTA) 
The debt ratio is predicted to have a negative relation with dividend 
changes. It is defined as 
DTA = Book value of total debt/Book value of total assets. (4.10) 
i) Dividend yield (YLD) 
To test the dividend clientele hypothesis, the past dividend yield is used as a 
proxy for investors’ anticipated yield. 
YLD = Dividends in year ­1/MV of equity at the end of year ­1 (4.11) 
j) Change in capital expenditures ( ∆CAPEX t ) 
Change in capital expenditures ( ∆CAPEX t ) is used to investigate the firm’s 
investment behaviours following dividend changes. 
CAPEX t − CAPEX t−1∆CAPEX t = , (4.12) 
TAt 
where CAPEX is purchase of fixed assets plus purchase of investments; and 
TAt is the book value of total assets in year t. 
Table 4.1 shows the descriptive statistics of the sample firms in dividend-
change year (year 0). It reveals that dividend increases are more frequent and of 
greater magnitude than dividend decreases in both the mean and the median values. 
The tests of differences in means and medians in Panel C indicate that, compared 
with dividend-decreasing firms, dividend-increasing firms are much larger, more 
profitable, and have higher cash flows. According to the free cash flow hypothesis, 
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these characteristics suggest that dividend-increasing firms are more likely to be 
overinvestors than dividend-decreasing firms. 
In addition, results in Panel C show that the past dividends yield of dividend-
increasing firms is significantly lower than that of dividend-decreasing firms. This 
might suggest that high-yield firms are less likely to increase dividends. However, 
the tests of significance do not indicate differences in growth opportunities, as 
measured by market-to-book ratio (MTB), retained earnings to total equity (RTE), 
and debt ratio (DTA) between these two groups. 
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Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics of variables in the dividend­change year 
Mean Median Std. Min. Max. 
Panel A: Dividend Increase (n = 206) 
Size of increase 82.53% 50.00% 90.82% 10% 500% 
Total Assets (Mil. Baht) 20,551 4,289 65,036 242 649,807 
Earnings/TA 0.1090 0.0869 0.1629 -0.1147 2.2896 
ROA 0.1278 0.1172 0.0663 0.0220 0.4490 
MTB 1.3067 1.1920 0.6365 0.1761 4.9065 
CF/TA 0.0880 0.0887 0.1135 -0.4174 0.9459 
RTE 0.4002 0.3917 0.2049 0.0217 0.9965 
DTA 0.3765 0.3879 0.1961 0.0044 0.7809 
YLD 0.0447 0.0433 0.0214 0.0018 0.1191 
Panel B: Dividend Decrease (n = 114) 
Size of decrease 38.68% 33.33% 21.58% 10% 100% 
Total Assets (Mil. Baht) 7,989 2,238 23,746 250 231,638 
Earnings/TA 0.0894 0.0757 0.0627 0.0082 0.3197 
ROA 0.1092 0.0935 0.0686 0.0052 0.3120 
MTB 1.4298 1.2329 0.7660 0.4098 6.7130 
CF/TA 0.0238 0.0290 0.1142 -0.3074 0.4548 
RTE 0.3825 0.3945 0.2258 0.0152 0.9298 
DTA 0.3441 0.3162 0.2185 0.0312 1.2775 
YLD 0.0788 0.0743 0.0360 0.0050 0.2468 
Panel C: Test of Difference (Dividend Increase – Dividend Decrease)

Mean Median t­statistic z­statistic 
Total Assets (Mil. Baht) 12,562* 2,051** 2.489 -2.725 
Earnings/TA 0.0196 0.0112* 1.236 -2.391 
ROA 0.0186* 0.0237** 2.380 -2.879 
MTB -0.1231 -0.0409 -1.540 -1.584 
CF/TA 0.0642** 0.0597** 4.831 -5.786 
RTE 0.0177 -0.0028 0.712 -0.777 
DTA 0.0324 0.0717 1.356 -1.600 
YLD -0.0341** -0.0310** -9.244 -9.190 
**, * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively, using two-tailed t-test 
for the means and Wilcoxon z-test for the medians. 
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4.4 Empirical Results 
4.4.1 Profitability around Dividend Changes 
4.4.1.1 Earnings Changes around Dividend Changes 
An implication of the signalling hypothesis is that subsequent earnings 
performance of dividend increasing (decreasing) firms should be higher (lower) than 
that of dividend-unchanged firms. Under the underlying assumption that earnings 
changes follow random walks, I begin the analysis of the signalling hypothesis by 
examining the earnings performance of dividend-changing firms in Thailand in years 
-1, year 0 (dividend-change year), year 1, and year 2 as Fukuda (2000) did in Japan. 
Panel A of Table 4.2a indicates that dividend-increasing firms perform well 
in one year before the dividend increases and in concurrent year, with significantly 
positive earnings growths of 2.30% and 2.28% respectively. However, their earnings 
growth declines to only 0.82% in one year after dividend increases and becomes 
negative at -0.09% in two years after dividend increases. For dividend-decreasing 
firms, the results show that they perform poorly in one year prior to dividend 
decreases, with a significantly negative earnings growth of -0.97%. In the event year 
and each of the two years following dividend decreases, however, I do not find any 
significant decline in earnings growth of dividend-decreasing firms. 
125 
Table 4.2a Earnings Changes Around Dividend Changes 
This table reports earnings changes of the sample firms around dividend changes. Earnings 
changes in year t is defined as earnings in year t minus earnings in year t-1 standardized by book 
value of total assets at the end of year t. Panel A reports the raw earnings changes of dividend-
changing firms. Panel B reports the industry-adjusted abnormal earnings changes calculated as 
the earnings changes of dividend-changing firms minus the earnings changes of firms in the 
same industry that did not change dividends in year 0. Panel C reports the abnormal earnings 
changes calculated as the earnings changes of dividend changing firms less the earnings changes 
of dividend unchanged firms that have earnings changes in year 0 within the 20% range below 
and above the mean earnings change of respective dividend changing firms in year 0. The 
figures in parentheses are the t-statistics for the means. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
Year ­1 Year 0 Year 1 Year 2

Panel A: Earnings changes standardised by book value of total assets (%)

Increases (n = 206) 2.30*** 2.28** 0.82* -0.09 
(6.473) (2.366) (1.820) (-0.173) 
Decreases (n = 114) -0.97* -0.05 0.48 -1.05 
(-1.842) (-0.100) (1.212) (-1.513) 
Panel B: Earning changes of dividend changing firms less earning changes of firms in 
the same industry that did not change dividends (%) 
Increases (n = 206)	 2.31*** 1.46 0.19 -0.31 
(6.085) (1.443) (0.405) (-0.576) 
Decreases (n = 114)	 -0.68* -0.30 -0.47 -1.18* 
(-1.896) (-1.272) (-0.729) (-1.662) 
Panel C: Earnings changes of dividend changing firms less earnings changes of firms 
that have similar earnings growths in year 0 but did not change dividends (%) 
Increases (n = 206)	 2.07*** 0.18 -0.19 0.36 
(5.810) (0.183) (-0.415) (0.687) 
Decreases (n = 114) 0.169 -0.003 0.353 -2.73*** 
(0.321) (-0.006) (0.889) (-3.939) 
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Panel B of Table 4.2a shows the earnings performance of dividend-changing 
firms adjusted for the earnings performance of firms that did not change dividends in 
year 0 in the same industry. I find that dividend-increasing firms significantly 
outperform dividend-unchanged firms in one year before dividend announcements 
but show no superior earnings performance in concurrent year and each of the two 
years following dividend increases. For dividend-decreasing firms, the result 
indicates that they significantly underperform dividend-unchanged firms in one year 
before and the two years after dividend decreases. 
To better detect the firm’s abnormal performance, Barber and Lyon (1996) 
recommend that sample firms be benchmarked with control firms that have similar 
performance. Accordingly, the abnormal earnings performance in Panel C of Table 
4.2a is calculated as the earnings changes of dividend-changing firms less the 
earnings changes of firms that experienced similar earnings growth in year 0 but did 
not change dividends. In particular, the dividend-unchanged firms are specified to 
have earnings growth in year 0 between 80% and 120% of the mean earnings growth 
in year 0 of respective dividend-changing firms. 
Panel C of Table 4.2a demonstrates that dividend-increasing firms 
outperform control firms in one year before dividend increases but show no superior 
earnings performance in concurrent year and subsequent years. For dividend-
decreasing firms, I find that they significantly underperform control firms in the two 
years after dividend decreases. 
Overall, the findings from Table 4.2a provide only a little support to 
signalling hypothesis. The only conclusion that can be drawn from Table 4.2a is that 
firms increase dividends to signal the past rather than the future earnings 
performance, as indicated by highly significant and robust results in all three panels. 
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4.4.1.2 ROA changes around Dividend Changes 
To check robustness of the results in previous section, I use return on assets 
(ROA) as alternative measure of firm’s profitability. If the signalling theory is 
supported, one should observe a significant change in ROA following a dividend 
change in same direction. In addition, subsequent ROA changes of dividend-
increasing (decreasing) firms should be higher (lower) than those of firms that did 
not change dividends. 
Panel A of Table 4.2b shows that ROA of dividend-increasing firms 
significantly increases in one year prior to and in the year of dividend increases. 
However, their ROA significantly declines in each of the two years following 
dividend increases, a finding in contrast with the signalling hypothesis. For dividend-
decreasing firms, the results indicate that their ROA declines significantly in one 
year before, in the year of dividend decrease announcements, and in the two years 
following dividend decreases, a finding consistent with the signalling hypothesis. 
In contrast with the signalling hypothesis, results from Panel B indicate that 
average industry-adjusted ROA change of dividend-increasing firms becomes 
significantly negative in one year following dividend increases although it is 
significantly and substantially positive in one year before dividend increases. For 
dividend-decreasing firms, I do not find any significant industry-adjusted ROA 
change in every year of the sample period. 
Panel C shows that average ROA change of dividend-increasing firms is 
significantly higher than that of control firms in one year before dividend increases, 
but becomes significantly lower in one year following dividend increase, a finding 
inconsistent with the signalling hypothesis. Nevertheless, consistent with the 
signalling hypothesis, average ROA change of dividend-decreasing firms is 
significantly negative in each of the two years following dividend decreases. 
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Table 4.2b ROA Changes Around Dividend Changes 
This table reports changes in return on assets (ROA) of the sample firms around dividend 
changes. ROA changes in year t is defined as ROA in year t minus ROA in year t-1, where ROA 
is calculated as earnings before interest and taxes, standardized by book value of total assets. 
Panel A reports the unadjusted ROA changes of dividend-changing firms. Panel B reports the 
industry-adjusted abnormal ROA changes calculated as the ROA changes of dividend-changing 
firms minus the ROA changes of firms in the same industry that did not change dividends in 
year 0. Panel C reports the abnormal ROA changes calculated as the ROA changes of dividend 
changing firms less the ROA changes of dividend-unchanged firms that have ROA changes in 
year 0 within the 20% range below and above the mean earnings change of respective dividend 
changing firms in year 0. The figures in parentheses are the t-statistics for the means. ***, **, 
and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
Year ­1 Year 0 Year +1 Year +2

Panel A: ROA changes (%)

Increases (n = 206) 2.13*** 0.71** -0.62** -0.73*** 
(7.330) (2.259) (-2.204) (-2.665) 
Decreases (n = 114) -2.06*** -1.13** -0.57 -1.50** 
(-3.886) (-2.016) (-1.073) (-2.076) 
Panel B: ROA changes of dividend-changing firms less ROA changes of firms in the 
same industry that did not change dividends (%) 
Increases (n = 206)	 34.58*** -3.57 -15.04*** 0.33 
(7.525) (-0.727) (-5.469) (0.083) 
Decreases (n = 114)	 -0.12 -0.43 3.02 -11.18 
(-0.023) (-0.051) (0.414) (-1.355) 
Panel C: ROA changes of dividend changing firms less ROA changes of firms that have 
similar ROA changes in year 0 but did not change dividends (%) 
Increases (n = 206)	 1.92*** -0.06 -0.79*** 0.08 
(6.585) (-0.201) (-2.783) (0.291) 
Decreases (n = 114)	 -0.44 -0.21 -1.04** -4.27*** 
(-0.834) (-0.215) (-1.978) (-5.913) 
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Overall, the findings from Table 4.2b for dividend-increasing firms show no 
evidence in support of the signalling hypothesis. That is, profitability does not 
significantly improve but deteriorate following dividend increases. Although the 
findings for dividend-decreasing firms lend support to the signalling hypothesis, i.e., 
profitability falls significantly after dividend decreases, the results are not robust in 
all three panels. 
4.4.2 Dividend Changes and Future Earnings Changes 
In this section, the relation between dividend changes and earnings changes is 
formally investigated. Adopting an approach similar to the one used in Benartzi et al. 
(1997), I start with the examination of the correlation between the change in dividend 
in year 0 and the change in earnings in years 1 and 2. 
∆Et = a + b∆DIV0 + ε t , (4.13) 
for t = 1 and 2, where ∆Et denotes change in earnings before extraordinary items 
from year t-1 to year t standardized by book value of total assets in year t, and 
∆DIV0 is the annualized dividend change between year -1 and year 0. 
Table 4.3 reports the regression result of equation (4.13). It indicates a 
significant positive relation between dividend changes and earnings changes in one 
year following dividend changes but insignificant negative relation between these 
variables in two years after dividend changes. Thus, the results from Table 4.3 lend 
only a little support to the signalling theory. 
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Table 4.3 Dividend Changes and Future Earnings Changes 
This table reports regression results between dividend changes and future earnings changes. 
∆Et denotes earnings growth between year t-1 and year t, standardized by book value of 
total assets in year t. ∆DIV0 is the annual dividend change (%) from year -1 to year 0. The 
figures in parentheses are the t-statistics for the coefficients. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
tE∆ tDIVba + ε∆+= 0 
t a b R
2 
1 
2 
0.004 
(1.098) 
-0.002 
(-0.452) 
0.008* 
(2.373) 
-0.006 
(-1.315) 
1.7% 
0.2% 
4.4.3 Dividend Changes and Future ROA Changes 
As a robustness check of whether dividend changes signal future profitability, 
the dependent variable in equation 4.13 is replaced with the ROA changes. 
∆ROAt = a + b∆DIV0 +ε t , (4.14) 
for t = 1 and 2, where ∆ROAt denotes change in return on assets between year t-1 and 
year t, ROAt is the earnings before interest and tax scaled by book value of total 
assets value of total assets at the beginning of the year, and ∆DIV0 is the annualized 
dividend change between year -1 and year 0. 
The results from Table 4.4 show no indication in support of the signalling 
hypothesis.17 In particular, a significantly negative relation between dividend change 
and ROA change is found in one year after dividend announcement, a finding against 
Using change in return on equity (∆ROEt ) or change in return on sales (∆ROSt ) as dependent 
variable yields similar results. 
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the signalling hypothesis, and no significant relation between dividend change and 
ROA change is found in two years after dividend announcement 
Table 4.4 Dividend Changes and Future ROA Changes 
This table reports regression results between dividend changes and future ROA changes. 
∆ROAt denotes change in return on assets between year t-1 and year t, where ROAt is the 
earnings before interest and tax scaled by book value of total assets. ∆DIV0 is the annual 
dividend change (%) from year -1 to year 0. The figures in parentheses are the t-statistics for 
the coefficients. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
tROA∆ tDIVba + ε∆+= 0 
t a b R
2 
1 
2 
0.065** 
(2.110) 
-0.033 
(-0.854) 
-0.056** 
(-1.833) 
0.038 
(1.003) 
1.0% 
0.3% 
4.4.4 Dividend Changes and Past Earnings Changes 
In previous sections, I have found only a little indication that dividend 
changes signal changes in profitability in the same direction. Perhaps, the manager’s 
decision to change dividends is a lagged result of past performance. Therefore, in this 
section, the other side of the story is explored by examining the relation between 
dividend changes and past earnings changes. The dependent variable now is the 
dividend change in year 0, and the explanatory variable is the earnings change in 
year -1. 
∆DIV0 = a + b∆E−1 +ε , (4.15) 
where ∆DIV0 is the percentage change in dividends from year -1 to year 0; ∆E−1 
denotes the earnings changes from year -2 to -1. 
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Table 4.5 demonstrates that the relations between dividend changes and the 
past earnings changes is positive and highly significant at 1% level. Thus, the past 
earnings change is a significant determinant of dividend change. 
Table 4.5 Dividend Changes and Past Earnings Changes

This table reports regression results between dividend changes and the past 
earnings changes. ∆DIV0 is the percentage change in dividends from year -1 to 
year 0. ∆E−1 denotes the percentage changes in earnings from year -2 to -1. The 
figures in parentheses are the t-statistics. ***, **, and * denote significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
a 
∆ 0DIV + ε∆+= −1Eba 
b R
2 
0.358*** 
(6.775) 
3.125*** 
(3.323) 
3.7% 
4.4.5 Dividend Changes and Past ROA Changes 
In this section, I test whether the past change in profitability, as measured by 
ROA, is a significant determinant of dividend change. 
∆DIV0 = a + b∆ROA−1 +ε , (4.16) 
where ∆DIV0 is the percentage change in dividend from year -1 to year 0; ∆ROA−1 
denotes the ROA changes from year -2 to -1. 
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Table 4.6 Dividend Changes and Past ROA Changes

This table reports regression results between dividend changes and the past ROA changes. 
∆DIV0 is the percentage change in dividends from year -1 to year 0. ∆ROA−1 denotes the 
changes in ROA from year -2 to -1. The figures in parentheses are the t-statistics. ***, **, and 
* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
∆DIV0 = a + b∆ROA−1 +ε 
2 
a b R
0.319*** 0.530*** 11.9% 
(6.775) (6.546) 
The results from Table 4.6 reveal that past ROA change is a highly 
significant factor of dividend change. Compared with past earnings change, past 
ROA change appears to be a better explanatory variable of dividend change in 
Thailand as indicated by higher R2. Therefore, ROA change will be used as a 
measure of firm’s profitability henceforth. 
4.4.6 Dividend Changes and Firm Size 
According to the signalling hypothesis, larger firms have fewer needs to 
signal their prospects to shareholders through dividends than smaller firms because 
larger firms tend to have more information available to public. Therefore, the 
signalling hypothesis predicts a negative relation between dividend change and firm 
size. On the other hand, the free cash flow hypothesis stipulates that larger firms are 
more mature than smaller firms and tend to pay higher dividends. Thus, the free cash 
flow hypothesis predicts a positive relation between dividend change and firm size. 
To examine whether firm size has a significant impact on dividend policy in 
Thailand, I perform the following regression with past ROA change as control 
variable. 
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∆DIV0 = a + b∆ROA−1 + cSIZE +ε , (4.17) 
where ∆DIV0 is the percentage change in dividends from year -1 to year 0; ∆ROA−1 
denotes the ROA changes from year -2 to -1 ; and SIZE is the natural logarithm of 
book value of total assets measured at the beginning of year 0. 
The result from Table 4.7 indicates that there is a significantly positive 
relation between firm size and dividend change, a finding consistent with the free 
cash flow hypothesis. 
Table 4.7 Dividend Changes and Firm Size

This table reports regression results between dividend changes and firm size, controlling for the 
past ROA change. ∆DIV0 is the percentage change in dividends from year -1 to year 0. ∆ROA−1 
denotes the ROA changes from year -2 to -1. SIZE is the natural logarithm of book value of total 
assets. The figures in parentheses are the t-statistics. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
a b c Adjusted R
2 
-0.758 0.533*** 0.071** 12.6% 
(-1.873) (7.092) (3.534) 
4.4.7 Dividend Changes and Investment Opportunities 
According to the free cash flow hypothesis, firms with low investment 
opportunities tend to be overinvestors, and are more likely to increase dividends to 
signal that corporate cash flows will not be wastefully invested in negative NPV 
projects. On the other hand, firms with high investments opportunities are less likely 
to increase dividends because they want to preserve cash to finance their growth. 
Hence, the free cash flow hypothesis predicts a negative relation between the 
magnitude of dividend change and investment opportunities. 
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To test this prediction, I run regression between dividend change and market-
to-book ratio, which is a proxy for investment opportunities. 
∆DIV0 = a + b∆ROA−1 + cMTB +ε , (4.18) 
where ∆DIV0 and ∆ROA−1 are defined as before; MTB is the market-to-book ratio of 
assets measured at the beginning of year 0. 
Table 4.8 Dividend Changes and Investment Opportunities

This table reports regression results between dividend changes and investment opportunities, 
controlling for the past ROA change. ∆DIV0 is the percentage change in dividends from year -1 
to year 0. ∆ROA−1 denotes the ROA changes from year -2 to -1. MTB is the market-to-book 
ratio of assets. The figures in parentheses are the t-statistics. ***, **, and * denote significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
+ ε+∆+=∆ − cMTBROAbaDIV 10 
2 
a b c Adjusted R
0.461*** 0.539*** -0.106 11.9% 
(4.226) (6.644) (-1.469) 
The results from Table 4.8 indicate that, controlling for the past ROA change, 
there is no significant relation between magnitude of dividend change and investment 
opportunities. 
4.4.8 Dividend Changes and Cash Flows 
In this section, I examine whether the magnitude of dividend change is 
significantly related to cash flow. The free cash flow hypothesis predicts a positive 
relation between dividend change and cash flow, positing that firms with high cash 
flows are more likely to raise dividend than firms with low cash flows. 
To determine the relation between cash flow and dividend change, I run the 
following regression 
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∆DIV0 = a + b∆ROA−1 + cCF +ε , (4.19) 
where ∆DIV0 and ∆ROA−1 are defined as before; CF is the operating income before 
depreciation minus interest expenses, taxes, preferred dividends, and common 
dividends, all scaled by book value of total assets. 
Results from Panel A of Table 4.9 reveal that, controlling for the past and 
concurrent ROA changes, cash flow has a significantly positive relation with the size 
of dividend changes, a finding consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis. 
However, results from separate regressions in Panel B and C show no significant 
relation between cash flow and the size of dividend increases and decreases. 
Table 4.9 Dividend Changes and Cash Flows

This table reports regression results between dividend changes and cash flows, controlling for 
the past ROA changes. ∆DIV0 is the percentage change in dividend from year -1 to year 0; 
∆ROA−1 denotes the ROA changes from year -2 to -1; CF is the operating income before 
depreciation minus interest expenses, taxes, preferred dividends, and common dividends, all 
scaled by book value of total assets. The figures in parentheses are the t-statistics. ***, **, and 
* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
+ ε+∆+=∆ − cCFROAbaDIV 10 
2 
a b c Adjusted R
0.253*** 0.504*** 1.066** 13.1% 
(4.226) (6.644) (-1.469) 
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4.4.9 Dividend Changes and Earned Equity Changes 
According to DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2006), the earned/contributed 
capital mix is a good proxy for the firm’s life-cycle stage because it measures the 
extent to which the firm is self-financing or reliant on external capital. Firms with 
high retained earnings to equity tend to be more mature with high accumulated 
profits and self-financed, thus making them good candidates to pay dividends. 
Investigating the propensity to pay dividends of U.S. firms, DeAngelo et al. 
find that there is a highly significant relation between the firm’s decision to pay 
dividend and the earned/contributed capital mix, controlling for profitability, growth, 
firm size, total equity, cash balances, and dividend history. This relation also holds 
for dividend initiations and omissions. Likewise, Denis and Osobov (2008) recently 
document that the earned/contributed capital mix is a significant determinant of the 
propensity to pay dividends in all six countries of their study. 
Accordingly, I hypothesise that the earned/contributed capital mix should 
also have a significant relation with dividend changes in Thailand. More precisely, I 
predict a positive relation between the change18 in earned/contributed capital mix, 
measured by the change in retained earnings to book value of equity ( ∆RTE ), and 
dividend changes. To test such a prediction, the following regression is performed 
∆DIV0 = a + b∆ROA−1 + c∆RTE−1 +ε , (4.20) 
where ∆DIV0 and ∆ROA−1 are defined as before; ∆RTE−1 is the change in retained 
earnings to book value of equity from year -2 to year -1. 
Table 4.10a shows that the past RTE change is a significantly positive factor 
of dividend changes, the results consistent with the life-cycle theory of dividends and 
the free cash flow hypothesis. 
While the level of earned/contributed capital mix is a significant factor explaining firm’s decision to 
pay or not to pay dividends, the change in earned/contributed capital mix is used here to test whether 
it is a significant factor explaining firm’s decision to change dividends. 
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Table 4.10a Dividend Changes and RTE Changes

This table reports regression results between dividend changes and RTE changes, controlling 
for the past ROA changes. ∆DIV0 is the percentage change in dividends from year -1 to year 0. 
∆ROA−1 denotes the changes in ROA from year -2 to -1. ∆RTE−1 is the change in retained 
earnings to book value of equity from year -2 to year -1. The figures in parentheses are the t-
statistics. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
ε+∆+∆+=∆ −− 110 RTEcROAbaDIV 
a b c Adjusted R
2 
0.261*** 0.446*** 1.483*** 17.7% 
(5.179) (5.571) (4.937) 
As a robustness check, I employ an alternative measure of earned equity 
change, change in retained earnings to total assets ( ∆RTA ), and test its significance 
by running the following regression. 
∆DIV0 = a + b∆ROA−1 + c∆RTA−1 +ε , (4.21) 
where ∆DIV0 and ∆ROA−1 are defined as before; ∆RTA−1 is the change in retained 
earnings to book value of assets from year -2 to year -1. 
Table 4.10b Dividend Changes and RTA Changes

This table reports regression results between dividend changes and RTA changes, controlling 
for the past ROA changes. ∆DIV0 is the percentage change in dividends from year -1 to year 0. 
∆ROA−1 denotes the changes in ROA from year -2 to -1. ∆RTA−1 is the change in retained 
earnings to book value of assets from year -2 to year -1. The figures in parentheses are the t-
statistics. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
+ ε∆+∆+=∆ −− 110 RTAcROAbaDIV 
2 
a b c Adjusted R
0.241*** 0.437*** 3.960*** 17.7% 
(4.681) (5.431) (4.931) 
139 
Table 4.10b shows very similar results to those in Table 4.10a. Controlling 
for the past ROA changes, the past RTA change has a highly significant relation with 
dividend changes in the same direction, the findings in line with the life-cycle theory 
of dividends and, to some extent, the free cash flow hypothesis. Therefore, the robust 
results ensure that earned equity change is a significant determinant of dividend 
changes in Thailand. 
4.4.10 Dividend Changes and Debt Ratio 
In this section, I examine whether debt ratio, measured as total debt to total 
assets, has a significant relation with magnitude of dividend change. Since firms with 
high debt ratio are more likely to be financially constrained and thus should have less 
ability to raise dividends, I predict a negative relation between debt ratio and 
magnitude of dividend change. To test such a prediction, the following regression is 
performed 
∆DIV0 = a + b∆ROA−1 + cDTA +ε , (4.22) 
where ∆DIV0 and ∆ROA−1 are defined as before. DTA is total debt to book value of 
total assets at the end of year -1. 
Table 4.11 Dividend Changes and Debt Ratio

This table reports regression results between dividend change and debt ratio, controlling for the 
past ROA changes. ∆DIV0 is the percentage change in dividend from year -1 to year 0. 
∆ROA−1 and ∆ROA0 denote the changes in ROA from year -2 to -1 and from year -1 to year 0 
respectively. DTA is total debt to book value of total assets at the end of year -1. The figures in 
parentheses are the t-statistics. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level respectively. 
+ ε+∆+=∆ − cDTAROAbaDIV 10 
2 
a b c Adjusted R
0.112* 0.549*** 0.532*** 17.2% 
(1.703) (6.996) (4.755) 
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In contrary to the prediction, the result from Table 4.11 indicates a highly 
significant positive relation between debt ratio and magnitude of dividend change, 
controlling for the past ROA changes. A possible explanation for this finding is that 
dividend increases in Thailand are financed with debt. However, this issue is beyond 
the scope of this study. 
4.4.11 Dividend Changes and Past Dividend Yield 
In this section, I introduce past dividend yield as a potential explanatory 
variable of dividend change in Thailand. As indicated by survey results of Lintner 
(1956), management has a strong desire to maintain the stability of dividends, 
implying that high yield firms are less likely to raise dividends than low yield firms. 
Thus, I expect a negative relation between past dividend yield and magnitude of 
dividend change. To test this prediction, the following regression is performed 
∆DIV0 = a + b∆ROA−1 + cYLD−1 + ε , (4.23) 
where ∆DIV0 and ∆ROA−1 are defined as before; YLD is dividend payments in year -
1 divided by market value of equity at the end of year -1. 
Table 4.12 Dividend Changes and Past Dividend Yield

This table reports regression results between dividend change and debt ratio, controlling for the 
past ROA change. ∆DIV0 is the percentage change in dividend from year -1 to year 0. ∆ROA−1 
denotes the change in ROA from year -2 to -1. YLD−1 is dividend payments in year -1 divided 
by market value of equity at the end of year -1. The figures in parentheses are the t-statistics. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
+ ε+∆+=∆ −− 110 cYLDROAbaDIV 
2 
a b c Adjusted R
1.079*** 0.328*** -12.864*** 28.8% 
(11.085) (4.304) (-8.832) 
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The result from Table 4.12 shows that past dividend yield has a highly 
significant negative relation with dividend changes. Dividend changes in Thailand 
are largely determined by the past dividend yield as indicated by a high adjusted R2 
of 28.8%. 
4.4.12 Determinants of Magnitude of Dividend Changes 
Having analysed the impact of each variable on magnitude of dividend 
changes in previous sections, the multiple regressions are performed between 
dividend change and potential independent variables, i.e., the past ROA change, firm 
size, market-to-book ratio, cash flow, earned equity change, debt ratio, and past 
dividend yield. The results from Table 4.13 reveal that the past ROA change is a 
significantly positive determinant of the magnitude of dividend changes. Model (1) 
indicates that firm size has a significantly positive relation with the magnitude of 
dividend change, controlling for the past ROA change, market-to-book ratio, and 
cash flow. Thus, this finding lends support to the free cash flow hypothesis. Both 
model (1) and model (2) show a negative relation between MTB and magnitude of 
dividend changes, the results consistent with the signalling hypothesis. In addition, 
Model (1) indicates that, controlling for the past ROA change, firm size, and MTB, 
cash flow has a significantly positive relation with the size of dividend change, a 
finding consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis. 
Further, I find that the past change in earned equity has a significantly 
positive relation with the magnitude of dividend changes, a finding consistent with 
the life-cycle theory of dividends. The results also indicate that debt ratio has a 
positive effect whereas dividend yield has a negative effect on the magnitude of 
dividend changes. Overall, I find that past profitability, firm size, cash flow, past 
RTE change, and debt ratio are positive factors while MTB and past dividend yield 
are negative factors of magnitude of dividend changes in Thailand. 
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Table 4.13 Determinants of Magnitude of Dividend Changes

This table reports multiple regression results between dividend change and hypothesised 
explanatory variables. ∆ROA−1 denotes ROA change from year -2 to -1. SIZE is the 
natural logarithm of book value of total assets. MTB is market-to-book value of assets at 
the end of year -1. CF is the operating income before depreciation minus interest 
expenses, taxes, preferred dividends, and common dividends, all scaled by book value of 
total assets. ∆RTE−1 is the change in retained earnings to book value of equity from year 
-2 to year -1. DTA is the total debt to book value of total assets. YLD−1 is dividend 
payments over market value of equity in year -1. The figures in parentheses are the t-
statistics. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
Model

Variable (1) (2) 
Intercept -0.807 0.989** 
(-1.623) (2.056) 
−1∆ROA 0.519*** 0.327*** 
(6.459) (4.931) 
SIZE 0.084** 0.004 
(2.508) (0.121) 
MTB -0.159** -0.199*** 
(-2.182) (-3.091) 
CF 1.089*** 0.095 
(2.611) (0.249) 
−1∆RTE 1.015*** 
(3.619) 
DTA 0.346*** 
(3.337) 
YLD−1 -10.844*** 
(-7.029) 
Adjusted R2 15.0% 34.6% 
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4.4.13 Logit Analysis of Firm’s Decision to Change Dividends 
In this section, I further examine the factors that have significant influences 
on firm’s decision to increase or decrease dividends (or keep dividends unchanged). 
Specifically, I run the logit regressions for dividend increases and decreases with all 
the same independent variables in section 4.4.12. 
The logit19 regression results in Table 4.14 reveal that the past ROA change 
has a significantly positive impact on firm’s decision to increase dividends. That is, 
the higher the past ROA change, the higher the probability that firms raise dividends. 
On the other hand, the past ROA change has a significantly negative impact on the 
firm’s decision to cut dividends. That is, the higher the past ROA change, the lower 
the probability that firms cut dividends. 
Controlling for the past ROA change, firm size has a significant relation with 
the firm’s decision to increase and decrease dividends. Specifically, larger firms are 
more likely to increase dividends while smaller firms are more likely to decrease 
dividends, the findings consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis. The results also 
show that firms with higher market-to-book ratio are less likely to raise dividends 
and more likely to cut dividends. These findings are consistent with the life-cycle 
theory of dividends proposed by DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2006) that firms in 
a growth phase with abundant investment opportunities are more likely to cut 
dividends to maintain their growth rate. Additionally, I find that firms with higher 
cash flows are more likely to increase dividends and firms with lower cash flows are 
more likely to cut dividends, the findings consistent with the free cash flow 
hypothesis. Further, I find that a larger increase in earned equity raises (lowers) the 
probability that firms increase (decrease) dividends, the findings consistent with the 
life-cycle theory of dividends. However, I find that debt ratio is insignificant 
determinant of probability to change dividends by Thai firms, a finding in contrast 
with that reported by Aivazian, Booth, and Cleary (2006). 
Using a dependent variable that is binary mitigates the simultaneity problem (Schmidt and Strauss, 
1975). 
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Finally, I find that dividend yield has a massive impact on firm’s decision to 
change dividends, as indicated by substantial increases in pseudo R2 in model (2) of 
both dividend increases and decreases. In particular, I find that the probability to 
increase (decrease) dividends falls (rises) with higher past dividend yield. 
Table 4.14 Logit Analysis of Firm’s Decision to Change Dividends 
This table reports logit regression results between dividend change and potential explanatory 
variables. Dividend change is either dividend increase (the value = 1 but 0 otherwise) or 
dividend decrease (the value = 1 but 0 otherwise). ∆ROA−1 denotes ROA changes from year -
2 to -1. SIZE is the natural logarithm of book value of total assets. MTB is market-to-book 
value of assets. CF is the operating income before depreciation minus interest expenses, 
taxes, preferred dividends, and common dividends, all scaled by book value of total assets. 
∆RTE−1 is the change in retained earnings to book value of equity from year -2 to year -
1. DTA is the total debt to book value of total assets at the end of year -1. YLD−1 is dividend 
payments over market value of equity in year -1. The figures in parentheses are the Wald-
statistics. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
Increases Decreases 
Variable (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Intercept -3.572*** -0.603 3.218** -0.135 
(9.086) (0.196) (5.366) (0.007) 
−1∆ROA 1.617*** 1.152*** -1.207*** -0.645** 
(26.859) (14.771) (14.087) (4.359) 
SIZE 0.241*** 0.128 -0.317*** -0.219** 
(9.056) (2.027) (11.031) (4.226) 
MTB -0.311* -0.348* 0.626*** 0.667*** 
(3.680) (3.480) (13.290) (10.878) 
CF 4.457*** 2.989** -4.781*** -2.896** 
(13.692) (5.789) (15.561) (4.807) 
−1∆RTE 5.561*** -6.749*** 
(6.888) (7.424) 
DTA 0.203 0.214 
(0.320) (0.557) 
YLD−1 -24.856*** 30.107*** 
(22.697) (27.846) 
Pseudo R2 22.2% 34.2% 19.5% 36.2% 
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4.4.14 Stock Market Reactions to Dividend Change Announcements 
4.4.14.1 Short­run Stock Price Performance around Dividend Changes 
One implication of the signalling hypothesis is that the unexpected dividend 
changes should be accompanied by stock price changes in the same direction around 
dividend change announcements (Allen and Michaely, 2003). In this section, I 
examine the stock returns surrounding dividend changes. Following DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo, and Skinner (1996), I use the market-adjust returns to measure the 
abnormal stock price reactions around dividend changes.20 Specifically, the daily 
abnormal return (AR) is calculated as 
ARi,t = ri ,t − rm,t , (4.24) 
where ri,t is the return on security i at date t, and rm,t is the return on the value-
weighted SET index. 
Subsequently, the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is calculated as the sum 
of ARi ,t during the 3-day window (-1, +1), from one day before to one day after the 
dividend announcement day (t=0), as following 
t=1 
CARi = ∑ ARi,t . (4.25) 
t=−1 
The results in Panel A of Table 4.15 show that market reacts positively to 
dividend increases but negatively to dividend decreases, the findings broadly 
consistent with earlier studies in the U.S. Compared with the average abnormal 
return in the U.S., however, the average abnormal return to dividend increases in 
20 I do not use the market model to estimate the expected returns because many securities in the 
sample firms have very low liquidity, i.e., they have no trading volume for many days in the sample 
period. 
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Thailand of 2.63% (a median of 2.06%) is much larger while the average abnormal 
return to dividend decreases of -1.53% (a median of -0.89%) is much smaller.21 
4.4.14.2 Long­run Stock Price Performance following Dividend Changes 
I further investigate the long-run stock price performance subsequent to 
dividend changes to observe how the market reacts as it later discovers that earnings 
of dividend-increasing firms do not significantly improve and earnings of dividend-
decreasing firms do not significantly decline. I use the buy-and-hold abnormal return 
(BHAR) adjusted by the market return to detect the abnormal stock price 
performance after dividend change announcements as follows 
b b 
BHARi =∏(1 + Rit ) −∏(1 + Mt ), (4.26) 
t=a t=a 
where R is the return on stock i on month t and M is the return on the SET value-it t 
weighted market portfolio on month t . The BHARs for 12 months before, and 12 
months and 24 months after the month in which firms announce dividend changes 
(month 0) are then calculated and reported in Table 4.15. 
The results indicate that dividend-increasing firms outperform the market by 
7.78% in 12 months prior to dividend increases. However, like Harada and Nguyen 
(2005), I find that the abnormal returns become negative in the long run following 
dividend changes. In particular, they underperform the market with a negative BHAR 
of -12.89% in 12 months subsequent to dividend changes and continue to perform 
poorly relative to the market in the longer term with a negative BHAR of -30.89% in 
24 months after dividend changes. These results contradict those of Benartzi, 
Michaely and Thaler (1997), who find a positive drift after dividend announcements. 
The downward trend of abnormal returns suggests that investors are initially overly 
21 See, e.g., Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan (2002) who reported the average abnormal return of 
1.34% (a median of 0.95%) to dividend increases and the average abnormal return of -3.71% (a 
median of -2.05%) to dividend decreases in the U.S. 
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optimistic about firm’s future prospects and overreact to dividend increase 
announcements, and then, over time, the market corrects firm valuations (as in 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner, 1996; Fukuda, 2000). 
I find that dividend-decreasing firms experience a significantly negative 
abnormal return of -37.83% in 12 months before dividend decreases, and continue to 
perform poorly relative to the market with significantly negative returns of -24.80% 
and -55.27% in 12 months and 24 months following dividend decreases. The 
downward trend in the long-run abnormal return of dividend-decreasing firms 
suggests that market underreacts to bad news. 
The results of an over-reaction to good news (dividend increases) and under-
reaction to bad news (dividend decreases) can be considered in the framework of 
behavioural finance. For example, market over- and under-reaction to corporate news 
features in the investor-sentiment model of Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), 
and the investor-overconfidence model of Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam 
(1998). 
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Table 4.15 Market Reactions around Dividend Changes 
This table reports the abnormal stock returns both in short-run and long-run. The immediate 
stock market reaction is measured by a 3-day window cumulative abnormal return from one day 
before to one day after the dividend change day (day 0). The abnormal market-adjusted return for 
each security i is defined as ARi,t = ri,t − rm,t , where ri,t is the return on security i at date t, and 
rm,t is the return on the value-weighted SET index. BHAR -12, BHAR12 and BHAR24 are the 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns for 12 months before, 12 months after, and 24 months after the 
dividend change month (month 0) respectively. The buy-and-hold abnormal return for each 
b b 
security i is defined as BHARi =∏(1+ Rit )−∏(1+ Mt ), where Rit is the return on stock i on month t 
t=a t=a 
and Mt is the return on the SET value- weighted market portfolio on month t. ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
CAR (-1,+1) BHAR -12 BHAR 12 BHAR 24 
Dividend Increases (n = 206) 
Mean 2.63*** 7.78 -12.89*** -30.89*** 
t-statistics (8.192) (1.383) (-3.131) (-5.776) 
Median 2.06 3.87 -9.19 -29.63 
Dividend Decreases (n = 114) 
Mean -1.53*** -37.83*** -24.80*** -55.27*** 
t-statistics (-4.465) (-6.200) (-5.352) (-8.685) 
Median -0.89 -26.04 -13.63 -54.44 
4.4.15 Announcement Returns and Size of Dividend Changes 
A prediction of the signalling hypothesis is that greater magnitude of 
dividend change is accompanied by higher announcement returns in the same 
direction. I test this prediction by running a regression between announcement 
returns and magnitude of dividend change. 
CAR = a + b∆DIV0 + cDIVDUM +ε , (4.27) 
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where CAR is the market-adjusted cumulative abnormal return during a 3-day 
window (-1, +1) ; ∆DIV0 is the percentage change in dividends from year -1 to year 0; 
DIVDUM = 1 for dividend increase and 0 for dividend decrease. 
Table 4.16 shows that the size of dividend changes has a significantly 
positive relation with the magnitude of announcement returns, indicating that 
dividend increases are perceived as good news and dividend cuts are perceived as 
bad news. The coefficient of dummy variable is highly significant, indicating that 
dividend increases and dividend decreases affect CAR differently. 
Table 4.16 Announcement Returns and Size of Dividend Changes 
This table reports regression results between cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and size of 
dividend changes. CAR is the market-adjusted cumulative abnormal return during a 3-day 
window (-1, +1). ∆DIV0 is the percentage change in dividend from year -1 to year 0. 
DIVDUM = 1 for dividend increase and 0 for dividend decrease. The figures in parentheses 
are the t-statistics for the coefficients. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level respectively. 
CAR = a + b∆DIV0 + cDIVDUM +ε 
2 
a b c Adjusted R
-0.013*** 0.010*** 0.032*** 23.0% 
(-3.346) (3.308) (5.257) 
4.4.16 Announcement Returns and Past Dividend Yield 
In this section, I examine whether there is any significant relation between 
announcement return and past dividend yield. This provides us with an opportunity 
to test the dividend clientele hypothesis in Thailand. According to this hypothesis, a 
dividend increase will result in higher positive announcement return for high-yield 
firms than for low-yield firms if high-yield firms attract investors with a preference 
for higher dividends. Similarly, a dividend decrease will be accompanied by lower 
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negative announcement return for low-yield firms if investors in low-yield stocks 
prefer lower dividend payments. 
Previous studies (e.g., Bajaj and Vijh, 1990; Denis et al., 1994) document a 
positive relation between the magnitude of stock market reaction to a dividend 
change announcement and dividend yield, the finding consistent with the dividend 
clientele hypothesis. To examine the relation between announcement return and 
dividend yield in Thailand, I run the following regression 
CAR = a + b∆DIV0 + cYLD−1 +ε , (4.28) 
where CAR and DIV0 are defined as before, and YLD−1 is the past dividend yield, 
calculated as dividends in year -1 over market value of equity at the end of year -1. 
The results from Table 4.17 indicate that, controlling for the size of dividend 
change, dividend yield is not a significant variable explaining initial stock market 
reactions to dividend change announcements. Hence, this finding fails to support the 
dividend clientele hypothesis. 
Table 4.17 Announcement Returns and Past Dividend Yield 
This table reports regression results between cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and 
dividend yield. CAR is the market-adjusted cumulative abnormal return during a 3-day 
window (-1, +1). ∆DIV0 is the percentage change in dividend from year -1 to year 0. 
YLD−1 is the past dividend yield, calculated as dividends in year -1 over market value of 
equity at the end of year -1. The figures in parentheses are the t-statistics for the coefficients. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
+ ε+∆+= −10 cYLDDIVbaCAR 
a b c Adjusted R
2 
0.006 
(1.019) 
0.019*** 
(6.654) 
-0.047 
(-0.549) 
16.4% 
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4.4.17 Announcement Returns and Firm Size 
An implication of signalling hypothesis is that a dividend increase by larger 
firms should be accompanied by a lower stock market response than a dividend 
increase by smaller firms because information asymmetry between managers and 
shareholders in larger firms, which are more often followed by analysts and 
outsiders, is less severe than that in smaller firms. In contrast, the free cash flow 
hypothesis predicts that a dividend increase by larger firms should result in a higher 
announcement return because larger firms are more mature and more likely to be 
overinvestors than smaller firms and a dividend increase is a mitigation of 
overinvestment problem. To test these two competing hypotheses, I run the simple 
regression between initial market reaction and firm size, controlling for the 
magnitude of dividend changes as follows. 
CAR = a + b∆DIV0 + c(DIVDUM * SIZE) +ε , (4.29) 
where CAR and ∆DIV0 are defined as before; SIZE is the natural logarithm of book 
value of total assets; DIVDUM = 1 for dividend increase and 0 for dividend 
decrease. 
Table 4.18 Announcement Returns and Firm Size 
This table reports regression results between cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and firm 
size, controlling for magnitude of dividend changes. CAR is the market-adjusted cumulative 
abnormal return during a 3-day window (-1, +1). ∆DIV0 is the percentage change in 
dividend from year -1 to year 0. DIVDUM = 1 for dividend increase and 0 for dividend 
decrease. SIZE is the natural logarithm of book value of total assets. The figures in 
parentheses are the t-statistics for the coefficients. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
( )+ ε+∆+= SIZEc DIVDUMDIVbaCAR * 0 
2 
a b c Adjusted R
-0.011*** 0.011*** 0.002*** 21.6% 
(-2.822) (3.733) (4.638) 
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The result from Table 4.18 shows a significantly positive relation between 
CAR and interaction term DIVDUM*SIZE, indicating that a dividend increase by 
larger firms results in a higher announcement return. This finding is consistent with 
the free cash flow hypothesis. 
4.4.18 Announcement Returns and Investment Opportunities 
According to the free cash flow hypothesis, a dividend increase by firms with 
low investment opportunities is good news for shareholders because it is less likely 
that management will waste corporate cash in negative NPV projects. Thus, the free 
cash flow hypothesis predicts a negative relation between announcement returns and 
investment opportunities. 
To examine the relationship between announcement return and firm’s 
investment opportunities, I run the following regression 
CAR = a + b∆DIV0 + cMTB +ε , (4.30) 
where CAR and ∆DIV0 are defined as before; MTB is the market-to-book ratio of 
assets measured at the beginning of year 0. 
Table 4.19 Announcement Returns and Investment Opportunities 
This table reports regression results between cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and 
investment opportunities, controlling for the size dividend changes. CAR is the market-
adjusted cumulative abnormal return during a 3-day window (-1, +1). ∆DIV0 is the 
percentage change in dividends from year -1 to year 0. MTB is the market-to-book ratio of 
assets. The figures in parentheses are the t-statistics for the coefficients. ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
+ ε+∆+= cMTBDIVbaCAR 0 
2 
a b c Adjusted R
0.008 0.020*** -0.003 16.5% 
(1.449) (7.954) (-0.982) 
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Table 4.19 indicates that there is no significant relation between investment 
opportunities, as measured by MTB ratio, and announcement returns for dividend 
changes in Thailand. 
4.4.19 Announcement Returns and Cash Flows 
The free cash flow hypothesis posits that firms with high cash flows are more 
likely to be overinvestors than firms with low cash flows. Therefore, a dividend 
increase by firms with high cash flows conveys information to the market that 
corporate cash flows will not be wastefully invested in negative NPV projects. To 
test the relation between cash flow and initial market reaction, the following 
regression is performed 
CAR = a + b∆DIV0 + c(DIVDUM *CF )+ ε , (4.31) 
where CF is undistributed cash flow defined as operating income before depreciation 
minus interest expenses, taxes, preferred dividends, and common dividends, scaled 
by total assets; DIVDUM = 1 for dividend increase and 0 for dividend decrease. 
Table 4.20 Announcement Returns and Cash Flows 
This table reports regression results between cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and cash 
flows, controlling for the size dividend changes. CAR is the market-adjusted cumulative 
abnormal return during a 3-day window (-1, +1). ∆DIV0 is the percentage change in 
dividends from year -1 to year 0. DIVDUM = 1 for dividend increase and 0 for dividend 
decrease. CF is undistributed cash flow defined as operating income before depreciation 
minus interest expenses, taxes, preferred dividends, and common dividends, all scaled by 
book value of total assets. The figures in parentheses are the t-statistics for the coefficients. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
( )+ ε+∆+= CFc DIVDUMDIVbaCAR * 0 
2 
a b c Adjusted R
-0.001 0.018*** 0.083*** 19.3% 
(-0.223) (6.880) (3.453) 
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Regression result from Table 4.20 shows a significantly positive relation 
between CAR and interaction term DIVDUM*CF, indicating that, compared with a 
dividend increase by firms with lower cash flows, a dividend increase by firms with 
higher cash flows results in a higher announcement return. This finding is consistent 
with the free cash flow hypothesis. 
4.4.20 Announcement Returns and Earned Equity 
In this section, I use the earned equity (RTE), measured as the retained 
earnings to book value of equity, to test the life-cycle theory of dividends in 
Thailand. According to DeAngelo et al. (2006), firms with low RTE tend to be in the 
growth stage and reliant on external funds, whereas firms with high RTE tend to be 
more mature with plentiful cumulative profits that make them good candidates to pay 
dividends. Essentially, the life-cycle hypothesis and the free cash flow hypothesis are 
very similar in that they both predict that more mature and profitable firms are more 
likely to pay dividends than younger firms with many investment opportunities. 
Consequently, a dividend increase should lead to a more positive market reaction for 
high RTE firms than for low RTE firms. To test the life-cycle hypothesis, I run the 
following regression: 
CAR = a + b∆DIV0 + cRTE +ε , (4.32) 
where CAR and ∆DIV0 are defined as before; RTE is earned equity measured as 
retained earnings to book value of equity at the end of year -1. 
The result from Table 4.21 shows that, controlling for the size of dividend 
change, there is a highly significant positive relation between announcement returns 
and RTE. In other words, for an equal size of dividend change, stock market reacts 
more strongly to a dividend change announcement by firms with higher RTE. This 
finding is consistent with the life-cycle hypothesis. 
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Table 4.21 Announcement Returns and Earned Equity 
This table reports regression results between cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and earned 
equity, controlling for magnitude of dividend changes. CAR is the market-adjusted 
cumulative abnormal return during a 3-day window (-1, +1). ∆DIV0 is the percentage 
change in dividends from year -1 to year 0. RTE is earned equity measured as retained 
earnings to book value of equity at the end of year -1. The figures in parentheses are the t-
statistics for the coefficients. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level respectively. 
+ ε+∆+= cRTEDIVbaCAR 0 
2 
a b c Adjusted R
-0.009* 0.021*** 0.030*** 18.2% 
(-1.771) (8.354) (2.736) 
4.4.21 Determinants of Announcement Returns 
Having determined significance of each variable in explaining initial market 
reactions to dividend change announcements in previous sections, the multiple 
regressions are performed between announcement returns and hypothesised 
independent variables, i.e., dividend change, dividend yield, firm size, investment 
opportunities, cash flow, and earned equity22 . 
Results from Model (1) of Table 4.22 show that announcement returns are 
significantly related to the size of dividend change. However, contrary to the findings 
of Fuller and Blau (2008), I find no significant relation between announcement 
returns and dividend yield in both models. Hence, there is no evidence in support of 
the dividend clientele hypothesis. In both models, the interaction term 
SIZE*DIVDUM is positively related to announcement returns, indicating that a 
dividend increase by larger firms leads to higher announcement returns. This finding 
is consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis. However, there is no significant 
I also attempted using firm’s age as a proxy for firm’s maturity to test the life-cycle hypothesis but 
found it insignificant in all regressions. 
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relation between MTB and announcement returns in any case. Model (2) shows that 
the interaction term CF*DIVDUM is significantly related to announcement returns in 
the same direction, indicating that a dividend increase by firms with higher cash 
flows leads to higher announcement returns. This finding is consistent with the free 
cash flow hypothesis. In addition, RTE, a proxy for firm’s life-cycle, has a 
significantly positive relation with announcement returns, a finding consistent with 
the life-cycle hypothesis and, to some extent, with the free cash flow hypothesis. 
Table 4.22 Determinants of Announcement Returns

This table reports regression results between cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and 
potential explanatory variables. CAR is the market-adjusted cumulative abnormal return 
during a 3-day window (-1, +1). ∆DIV0 is the percentage change in dividend from year -1 
to year 0. YLD−1 is the past dividend yield, calculated as dividend payments in year -1 
over market value of equity at the end of year -1. SIZE is the natural logarithm of book 
value of total assets. MTB is market-to-book value of assets. CF is undistributed cash 
flow calculated as operating income before depreciation minus interest expenses, taxes, 
preferred dividends, and common dividends, all scaled by book value of total 
assets. RTE is retained earnings to book value of equity. The figures in parentheses are 
the t-statistics. DIVDUM =1 for dividend increase and 0 for dividend decrease. ***, **, 
and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
Model

Variable (1) (2) 
Intercept -0.017** -0.019* 
(-2.268) (-1.917) 
0∆DIV 0.012*** 0.013*** 
(3.850) (3.986) 
YLD−1 0.083 0.067 
(0.949) (0.768) 
SIZE*DIVDUM 0.002*** 0.002*** 
(4.699) (3.614) 
MTB -0.003 
(-0.880) 
CF*DIVDUM 0.048* 
(1.893*) 
RTE 0.020 
(1.774) 
Adjusted R2 21.6% 23.0% 
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4.4.22 Investments following Dividend Changes 
In this section, I further examine the firm’s investment behaviours following 
dividend changes. According to the free cash flow hypothesis, the firm’s investments 
should decline following a dividend increase by low-growth (MTB < the mean)23 
firms. Table 4.23 provides information about change in capital expenditures of 
sample firms around dividend changes according to their future investment 
opportunities. 
Table 4.23 Investments Around Dividend Changes 
This table reports percentage changes in capital expenditures of the sample firms around 
dividend changes. The change in capital expenditure in year t (∆CAPEX t ) is the change 
from year t-1 to year t scaled by book value of total assets at the end of year t, where the 
capital expenditure in year t is the cash used to purchase tangible fixed assets and 
investments. MTB is market-to-book ratio of assets. ***, **, and * denote significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
Year ­1 Year 0 Year +1 Year +2

Panel A: Dividend increase 
MTB < Mean (n = 132) 2.38*** 1.17* 1.53** 0.33 
(3.456) (1.665) (2.280) (0.546) 
MTB > Mean (n = 74) 3.23*** 1.50 -0.16 3.33*** 
(2.668) (1.040) (-0.157) (3.071) 
Difference -0.85 -0.33 1.69 -3.00** 
(-0.656) (-0.205) (1.435) (-2.425) 
Panel B: Dividend decrease 
MTB < Mean (n = 74) 1.54 1.20 0.68 0.33 
(0.749) (0.770) (0.576) (0.274) 
MTB > Mean (n = 40) 3.45 0.47 -0.38 -0.47 
(1.023) (0.300) (-0.288) (-0.394) 
Difference -1.91 0.73 1.06 0.80 
(-0.513) (0.299) (0.564) (0.428) 
23 Using MTB less than the median yields similar results. 
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For dividend-increasing group, Panel A shows that low-growth firms 
significantly increase their capital expenditures by 2.38% in one year prior to 
dividend increases. Then, their investment growth declines to 1.17% in the event 
year. In contrast with the free cash flow hypothesis, these firms increase capital 
expenditures significantly by 1.53% in one year following dividend increases. In the 
two years following dividend increases, their capital expenditures increase 
insignificantly by 0.33%. In addition, Panel A shows that high-growth firms 
significantly increase their capital expenditures by 3.23% in one year before dividend 
increases. However, there is no significant change in capital expenditures in the 
event year and one year following dividend increases. Their capital expenditures 
significantly increase again by 3.33% in the two years following dividend increases. 
Further, Panel A indicates that investment growth of high-growth firms is 3% 
significantly higher than that of low-growth firms in the two years following 
dividend increases. 
For dividend-decreasing group, Panel B shows no significant investment 
growth for both low-growth firms and high-growth firms in the sample period. The 
results for dividend-decreasing group reveal that there is no statistically significant 
difference in investment behaviours between low-growth firms and high-growth 
firms. 
4.4.23 Dividend Changes and Future Investments 
In previous section, I find that low-growth firms do not decrease their capital 
expenditures following a dividend increase as predicted by the free cash flow 
hypothesis. In contrary, they significantly increase investments in one year following 
dividend increase announcements. However, it does not mean that a dividend 
increase does not help curtail investments and thus mitigate overinvestment problem. 
If a dividend increase indeed helps alleviate the agency cost of free cash flow, the 
size of dividend increases should have a negative impact on future investments. 
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An implication of the free cash flow hypothesis is that larger firms are more 
mature, have more free cash flow, and are more likely to be overinvestors than 
smaller firms. Thus, if dividend policy is adopted to control overinvestment problem, 
firm size may have a negative effect on subsequent investments. Cash flow change 
is used to test the free cash flow hypothesis that firms with more free cash flows are 
more likely to overinvest. Since higher MTB imply more investment opportunities, 
the relation between MTB ratio and capital expenditures are likely to be positive if 
the signalling hypothesis is supported. On the other hand, the negative relation 
between these two variables is consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis. To test 
these predictions, I adopt the following model for t =1 and 2. 
∆CAPEXt = a + b∆DIV0 + cDIVDUM + d∆CFt −1 + eSIZEt−1 + fMTBt −1 +ε t (4.34) 
where ∆CAPEX is the change in capital expenditure from year t-1 to year t scaled t 
by total assets at the end of year t, where the capital expenditure in year t is the cash 
used to purchase tangible fixed assets and investments. 
Table 4.24 shows that the magnitude of dividend change has a significantly 
negative impact on investments in one year following dividend announcements, a 
finding consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis. However, there is no 
significant relation between the magnitude of dividend change and investment 
growth in two years following dividend change announcements. The dummy variable 
of dividend change is statistically significant, indicating different effect between 
dividend increase and dividend decrease on investment growth in one year following 
dividend change announcements. The past cash flow change is insignificant impact 
on investment growth. Firm size has negative relation with investment growth in one 
year following dividend changes, a finding in support of the free cash flow 
hypothesis. However, there is no significant relation between market-to-book ratio 
and subsequent investment growth in any case. 
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Table 4.24 Investments following Dividend Changes

This table reports regression results between changes in capital expenditures and 
dividend changes, cash flow changes, firm size, and investment opportunities. 
∆CAPEXt is the change in capital expenditure from year t-1 to year t scaled by 
book value of total assets at the end of year t. ∆CFt is the change in undistributed 
cash flow from year t-1 to year t scaled by book value of total assets at the end of 
year t. ∆DIV0 is the annual dividend change (%) from year -1 to year 0. DIVDUM 
=1 for dividend increase and 0 for dividend decrease SIZE is the natural logarithm 
of total assets. MTB is the market-to-book ratio of assets. The figures in the 
parentheses are the t-statistics for the coefficients. ***, ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively. 
tCAPEX∆ cDIVDUMDIVba +∆+= 0 tt eSIZECFd ++∆+ −− 11 ttfMTB + ε−1 
Coefficient t = 1 t = 2 
a 0.113** 0.065 
(2.297) (1.309) 
b -0.013* 0.004 
(-0.944) (0.643) 
c 0.026** 0.011 
(2.003) (0.833) 
d 0.011 -0.047 
(0.239) (-1.023) 
e -0.008** -0.004 
(-2.380) (-1.335) 
f 0.002 0.030 
(0.251) (0.346) 
Adjusted R2 1.6% 0.0% 
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4.5 Summary 
I test the signalling hypothesis and the free cash flow hypothesis of dividend 
changes in Thailand between 2002 and 2005. The analysis of sample firms’ 
profitability around dividend changes reveals that dividend-increasing firms do not 
have better profitability but dividend-decreasing firms experience a significant 
decline in profitability. Results from univariate analysis of the relation between 
dividend changes and subsequent profitability changes show that ROA changes of 
dividend changing firms significantly decline in one year after dividend 
announcements and no significant relation between these variables in two years after 
dividend announcements. Therefore, the findings show no or, if any, only a little 
indication that dividend changes signal changes in profitability in the same direction. 
Then, I investigate whether dividend changes are lagged results of the past 
performance and find that dividend changes are positively related to the past 
profitability, as measured by earnings growth rates or ROA changes. These findings 
are consistent with those in Benartzi et al. (1997) who show that dividend changes 
signal the past rather than the future. 
Further examination of the factors determining the size of dividend changes 
shows that the past ROA change is a positively significant determinant of the 
magnitude of dividend changes. Consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis, the 
results indicate that larger firm size and higher cash flow lead to greater magnitude 
of dividend changes, and that firms with lower MTB ratio make larger dividend 
changes. Additionally, I find that past dividend yield has a strongly negative impact 
on the size of dividend changes. This finding suggests a high level of dividend 
stability in Thailand. Further, I find that higher change in earned equity leads to 
larger dividend changes, the finding consistent with the life-cycle theory of 
dividends. Finally, I find a positive relation between debt ratio and the magnitude of 
dividend changes. This finding is surprising and casts doubt whether dividend 
increases by Thai firms are financed with debts. However, this issue is beyond the 
scope of this study. 
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Additional logit analysis of firm’ decision to change dividends indicates that 
larger firms with better past profitability, higher cash flows, and higher earned equity 
change are more likely to increase dividends while higher-yield firms are less likely 
to increase dividends. On the other hand, larger firms with better past profitability, 
higher cash flows, and higher earned equity change are less likely to cut dividends 
while higher-yield firms and firms with higher MTB ratio are more likely to decrease 
dividends. These findings are broadly consistent with the implication of the free cash 
flow hypothesis that larger firms with higher profits and cash flows are better 
candidates to increase dividends. 
Next, I analyse the short-run and long-run stock price performance around 
dividend changes. Consistent with evidence in the U.S., the Thai stock market reacts 
positively to dividend increase but negatively to dividend decrease announcements. 
Compared to that in the U.S., however, the average announcement return is higher 
for a dividend increase and lower for a dividend decrease. Analysis of long-run price 
performance shows negative and downward trends in buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
in 12 months and 24 months following dividend announcements for both dividend 
increases and dividend decreases. These findings suggest that Thai stock market 
appears to overreact to good news but underreact to bad news. 
Subsequently, I examine the relation between announcement returns and 
hypothesised independent variables. I find that the magnitude of dividend changes is 
positively related to the magnitude of announcement returns and that a dividend 
increase by larger firms or firms with more cash flows leads to a higher stock price 
reaction, the findings consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis. Although 
dividend yield is a highly significant factor determining the magnitude of dividend 
changes, it is insignificant factor of announcement returns. Hence, there is no 
evidence in support for the dividend clientele hypothesis. 
Analysis of firms’ investment behaviours around dividend changes indicate 
that both low MTB and high MTB firms significantly increase their capital 
expenditures following dividend increase announcements. The finding for low MTB 
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firms is therefore in contrast with a prediction of free cash flow hypothesis whereas 
the finding for high MTB firms is consistent with the signalling hypothesis. For 
dividend-decreasing group, I do not find any significant change in capital 
expenditures following dividend cuts for both low MTB and high MTB firms. 
The examination of the factors explaining firm’s subsequent investments 
reveals that there is a negative relation between dividend changes and capital 
expenditures in one year following dividend increase announcements, suggesting that 
a dividend increase helps alleviate overinvestment problem. It is also found that 
larger firms decrease their capital expenditures in one year after dividend changes, 
the evidence consistent with a prediction of the free cash flow hypothesis. 
Overall, the findings offer almost no indication that dividend changes signal 
the future profitability. Rather, a dividend increase by the sample firms is used to 
signal to shareholders that overinvestment problem is being mitigated, thus 
increasing the firm value. Therefore, the empirical evidence of dividend changes in 
Thailand is broadly consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis rather than the 
signalling hypothesis. 
In the next chapter, I investigate the share repurchase activities in Thailand 
over the period 2001-2007. The focus is to examine the stock market reaction to 
share repurchase announcements and to test whether the managers of repurchasing 
firms are able to time the market. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Open Market Share Repurchases in Thailand 
This chapter provides preliminary evidence on open-market share repurchase 
activities in Thailand from December 2001 to January 2007. It is divided into two 
main parts. In the first part, the stock market reactions to open market share 
repurchase announcements are examined. In the second part, the actual repurchase 
costs are compared with the costs of benchmark portfolios to test whether the 
managers of repurchasing firms are able to time the market. 
5.1 Methods of Share Repurchases 
Typically, share repurchases can be implemented in three ways: fixed-price 
tender offers, Dutch auctions, or open market repurchases. 
In a fixed-price tender offer, a repurchasing firm firstly specifies the price at 
which it wants to repurchase shares, the number of shares sought, and the offering 
period. The shareholders then decide whether they want to sell shares to the firm at 
that specified price, and how many shares they want to tender to the firm. If the 
number of shares tenders is higher than the number of shares sought, the firm 
purchases shares on the pro-rata basis. If, on the other hand, the number of tendered 
shares is lower than the number of shares sought, the firm may choose to extend the 
repurchasing period. If too few shares are tendered, however, the firm may withdraw 
all the tendered shares prior to the expiration date. 
In a Dutch auction repurchase24, a repurchasing firm specifies a price range, 
instead of a single offer price, at which it wants to repurchase shares and the 
repurchasing period. The shareholders then submit the minimum acceptable price at 
which they are willing to sell within such specified range, along with the number of 
For more details, see Bagwell, L., 1992. “Dutch auction repurchases: An analysis of shareholder 
Heterogeneity.” Journal of Finance 47, 71-105. 
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shares they want to sell. The firm collects this information, create a supply curve, 
which is used to determine the minimum price it can buy the number of shares 
sought, and then pay all investors who tendered at or below that price. If the number 
of shares tendered exceeds the number of shares sought, the firm can repurchase 
shares on the pro-rata basis or buy back all tendered shares at or below the 
determined price. On the other hand, if the number of tendered shares is lower than 
the number of shares sought, the firm can either cancel the repurchase programme or 
repurchase all tendered shares at the maximum price (within pre-specified price 
range) proposed by tendering shareholders. 
In an open market repurchase (OMR), a firm announces its intention to buy 
back a number of shares without a commitment to do so. In the U.S., an open market 
repurchase programme generally takes several months or years to complete, and a 
substantial number of firms did not subsequently buy back shares after 
announcements at all (Stephens and Weisbach, 1998). From shareholders’ 
perspectives, hence, there is a significant uncertainty at the time of an open market 
repurchase announcement whether the firm will actually repurchase shares as 
announced. From managerial perspectives, however, a stock repurchase 
announcement can be regarded as an option to repurchase shares (Ikenberry and 
Vermaelen, 1996), thereby providing much flexibility to the firm announcing a share 
repurchase programme. 
5.2 Open Market Share Repurchase Regulations in Thailand 
Thai listed companies were first allowed by the Stock Exchange of Thailand 
(SET) to repurchase their own shares on 21st December 2001. The SET stipulated25 
that repurchasing firms must show that they have ample accumulated profits and 
ability to repay debts due during the next six months, starting from the day they 
commence the share repurchase programme and that the number of free-float shares 
The OMR regulations by the SET are obtained from “Disclosure of information and other acts of a 
listed company in the case that a listed company repurchases their own shares and disposes of such 
repurchased shares, 2001”. 
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not to fall below 15 percent. In addition, firms are prohibited from buying shares 
immediately prior to and when the key information is released to public. Moreover, 
firms must not buy back shares from connected persons. 
To better protect shareholders’ benefits and to avoid any negative impact on 
general market conditions, the SET subsequently amended the share repurchase 
rules, effective on 5th April 2004. In particular, a listed company will have to seek 
approval from shareholders in the case where share repurchases exceed 10 percent of 
paid-up capital.26 If share repurchases do not exceed 10 percent, a firm should 
propose an amendment in the articles of association to the shareholder meeting to 
give the board of directors the authority to undertake share repurchase programme. 
Moreover, share repurchases are prohibited during a takeover period unless a 
company can demonstrate that it does not repurchase shares for a takeover purpose. 
With regard to the information disclosure rules, listed companies are required 
to disclose to the SET their board resolutions approving share repurchases on the 
date of the meeting or up until 9.00 a.m. on the following trading day, and to disclose 
this information at least 14 days before they initiate share repurchase programmes. 
Furthermore, it is required that firms establish a repurchase price of no more than 
115 percent of the average closing price over the previous five trading days and it is 
recommended that firms take into account the average closing price over the 
previous 30 days before the disclosure date in buying back shares. 
A repurchasing firm may subsequently resell the repurchased shares, 
recorded on its balanced sheet as Treasury Stocks, via open market or by public 
offering, after 6 months from the completion date of share repurchases but not later 
than 3 years from that date. If a repurchasing firm has not resold repurchased shares 
within such period, the unsold treasury shares must be written off from its balanced 
sheet. 
The repurchase that exceeds 10% of the outstanding shares is treated as a tender offer repurchase. 
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The information disclosure requirements of share resale are similar to those 
of share repurchases. Listed companies must report to the SET any resolutions of the 
board of directors regarding proposed projects for share resale on the date of the 
meeting or up until 9.00 a.m. on the following trading day, and to disclose this 
information at least 14 days before they initiate share resale programmes. In addition, 
the firms are required to report the number of shares they want to resell; the 
procedure for reselling shares, which is either on the open market or by public 
offering; and the principle used to determine the resale price, which is not less than 
85 percent of the average closing price over the previous five trading days. 
5.3 The Sample 
I obtained data mainly from SETSMART (SET Market Analysis and 
Reporting Tool), the web-based application of the Stock Exchange of Thailand, via 
the website www.setsmart.com. The first step is to browse the balanced sheets of 
listed companies and look for the “Treasury Stock” item recorded in the firm’s 
equity. By doing so, only a few repurchasing firms are acquired since some firms 
that repurchased shares may subsequently resell all acquired shares so that there is no 
treasury stock item on their balanced sheets. 
Then, I search the company news by using keywords “share repurchases” and 
“treasury stock”. The most recent company news in the previous 6 months can be 
obtained from www.settrade.com and www.set.or.th. To obtain the older company 
news and historical trading data, I use the database of Kim Eng Securities (Thailand) 
Public Company Limited, a securities broker in Thailand, via www.kimeng.co.th. 
Using various searching strategies through multiple sources, I have gathered 
a total of 26 open market share repurchase announcements made by 25 firms over the 
period December 2001 and January 2007. Of these 25 firms, only one firm made two 
announcements during the sample period. The summary statistics of repurchasing 
activities in Thailand are reported in Table 5.1 below. 
168 
Table 5.1 Summary Statistics of Open Market Share Repurchases in

Thailand (December 2001 ­ January 2007)

Number of OMR announcements 26 
Number of firms which announced OMRs 25 
Number of shares announced for repurchase 1,326,761,436 
Value announced for repurchase (Million Baht) 20,283.83 
Average percentage (%) of equity announced for repurchase 7.29 
Actual number of shares repurchased 543,451,969 
Value of shares repurchased (Million Baht) 8,385.16 
Average completion rate (%) 41.52 
Average actual repurchasing days 29 
Average 6-month debt to retained Earnings 0.58 
Note that the average completion rate of OMRs by Thai firms is only about 
42%, a level much lower than that reported in the U.S. of about 70-80% (see, e.g., 
Stephens and Weisbach, 1998; Jagannathan et al., 2000) despite more stringent 
repurchase regulations in Thailand.27 Moreover, the average actual repurchasing days 
by Thai firms is only 29 days from the repurchasing period of approximately 120 
trading days. From another perspective, however, the strict regulations for OMRs in 
Thailand might explain why only a few companies have repurchased shares. 
Table 5.2 provides the descriptive statistics of OMR programmes by Thai 
firms. As required by the SET, repurchasing firms must report the details of their 
OMR programmes under “the share repurchase disclosure form” (See an example in 
Appendix C). Apart from providing the details of the maximum amount of money for 
the repurchase programme, the number of shares to be repurchased, and the 
implementation period, repurchasing firms must also report their retained earnings 
Thai firms must complete their OMR programmes within the next 6 months from the first 
repurchasing day, which is not less than 14 days after the announcement date, while the U.S. firms 
may buy back their shares within the next 2-3 years. 
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27 
and the amount of debt due in the next six months following the first repurchasing 
day to ensure that they have sufficient liquidity to execute the OMR programmes. 
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Table 5.2 Descriptive Statistics of Open Market Share Repurchases in Thailand from December 2001 to January 2007

Announcement Repurchase Period Amount No. of Shares 
Company Date From To (Baht) to Repurchase 
Advance Info Service 15/11/02 2/12/02 1/6/03 3,500,000,000 90,000,000 
Aapico HiTech 16/5/06 30/5/06 29/11/06 847,080,000 28,236,000 
BankThai 14/11/02 27/11/02 26/5/03 1,538,250,000 149,345,000 
Dusit Thani * 19/9/03 1/10/03 30/12/03 193,500,000 4,500,000 
Electricity Generating 17/12/01 2/1/02 1/7/02 1,500,000,000 42,860,000 
Finansa 13/5/05 30/5/05 30/11/05 300,000,000 12,501,000 
GMM Media 14/5/03 1/6/03 1/12/03 300,000,000 10,000,000 
GMM Grammy 1/3/02 2/4/02 2/10/02 500,000,000 45,000,000 
I.C.C. International 23/8/02 16/9/02 15/3/03 610,000,000 2,900,000 
Thainox Stainless 21/11/05 6/12/05 5/6/06 580,000,000 400,000,000 
Kiatnakin Bank 25/8/04 9/9/04 8/3/05 1,500,000,000 47,070,600 
Lam Soon (Thailand) 13/11/02 1/12/02 31/5/03 150,000,000 82,000,000 
MBK Development 10/4/03 23/4/03 22/10/03 700,000,000 20,000,000 
Modernform Group 12/11/04 29/11/04 28/5/05 300,000,000 8,000,000 
Prakit Holdings 16/12/04 1/1/05 30/6/05 30,000,000 1,800,000 
Precious Shipping 29/3/04 10/4/04 9/10/04 1,000,000,000 26,000,000 
The Safety Insurance 14/5/04 27/6/04 26/12/04 100,000,000 3,552,796 
Siam City Cement** 29/6/06 14/7/06 13/1/07 1,800,000,000 75,000,000 
Siam City Cement** 12/12/03 26/12/03 25/6/04 3,200,000,000 12,500,000 
SE-Education 25/2/04 11/3/04 11/9/04 160,000,000 25,783,600 
Srithai Superware 13/5/05 1/6/05 30/11/05 280,000,000 28,000,000 
Siam United Services 27/6/05 15/7/05 15/1/06 30,000,000 35,000,000 
Ratchthani Leasing 22/2/05 2/4/05 1/10/05 35,000,000 25,000,000 
Thai Plastic and Chemicals 27/7/05 10/8/05 9/2/06 700,000,000 43,750,000 
Tycoons Worldwide Group 18/11/05 1/12/05 31/5/06 230,000,000 25,000,000 
Seamico Securities 28/2/06 15/3/06 14/9/06 200,000,000 82,962,440 
*Dusit Thani announce a 3-month OMR programme. **Siam City Cement made 2 OMR announcements. 
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5.4 Market Reactions to OMR Announcements 
5.4.1 Methodology 
The initial market reaction to open market share repurchase announcements is 
measured by the cumulative average abnormal return (CAR) over various windows 
from twenty days before to twenty day afters the announcement date (day 0). 
Standard event methodology of Brown and Warner (1985) is used to estimate 
the daily abnormal return (AR) and the cumulative average abnormal return (CAR) 
as follows: 
AR = R − Rˆ (5.1) it it it 
Rˆ it =α i + β i Rmt (5.2) 
Where 
Rit is the return of stock i on day t; t = 0 represents the open market stock 
repurchase announcement day; 
Rˆ it is the expected return of stock i on day t; 
α i is the intercept of the model; 
β t is the systematic risk of stock i; and 
Rmt is the SET index, which is a value-weighted index of all listed companies 
in the Stock Exchange of Thailand. 
The window used to estimate the market model parameters α i and β i is 
(-250,-21). 
Given N sample securities, the average abnormal return for day t is 
1 N 
ARt = ∑ ARit . (5.3) 
N i=1 
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N 
AR 
ARσ 
The daily average abnormal returns are then aggregated across an event 
window τ to obtain a cumulative average abnormal return (CAR) 
τ 2 
CAR(τ1,τ 2 ) = ∑ ARt . (5.4) 
t=τ1 
Equations (5.5) and (5.6) below are t-statistics used to test the null hypothesis 
that AR and CAR are not statistically different from zero 
t = (5.5) AR 
CAR 
t = (5.6) CAR 
σ NCAR 
5.4.2 Market Reactions to OMR Announcements 
I begin an analysis of the initial market reaction to OMR announcements by 
plotting the graph of cumulative average abnormal returns (CARs) from 20 days 
before to 20 days after the announcement date (day 0) as shown in Figure 5.1. To 
investigate the longer-term market reaction, I plot the graph of CARs from 20 days 
before to 160 days after the announcement date as shown in Figure 5.2. 
The figures show that the stock prices of repurchasing firms experienced 
negative CARs over 20 days prior to, but positive CARs during the OMR 
announcements. The CARs of repurchasing firms had fallen continuously over 40 
days after the announcements but subsequently recovered and increased in the longer 
term. 
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Figure 5.1 Short­term Market Reactions to OMRs in Thailand
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Figure 5.2 Longer­term Market Reactions to OMRs in Thailand
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Table 5.3 provides analysis of market reactions to 26 share repurchase 
announcements by Thai firms. On average, the share prices of Thai repurchasing 
firms experienced negative cumulative abnormal returns of 3.04%, measured from 
-20 to -3 trading days preceding the open market share repurchase announcements. 
This finding is similar to that reported in the U.S. (see, e.g., Comment and Jarrell, 
1991; Ikenberry et al., 1995; Grullon and Michaely, 2002), showing significant stock 
price declines prior to OMR announcements. 
Table 5.3 Market Reactions to OMRs in Thailand 
This table shows cumulative average abnormal returns of 26 open market share repurchase 
announcements over various windows from -20 days to +160 relative to announcement date 
(day 0). The abnormal returns (ARs) are calculated against the market model, in which 
parameters are estimated from -250 days to -21 days relative to announcement date (day 0). 
% Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CARs) over Window 
N=26 (-20,-3) (-2, +2) (+3, +20) (+3, +120) (+3, +160) 
Mean -3.041 4.223 -1.442 7.534 5.104 
S.D. 9.835 6.974 10.875 26.783 33.349 
t-statistic -1.117 -3.280 -0.923 1.434 0.673 
p-value 0.275 0.003 0.365 0.164 0.507 
The mean announcement return during the event window (-2, +2) in Thailand 
is 4.22%, the level higher than the mean announcement return during the same 
window of 3.54% in the U.S. reported by Ikenberry et al. (1995) and the average 
initial market reaction reported by other researchers of approximately 3% (e.g. 
Vermaelen, 1981; Comment and Jarrell, 1991; Grullon and Michaely, 2002). 
Following the OMR announcements, the average CAR during the window (+3, +20) 
is -1.44%. However, stock prices of repurchasing firms show a positive drift in the 
longer term with the CAR of 7.53% and 5.10%, measured over windows (+3, +120) 
and (+3, +160) respectively. 
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5.5 Managerial Timing Ability 
Open market share repurchases in Thailand allows one to test the managerial 
timing ability because the repurchasing firms are required to report the information 
on share repurchases such as the number of shares repurchased, the average price 
paid for the repurchased shares, and the amount of money spent for those 
repurchased shares, to the SET no later than 9 a.m. on the next business day. This 
information is disclosed to public via the websites www.set.or.th and 
www.settrade.com. 
In order to test whether the managers of repurchasing firms have ability to 
time the market, the actual costs of repurchasing shares are compared with the costs 
of benchmark portfolios. For example, the cost of a benchmark portfolio in which a 
repurchasing firm repurchased shares with equal number of shares every day at the 
closing prices during the repurchasing period is compared with the cost of an actual 
portfolio in which a repurchasing firm repurchased different numbers of shares with 
different prices. If the cost of a benchmark portfolio is higher than that of an actual 
portfolio, the manager of a repurchasing firm may have shown ability to time the 
market. 
Using Cook, Krigman, and Leach’s (2004) methodology, I have constructed 
various benchmark portfolios, calculated their costs, and compared them with the 
actual cost to assess managerial timing ability as follows: 
(i)	 The uniform repurchase cost (UC) is the cost of accumulating shares 
uniformly during the repurchasing period. The UC is defined as 
R 
Ti Vi cUCi =∑t=1 T × Pit ,	 (5.7) i 
where Ti is the number of trading days in the repurchasing period for 
firm i,	 Vi
R = ∑tV 
R is the total number of shares repurchased in it 
actual portfolio, and Pit
c is the closing price on day t for firm i. 
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(ii)	 The closing repurchase cost (CC) is the cost of repurchasing shares at 
closing prices for the actual repurchasing days. The CC is defined as 
CCi =	 ∑PitcVitR , (5.8) 
t∈RDi 
where Pit
c is the closing price on day t for firm i, Vit
R is the number of 
shares repurchased on day t for firm i, and RDi is the set of actual 
repurchasing days. 
(iii)	 The smoothing repurchase cost (SC) is the cost of repurchasing equal 
number of shares on every repurchasing day at the closing price. The 
SC is defined as 
SCi =	 ∑ 
Vi
R 
× Pit
c 
, (5.9) 
t∈RDi 
TRDi 
where	 TRDi is the number of repurchasing days for firm i, 
Vi
R = ∑tVit
R is the total number of shares repurchased in actual 
portfolio, Pit
c is the closing price on day t for firm i, and RDi is the set 
of repurchasing days. 
(iv)	 The immediate repurchase cost (IC) is the cost of repurchasing shares 
at the closing price immediately, starting from the first day of 
announced repurchasing period for every consecutive trading day 
until the total number of shares is equivalent to that in actual portfolio. 
ICi =∑TRDi PitcVitR ,	 (5.10) t =1 
where	 TRDi is the number of repurchasing days for firm i, Pit
c is the 
closing price on day t for firm i, and Vit
R is the number of shares 
repurchased on day t for firm i. 
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Table 5.4 Actual Repurchase Cost vs. Costs of Benchmark Portfolios

COMPANY AC MAX MIN UC CC SC IC 
Advance Info Service 82,922,450 83,530,425 82,311,025 100,962,186 83,347,850 84,969,690 85,873,800 
Aapico HiTech 192,809,988 195,925,070 189,743,800 212,207,122 192,329,970 192,612,998 189,499,500 
BankThai 789,581,115 795,374,350 783,909,920 820,813,798 792,815,215 813,227,587 823,591,465 
Dusit Thani * 115,529,350 115,575,525 115,076,725 114,616,405 115,414,050 115,083,572 115,685,550 
Electricity Generating 52,031,800 52,117,975 51,911,625 52,182,506 52,223,650 51,799,714 47,634,200 
Finansa 25,037,260 25,372,500 24,919,147 27,424,986 25,320,070 24,873,107 29,906,630 
MM Media 231,334,750 231,614,200 229,496,900 258,190,654 241,170,625 229,943,316 228,552,200 
GMM Grammy 156,550,960 159,127,800 152,268,300 178,040,650 155,453,100 150,923,077 121,083,700 
I.C.C. International 61,136,000 61,262,800 60,944,400 63,415,180 60,998,800 61,612,587 61,383,400 
Thainox Stainless 248,935,341 252,856,360 245,050,847 225,877,638 248,483,536 245,149,080 272,416,404 
Kiatnakin Bank - - - - - - -
Lam Soon (Thailand) 127,612,900 128,197,230 127,485,820 128,983,220 128,172,030 131,829,302 129,966,390 
MBK Development 394,496,175 394,496,475 394,078,675 467,594,150 397,498,450 396,086,350 400,789,775 
Modernform Group 28,347,800 28,467,050 28,212,650 29,181,356 28,435,375 28,492,308 27,893,800 
Prakit Holdings 5,415,280 5,415,280 5,415,280 6,028,170 5,415,280 5,407,680 6,402,740 
Precious Shipping 449,756,325 454,482,950 445,869,175 466,390,861 448,561,300 454,095,608 452,653,950 
The Safety Insurance 60,894,137 61,312,283 57,510,947 56,943,953 61,054,083 58,079,581 51,774,343 
Siam City Cement** 1,699,352,600 1,702,383,200 1,681,381,400 1,827,338,710 1,690,446,000 1,785,000,000 1,616,289,800 
Siam City Cement** 2,977,979,000 2,989,974,800 2,956,569,600 2,911,776,860 2,980,727,800 2,922,435,897 3,054,259,400 
SE-Education 122,641,095 122,705,605 122,020,440 124,547,492 122,670,595 124,558,587 124,813,320 
Srithai Superware 127,309,640 127,941,936 126,757,385 126,729,074 127,295,520 127,069,361 127,759,011 
Siam United Services 24,610,000 24,762,210 24,446,622 23,475,200 24,728,895 24,613,514 24,435,180 
Ratchthani Leasing 1,837,978 1,850,489 1,829,967 1,924,537 1,846,989 1,850,333 2,139,489 
Thai Plastic and Chemicals - - - - - - -
Tycoons Worldwide Group 209,043,465 211,781,230 203,166,660 196,082,852 207,572,195 196,085,477 199,036,950 
Seamico Securities 199,990,000 201,239,424 198,065,912 200,172,324 200,402,074 201,401,470 227,565,006 
TOTAL 8,385,155,409 8,427,767,166 8,308,443,222 8,620,899,883 8,392,383,452 8,427,200,196 8,421,406,003 
Notes: AC is the actual repurchase cost. MAX is the cost of repurchasing shares at the highest prices for the actual repurchasing days. MIN is the cost of repurchasing shares at the lowest prices for the 
actual repurchasing days. The uniform repurchase cost (UC) is the cost of accumulating shares uniformly during the repurchasing period. The closing repurchase cost (CC) is the cost of repurchasing 
shares at closing prices for the actual repurchasing days. The smoothing repurchase cost (SC) is the cost of repurchasing equal number of shares on every repurchasing day at the closing prices. The 
immediate repurchase cost (IC) is the cost of repurchasing shares at the closing price immediately, starting from the first day of repurchase period for every consecutive trading day until the total number 
of shares is equivalent to that in actual portfolio. 
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Table 5.5 
Sign Test of Differences between Actual Repurchase Cost and Costs of 
Benchmark Portfolios 
Sign AC­UC AC­CC AC­SC AC­IC 
Negative 17 14 12 15 
Positive 7 9 12 9 
Ties 0 1 0 0 
Total 24 24 24 24 
Sign Test (p-value) 0.064 0.405 1.000 0.307 
Notes: Two firms that did not actually repurchase shares (Kiatnakin Bank and Thai Plastic and Chemicals) 
are not included. AC is the actual repurchase cost. The uniform repurchase cost (UC) is the cost of 
accumulating shares uniformly during the repurchasing period. The closing repurchase cost (CC) is the cost 
of repurchasing shares at closing prices for the actual repurchasing days. The smoothing repurchase cost 
(SC) is the cost of repurchasing equal number of shares on every repurchasing day at the closing prices. The 
immediate repurchase cost (IC) is the cost of repurchasing shares at the closing price immediately, starting 
from the first day of repurchase period for every consecutive trading day until the total number of shares is 
equivalent to that in actual portfolio. 
Table 5.4 provides details for actual repurchasing costs and the costs of 
benchmark portfolios. The figures show that the cost of actual share repurchases is 
lower than the costs of all benchmark portfolios, suggesting that the managers of 
repurchasing firms possess substantial timing ability. 
Table 5.5 shows the sign test of the differences between actual repurchasing 
cost (AC) and four benchmark portfolios (UC, CC, SC, and IC). Note that two firms 
that did not actually buy back shares are not included in the sign test. The results 
indicate that 17 out of 24 firms (70.83%) have actual repurchase cost (AC) lower 
than uniform repurchase cost (UC); 14 out of 24 firms (58.33%) have actual 
repurchase cost (AC) lower than closing repurchase cost (CC); 12 out of 24 firms 
(50%) have actual repurchase cost (AC) lower than smoothing repurchase cost; and 
15 out of 24 firms (62.5%) have actual repurchase cost (AC) lower than immediate 
repurchase cost. Although the differences are not statistically significant, the overall 
results demonstrate that the actual repurchase costs of most repurchasing firms are 
lower than the costs of benchmark portfolios. This evidence suggests that the 
managers of repurchasing firms in Thailand are able to time the market. 
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5.6 Summary 
This chapter provides preliminary evidence on open-market share 
repurchases in Thailand from December 2001 to January 2007. The results from the 
examination of stock price reactions surrounding open-market share repurchases in 
Thailand reveal that share prices of repurchasing firms significantly decline prior to 
but reacts positively upon OMR announcements. These findings show that open-
market share repurchases are good news for investors. In addition, it is found that 
share prices of repurchasing firms earn positive CARs over the market index in the 
longer-term subsequent to OMR announcements, indicating that Thai stock market 
underreacts to OMR announcements. In a further investigation of managerial timing 
ability, the results reveal that the costs of actual repurchase portfolio are lower than 
those of benchmark portfolios, suggesting that the managers of repurchasing firms 
repurchase shares in order to time the market and they are successful in doing so. 
Nevertheless, it is recognised that the small sample size limits the power of 
statistical tests of the results in this chapter. Thus, it will be worthwhile to re-
examine the share repurchases in Thailand in the future when the number of 
repurchase activities increase to a certain level in order to obtain a more complete 
picture of payout policy in this emerging market. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Conclusions 
This thesis aims to shed additional light on dividend puzzle. Accordingly, two 
theoretical models related to the corporate dividend policy have been developed. The 
first model, developed in spirit of Isagawa (2000), demonstrates a situation in which 
the manager chooses to payout free cash flows to shareholders in the form of 
dividends or share repurchases, or to invest cash flows in a real project from which 
he can take private benefits. I focus on the case in which the return on investment for 
high-quality firm (firm H) is positive whereas that for low-quality firm (firm L) is 
negative. That is, firm H has a better prospect and firm L has a worse prospect. The 
model is then analysed in three cases according to managerial weight parameter: (1) 
the manager balances his short-term and long-term payoffs; (2) the manager 
maximises only his short-term payoff; and (3) the manager maximises only his long-
term payoff. 
The results show that, regardless of the managerial weight parameter, paying 
dividends is a dominated strategy for firm H. The manager of firm H has two better 
alternatives. Firstly, he can invest cash flow in a positive NPV project from which he 
also obtains private benefits or, secondly, he can buy back undervalued shares to 
benefit long-term shareholders. If the manager places equal weight to his short-term 
and long-term payoffs, there exist three equilibria: (1) a pooling equilibrium in which 
both firms repurchase shares if the private benefit is too low for both firms; (2) a 
separating equilibrium in which firm H invests in the new project whereas firm L 
repurchases shares if the private benefit is high enough for firm H but too low for 
firm L; and (3) a pooling equilibrium in which both firms invest in the new project is 
sufficiently high for both firms. If the manager is myopic, firm L has a strong 
incentive to make a false signal to the market by announcing a share repurchase 
programme. In this case, there exists a pooling equilibrium in which both firms 
repurchase shares if the private benefit is too low for both firms, and a pooling 
equilibrium in which both firms invest in the new project if the private benefit is 
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sufficiently high for both firms. Note that, for a pooling equilibrium in which both 
firms invest in the new project to be achieved, the manager needs higher private 
benefits as he places more weight on the short-term payoff. If the manager is 
farsighted, there exist a separating equilibrium in which firm H invests in the new 
project while firm L repurchases shares if the private benefit is too low for firm L and 
a pooling equilibrium in which both firms invest in the new project if the private 
benefit is high enough for firm L. Note that, for a pooling equilibrium in which both 
firms invest in the new project to be achieved, the manager needs lower private 
benefits as he places more weight on the long-term payoff. 
Further, I analyse the case in which the investors are irrational in that they do 
not update their beliefs upon observing one firm repurchase shares while the other 
pays dividends. In other words, investors fail to recognise that managers may buy 
back shares in order to time the market. If the manager balances his short-term and 
long-term payoff, there exist a separating equilibrium in which firm H invests in the 
new project while firm L repurchases shares and a pooling equilibrium in which both 
firms invest in the new project. Note that, there is no pooling equilibrium in which 
both firms repurchase shares under this case. The reason is that firm L cannot obtain 
any benefit from mimicking firm H if the market underreacts to share repurchase 
announcements. If the manager is myopic, there exists a pooling equilibrium in 
which both firms invest in the new project. Under this case, the manager requires 
higher private benefit, compared to that in the case where he balances the payoffs, in 
order to invest in the new project. On the other hand, if the manager is farsighted, 
there exist the same equilibria as in the case where the manager balances his payoffs 
but the manager requires lower private benefit in order to invest in the new project. 
Hence, the higher the long-term managerial weight, the lower the private benefits the 
manager needs for investing in the new project and vice versa. 
The second model is a catering model, developed in spirit of Fairchild and 
Zhang (2005), in which it shows that managers may use excess cash to cater to 
investor demand by paying dividends or repurchasing shares, or alternatively, 
investing in a real project to take private benefits. The dividend and repurchase 
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premia are introduced in this model. Like the previous model, this model focuses on 
the case in which the high-quality firm (firm H) has a positive NPV project available 
whereas the low-quality firm (firm L) has a negative NPV project available. 
The key assumptions of this model are: (1) investors do not update their 
beliefs when they observe one firm paying dividends and the other repurchasing 
shares; and (2) investors react fully and immediately to dividend announcements but 
slowly to share repurchase announcements. The model demonstrates that the firm’s 
payout/investment policies depend on: (1) the gain/loss from investment; (2) the 
manager’s time horizon; (3) the relative magnitude of dividend and repurchase 
premia; and (4) the degree of information asymmetry between managers and 
investors. 
The model shows that a myopic manager may pass up a positive NPV project 
in order to cater to investor demand for dividends or share repurchases. That is, there 
exists an adverse selection problem. Hence, paying dividends or repurchasing shares 
is inefficient for the high-quality firm. Fairchild (2008) point out that this adverse 
selection problem may be mitigated by investor communication, reinforced by 
managerial reputation effects. On the other hand, the low-quality firm may have a 
strong incentive to pay dividends if the dividend-catering premium is higher than the 
private benefit from investing in a negative NPV project. That is, a moral hazard 
problem is mitigated under this case. The results also demonstrate that the higher the 
long-term managerial weight, the higher dividend catering premium required by the 
manager for paying dividends. On the other hand, the higher the short-term 
managerial weight, the lower dividend catering premium required by the manager 
for paying dividends. 
Subsequently, I investigate dividend policy of firms listed in Thai stock 
market over the period 2001-2005. I focus on testing the two competing theories in 
dividend literature: the signalling hypothesis and the free cash flow hypothesis. The 
analysis of sample firms’ profitability around dividend changes reveals that 
dividend-increasing firms do not have better profitability but dividend-decreasing 
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firms experience a significant decline in profitability. Results from univariate 
analysis of the relation between dividend changes and subsequent profitability 
changes show that ROA changes of dividend changing firms significantly decline in 
one year after dividend announcements and no significant relation between these 
variables in two years after dividend announcements. Therefore, the findings show 
no or, if any, only a little indication that dividend changes signal changes in 
profitability in the same direction. Then, I examine whether dividend changes are 
lagged results of the past profitability. The results reveal that dividend changes are 
positively related to the past profitability changes. These findings are consistent with 
those in Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997) who show that dividend changes 
signal the past rather than the future. 
Further analysis of the factors affecting the size of dividend changes indicates 
that the past ROA changes are significantly positive determinants of the magnitude 
of dividend changes. The results also indicate that larger firm size and higher cash 
flow lead to greater magnitude of dividend changes, the findings consistent with the 
free cash flow hypothesis. In addition, lower MTB leads to higher dividend changes, 
the finding also supporting the free cash flow hypothesis. Moreover, I find that past 
dividend yield has a strongly negative impact on the magnitude of dividend changes. 
This finding suggests a high level of dividend stability in Thailand. Moreover, I find 
that earned equity change is a significantly positive factor of dividend changes, the 
findings consistent with the life-cycle theory of dividends. Finally, I find a positive 
relation between debt ratio and the magnitude of dividend changes. This finding casts 
doubt whether dividend increases by Thai firms are financed with debt. However, 
this issue is beyond the scope of this study. 
The results from additional logit analysis of firms’ decision to change 
dividends show that larger firms with better past profitability, higher cash flows, and 
higher earned equity change are more likely to raise dividends while firms with 
higher market-to-book ratio and past dividend yield are less likely to raise dividends. 
On the other hand, larger firms with better past profitability, higher cash flows, and 
higher earned equity change are less likely to cut dividends while higher-yield firms 
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and firms with higher market-to-book ratio are more likely to cut dividends. These 
findings are broadly consistent with the implication of the free cash flow hypothesis 
that larger firms with higher profits and cash flows are better candidates to increase 
dividends. 
Further, I analyse the short-run and long-run stock price performance around 
dividend changes. Consistent with evidence in the U.S., the Thai stock market reacts 
positively to dividend increase but negatively to dividend decrease announcements. 
Compared to that in the U.S., however, the average announcement return is higher 
for a dividend increase and lower for a dividend decrease. The analysis of long-run 
stock price performance shows negative and downward trends in buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns in 12 months and 24 months following dividend announcements for 
both dividend increases and dividend decreases. These findings suggest that Thai 
stock market appears to overreact to good news (dividend increases) but underreact 
to bad news (dividend cuts). 
Then, I examine the relation between announcement returns and hypothesised 
independent variables. Consistent with the signalling hypothesis, I find that the size 
of dividend changes is positively related to the size of announcement returns. I also 
find that a dividend increase by larger firms and firms with higher cash flows leads to 
higher positive stock market reaction, a finding consistent with the free cash flow 
hypothesis. Dividend yield is, nevertheless, an insignificant factor of announcement 
returns. Hence, there is no evidence in support of the dividend clientele hypothesis. 
Finally, I investigate firms’ investment behaviours surrounding dividend 
changes. The results indicate that both low MTB and high MTB firms significantly 
increase their capital expenditures following dividend increase announcements. The 
finding for low MTB firms is therefore in contrast with a prediction of the free cash 
flow hypothesis while the finding for high MTB firms is consistent with the 
signalling hypothesis. For dividend-decreasing group, I do not find any significant 
change in capital expenditures following dividend cuts for both low MTB and high 
MTB firms. In addition, I find that there is a negative relation between the size of 
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dividend increase and capital expenditure in one year following dividend increase 
announcements, a result suggesting that a dividend increase can help mitigate 
overinvestment problem. It is also found that firms with higher cash flows increase 
their capital expenditures in one year after dividend increases, a finding consistent 
with a prediction of the free cash flow hypothesis. 
Overall, the findings offer almost no indication that dividend changes signal 
future profitability. Rather, a dividend increase by the sample firms is used to signal 
to shareholders that overinvestment problem is being mitigated. Therefore, the 
empirical evidence of dividend changes in Thailand is broadly consistent with the 
free cash flow hypothesis rather than the signalling hypothesis. 
In addition to investigating dividend policy of Thai public companies, I also 
examine open market repurchase activities in Thailand from December 2001 to 
January 2007. Analysis of stock market reactions to 26 share repurchase 
announcements made by Thai firms during such period indicates that, on average, the 
share prices of repurchasing firms experience a negative cumulative abnormal return 
prior to open market share repurchase announcements, and earn a positive 
cumulative abnormal return during share repurchase announcements. These results 
are consistent with those in the U.S. (e.g., Comment and Jarrell, 1991; Ikenberry et 
al., 1995; Grullon and Michaely, 2002). Immediately following the open market 
share repurchase announcements, stock prices of repurchasing firms experience 
negative cumulative abnormal returns. However, their stock prices subsequently 
show a positive drift and earn a positive cumulative abnormal return in the longer 
term. These findings suggest that Thai stock market underreacts to open market share 
repurchase announcements. 
I further test whether the managers of repurchasing firms have ability to time 
the market. Comparing the actual cost of shares repurchased with the costs of various 
benchmark portfolios, I find that the cost of actual portfolio is lower than the costs of 
benchmark portfolios, suggesting that the managers of repurchasing firms in 
Thailand have substantial ability to time the market. 
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In summary, this study makes contributions to existing payout literature both 
theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, the models demonstrate that the payout 
policy is indeed complex since it is affected by several factors such as the managerial 
motives to signal undervaluation, to disgorge free cash flows, or to time the market. 
The models also demonstrate that payout policy may be affected by behavioural 
biases such as investor demand for dividends and share repurchases. The models that 
incorporate behavioural factors of both managers and shareholders may be better at 
explaining payout policy in the real world, thus offering interesting area for future 
research. 
The empirical tests of dividend policy in Thailand indicate that Thai firms 
pay dividends in order to disgorge free cash flows rather than to signal better 
profitability. This result may not be applied in other emerging countries. Therefore, 
the tests of the dividend signalling hypothesis and the free cash flow hypothesis in 
other developing economies are required to help explain the dividend puzzle. Since 
this thesis focuses only on the dividend changes of Thai firms over the short period, 
the future research therefore could be to investigate the firms’ dividend policy over 
the longer period using a larger sample size. A better approach such as a vector 
autoregressive model (VAR) can be employed to examine the dynamic relations 
between dividends and earnings and test the signalling and smoothing hypotheses 
(see, e.g., Chen and Wu (1999); Goddard et al. (2006)). Moreover, the study of other 
factors that could affect dividend policy of Thai firms such as cash flow permanence, 
ownership structure, and capital structure also offer promising area for future 
research. Recently, Brockman and Unlu (2009) study the effect of creditor rights on 
dividend policies in 52 countries around the world and find that the probability and 
the amount of dividend payouts are significantly lower in countries with poor 
creditor rights. Therefore, it is also interesting to examine more closely whether the 
agency costs of debt play a significant role in determining dividend policies of Thai 
firms. 
The investigation of open market share repurchases in Thailand is limited by 
a small sample size. The preliminary results indicate that open market share 
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repurchase announcements in Thailand are perceived as good news. However, 
investors appear to initially underreact to open market share repurchase 
announcements. Hence, the managers use this opportunity to time the market and 
they are successful in doing so. As the open market share repurchase activities in 
Thailand increase to a certain level in the future, the examination of repurchasing 
firms’ operating performances before and after share repurchases can be used in 
testing the signalling and free cash flow hypotheses. In addition, the researcher could 
examine whether the open market share repurchases in Thailand result in the wealth 
transfer from bondholders to stockholders. Moreover, it can be tested whether the 
open market share repurchases have liquidity impact on the stock market. Thus, it 
will be worthwhile to revisit and conduct more tests to obtain a more complete 
picture of payout policy in Thailand. 
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Appendix A 
Proof of Lemma 1 
a) If both firms pay dividends at date 1, the market cannot distinguish firm 
types, so the market values of both firms are the same 
Y + Y + 2X 
at V1H	 = V1L = V0 = 
H L . At date 2, as all information is revealed, 
2 
the cum-dividend value of firm H and firm L are Y + X and H 
Y	 + X respectively. L 
b)	 In this strategy pair{D, R}, firm L sends false signal to the market so that the 
market mistakenly believes that the low-quality type is the high-quality type 
and, conversely, the high-quality type is the low quality type at date 1. 
Therefore, the market value of high-quality firm decreases to YL + X , and the 
market value of low-quality firm increases to YH + X at date 1. The 
proportion of shares repurchased is θ = 
X X 
= . Thus, the number of 
Vˆ1	 YH + X 
X XN 
shares repurchased (and destroyed) is NR = ) = . As a result, the 
P1 YH + X 
Y N 
new	 total number of shares is N − N = H . The manager still holds R 
Y	 + XH 
N	 . Therefore, the manager’s post-repurchase equity stake is M 
β = 
NM = 
NM (YH + X ) = 
YH + X α. 
N − N NY YR H H 
Substituting Vˆ1,V2 , andβ into (M1), I obtain firm L’s payoff given in lemma 
1b). 
c) The strategy pair {R, D}is consistent with the market’s belief{H , L}. Hence, 
the market value of high-quality firm increases to its fundamental value 
198 
YH + X , and the market value of low-quality firm decreases to its 
fundamental value Y + X at date 1. L 
d) If both firms repurchase at date 1, the manager’s payoff is derived as follows. 
Initially, the manager has NM shares, and the outsiders have NS shares. 
N
Therefore, the total number of shares is N = NM + NS and α = 
M . At date 0, 
N 
prior to the policy announcement, the value of the firm and price per share are 
Y + Y + 2X Y + Y + 2X 
V0 = 
H L , P0 = 
H L . 
2 2N 
At date 1, the manager repurchases X = θVˆ1 . Since both firms repurchase, the 
type is not revealed at date 1. Hence, Vˆ1 = V0 , and Pˆ1 = P0. Therefore, the 
proportion of repurchased shares is θ = 
X 2X 
= . Thus, the 
Vˆ1 YH + YL + 2X 
X 2XN 
number of shares repurchased (and destroyed) is NR = = . 
Pˆ1 YH + YL + 2X 
The new total number of shares is N − N = 
(YH + YL )N . The manager R 
Y + Y + 2XH L 
still holds N . Therefore, the manager’s post-repurchase equity stake is M 
β = 
NM = 
NM (YH + YL + 2X ) = 
YH + YL + 2X α. 
N − NR N (YH + YL ) YH + YL 
Substituting Vˆ1,V2 , andβ into (M1), I obtain the payoffs in lemma 1d). ■ 
Proof of Proposition 1 
• If firm L pays dividends, equations (a) and (e) are compared to find firm H’ 
best response. Subtracting equation (a) from (e) yields αw1 

 
YH − YL  , which 
 2  
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is positive. Hence, firm H will choose to repurchase shares rather than pay 
dividends. 
•	 If firm L pays dividends, equations (c) and (g) are compared to find firm H’ 
best response. Subtracting equation (c) from (g) yields 
α
 
w1
 YH −YL 
 + w2 X 

 
YH −YL 



 
(P1) 
  2   YH + YL  
Since (P1) is positive, firm H will choose to repurchase shares rather than pay 
dividends. 
•	 Given that firm H repurchases shares, equations (f) and (h) are compared to 
find firm L’s best response. Subtracting (f) from (h) yields 
α
 
w1
 YH −YL 
 + w2 X 
 YL −YH 



 
(P2) 
  2   YH + YL  
Given w1 = w2 = 1/ 2 , (P2) is positive if 

 YH 
2 
−YL 


 > X 


 
Y
Y
H
H 
+
−Y
Y
L
L 



 
but negative 
 Y	 −Y   Y −Y  
if 	 H L  < X  H L  .■ 
	 2   YH + YL 

 
Proof of Lemma 2 
a) The same as proof of lemma 1a)

b) If the market does not update its belief once observing {D, R}, the value of

the firm and price per share are still the same 
Y	 + Y + 2X Y	 + Y + 2X 
V0 = 
H L , P0 = 
H L . 
2 2N 
Thus, firm L repurchases (overvalued) shares at a pooling price. 
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X 2X 
Therefore, the proportion of repurchased shares	 is θ = =	 . 
Vˆ1 YH + YL + 2X 
X 2XN 
The number of shares repurchased (destroyed)	 is NR = = 
Pˆ1 YH + YL + 2X 
The new total number of shares is N − N = 
(YH + YL )N . The manager R 
Y + Y + 2XH L 
still holds N . Therefore, the manager’s post-repurchase equity stake is M 
β = 
NM = 
NM (YH + YL + 2X ) = 
YH + YL + 2X α. 
N − NR N (YH + YL ) YH + YL 
Substituting Vˆ1,V2 , andβ into (M1), I obtain the payoffs in lemma 1b). 
c) If the market does not update its belief once observing {R, D}, the value of 
the firm and price per share are still the same 
Y + Y + 2X Y + Y + 2X 
V0 = 
H L , P0 = 
H L . 
2 2N 
Thus, firm H can repurchase (undervalued) shares at a pooling price. The rest 
is the same as in the proof of lemma 1b). 
d) The same as proof of lemma 1d).■ 
Proof of Proposition 2 
•	 If firm H pays dividends, equations (j) and (l) are compared to find firm L’s 
 Y −Y  
best response. Subtracting (l) from (j) yields αw2  
H L 
 , which is positive. 
 YH + YL  
Therefore, firm L chooses to pay dividends rather than repurchase shares. 
•	 If firm H repurchases shares, equations (n) and (p) are compared to find firm 
 Y −Y  
L’s best response. Subtracting (p) from (n) yields αw2  
H L 
 , which is 
 YH + YL  
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positive. Therefore, firm L chooses to pay dividends rather than repurchase 
shares. 
•	 If firm L’s dominant strategy is to pay dividends, equations (i) and (m) are 
compared to find firm H’s best response. Subtracting (i) from (m) 
 Y	 −Y  
yields αw  H L  , which is positive. Therefore, firm H chooses to 2 
 YH + YL 

 
repurchase shares rather than pay dividends. 
Hence, there exists a unique separating equilibrium where firm H repurchases 
shares and firm L pays dividends. ■ 
Proof of Lemma 3 
a) The same as proof of lemma 1a).

b) The same as proof of lemma 1b).

c) If the market observes {D, I} , the market incorrectly distinguishes firm types

at date 1. Thus, the market value of firm H decreases to YL + X while that of 
firm L increases to YH + X (1+ rH ) at date 1. At date 2, as all information is 
revealed, the cum-dividend value of firm H is YH + X , and the value of firm L 
when its return from the project is realised is YL + X (1+ rL ) . In addition, firm 
L receives private benefit from investment B. 
d) The same as proof of lemma 1c). 
e) The same as proof of lemma 1d) 
f) If firm H repurchases shares and firm L invests in the new project, the market 
can correctly distinguish the firm types at date 1. Thus, the market value of 
firm H increases to its true value at YH + X , and the market value of firm L 
decreases to YL + X (1+ rL ) because the market knows that firm L is investing 
in a negative NPV project. 
g) When the market observes {I , D} , the market can correctly distinguish firm 
types. The market value of firm H increases to YH + X (1+ rH ) while that of 
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firm L decreases to YL + X . At date 2, as all information is revealed, the cum-
dividend value of firm L is YL + X , and the value of firm H when its return 
from the project is realised is YH + X (1+ rH ) . In addition, firm H receives 
private benefit from investment B. 
h) If firm H invests in the new project and firm L repurchases shares, the 
market incorrectly distinguish the firm types at date 1. Thus, the market value 
of firm H decreases to YL + X (1+ rL ) because the market mistakenly believes 
that firm H is firm L and it knows that firm L invests in a negative NPV 
project. On the other hand, the market value of firm L increases to YH + X at 
date 1. Since firm L repurchases overvalued shares at Pˆ1L (R) = 
YH + X , the 
N 
X XN 
number of shares repurchased (and destroyed) is NR = ) = . As a 
P Y + X1 H 
Y N 
result, the new total number of shares is N − NR = 
H . The manager still 
Y + XH 
holds NM . Therefore, the manager’s post-repurchase equity stake is 
β = 
NM = 
NM (YH + X ) = 
YH + X α. 
N − N NY YR H H 
Substituting Vˆ1,V2 , andβ into (M2), I obtain firm L’s payoff given in lemma 
3h). 
i) If both firms invest in the new project, the market cannot update its belief at 
date 1. Hence, the market values of both firms are the same 
Y + Y + 2X 
at V1H = V1L = V0 = 
H L . At date 2, the project return is realised and 
2

both firms receive benefits from investment.■
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Proof of Lemma 4 
(a) If firm L pays dividends, equations (1), (7), and (13) are compared to find 
firm H’s best response. Subtracting (1) from (7) yieldsαw1 

 
YH − YL  , which 
 2  
is obviously positive. Hence, firm H will choose to repurchase shares rather 
than pay dividends. 
Subtracting (7) from (13) yields 
α(1− w3 )XrH + w3B (P3) 
Since (P3) is obviously positive, firm H will choose to invest in the new 
project rather than repurchase shares. 
(b) If firm L repurchases shares, equations (3), (9), and (15) are compared to find 
firm H’s best response. 
Subtracting (3) from (9) yieldsα
 
w1
 YH −YL 
 + w2 X 

 
YH −YL 



 
, which is 
  2   YH + YL  
obviously positive. Hence, firm H will choose to repurchase shares rather 
than pay dividends. 
Subtracting (9) from (15) yields 
L H L Hα

 
w1




 Y − 
2 
Y 


 + XrL 


+ w2 
 
X 

 
Y
Y
H 
−
+ 
Y
YL 



+ XrH 



 
+ w3B (P4) 
   
Given that w1 = w2 = w3 = 1/ 3 , and rH + rL = 0 , (P4) becomes 
α  YL −YH   YL −YH  B (P5) 
3 



 2 


+ X 
 YH + YL 



 
+ 
3 
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Hence, firm H chooses to invest in the new project 
 Y −Y   Y −Y  
if B ≥α  H L  + X  
H L 
 , but choose to repurchase shares 
 2   YH + YL  
if B <α 


 YH −YL 
 + X 
 YH −YL 


 
.

 2  

 YH + YL 



(c) If	 firm L invests in the new project, equations (5), (11), and (17) are 
compared to find firm H’s best response. 
Subtracting (5) from (11) yields αw1(YH −YL ), which is obviously positive. 
Thus, firm H will choose to repurchase shares rather than pay dividends. 
Subtracting (11) from (17) yields 
α
 
w1
 YL −YH 
 + w2 XrH 
 
+ w3B (P6) 
  2   
Given assumption (a1), (P6) is positive. Therefore, firm H chooses to invest 
in the new project rather than repurchase shares. ■ 
Proof of Lemma 5 
(a) If firm H repurchases shares, equations (8), (10), and (12) are compared to 
find firm L’s best response. 
Subtracting (8) from (10) yields 
α

w 
 YH −YL 
 + w X 

 
YL −YH 

 (P7) 1 2  
  2   YH + YL  
Given w1 = w2 = w3 = 1/ 3and assumption (a1), it follows that (P7) is positive. 
Hence, firm L will choose to repurchase shares rather than pay dividends. 
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Subtracting (10) from (12) yields


 










 + 

 


 
−
 −








YL YH YH

H

YLα
 


+ 

+
 +
w2 X
 w B3 (P8)
XrL XrL





w1 

 +
2
 Y
 YL
 

Substituting
 1/ 3 into (P8) yields
=
 =
 =
w1 w2 w3 

 

 
 

 + 2

α
 −
 −




YH 


YL YH YL B
+
X
 (P9)+ 
3




XrL 




 +
3
 2
 YH YL 

 

Hence, firm L will choose to invest in the new project if 
H L  − 
−Y Y
 

 −





YH YLα
 −
B > but choose to repurchase shares if
2
X
 XrL 




 +
2
 YH YL 

 

 




−Y	 Y H L H
 
− 
(b) If firm	 H invests in the new project, equations (14), (16), and (18) are 
compared to find firm L’s best response. 
Subtracting (14) from (16) yields 

 −
Y
 YLα
 −
B < 2



X
 XrL 





.

+
2
 YH YL 

 

 



 



− 

YL YH(Y 
w3 
YL )
+
w2 Xα
 −
 (P10)






w1 H 
YH 
Given that
w1 1/ 2 and assumption (a1), (P10) is positive. Hence,
=
 =
 =
w2 
firm L will choose to repurchase shares rather than pay dividends. 
Subtracting (16) from (18) yields 

 



YL −
YH 







Y
 −
YL  

 + 






α
 


w1 
2

+
w2 X






H 
YH 
XrL 


+ 

w B3 (P11)
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Substituting w1 = w2 = w3 = 1/ 3 into (P11) yields 
α 



 YL −YH 
 + X 
 YH −YL 


+ XrL 
 
+ 
B 
(P12) 
3  2   YH   3 
Hence, firm L will choose to invest in the new project if 
B ≥α 


 YH −YL 
 − X 

 
YH −YL 


 − XrL 
 
but choose to repurchase shares if 
 2   YH   
 YH −YL   YH −YL   B <α   − X   − XrL  .

 2  
 YH  

Proof of Corollary 2 
Substituting w1 = 0.6, w2 = 0.3, w3 = 0.1 into equations (1) to (18), I re-analyse the 
equilibrium as follows: 
•	 If firm L pays dividends, equations (1), (7), and (13) are compared to find firm 
H’s best response. Subtracting (1) from (7) yields αw1 

 
YH − YL  , which is 
 2  
obviously positive. Hence, firm H will choose to repurchase shares rather pay 
dividends. Subtracting (7) from (13) yields α(1− w3 )XrH + w3B , which is 
positive. Thus, firm H will invest in the new project rather than repurchase 
shares. 
•	 If firm L repurchases shares, equations (3), (9), and (15) are compared to find 
firm H’s best response. 
Subtracting (3) from (9) yields α

w1 

 
YH −YL  + w2 X 

 
YH −YL 


 , which is 
  2   YH + YL 

positive. Hence, firm H will not choose to pay dividends.
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Subtracting (9) from (15) yields 
α

w1 



 
YL −YH  + XrL 

 + w2 


 X 

 
YL −YH 
 + XrH 




 + w3B 
	 2  Y + Y  	     H L  
Therefore, firm H will invest in the new project if 
H LB ≥ 3α

(YH −YL )+ X 
 Y −Y 



 
but choose to repurchase shares if 
  YH + YL  
H LB < 3α

(YH −YL )+ X 

 
Y −Y 


 .

  YH + YL 

•	 If firm L invests in the new project, equations (5), (11), and (17) are compared 
to find firm H’s best response. Subtracting (5) from (11) yieldsαw1(YH −YL ), 
which is obviously positive. Hence, firm H will not choose to pay dividends. 
Subtracting (11) from (17) yieldsα

w1 

 
YL −YH  + w2 XrH 

 + w3B , which is 
  2   
positive. Thus, firm H will choose to invest in the new project. 
•	 If firm H repurchase shares, equations (8), (10), and (12) are compared to find 
firm	 L’s best response. Subtracting (8) from (10) 
  YH −YL   YL −YH  yieldsαw   + w X   , which is positive. Hence, firm L will 
2 Y + Y	
1
  
2 


H L 

 
not choose to pay dividends. Subtracting (10) from (12) yields 
α

w1 



 
YL −YH  + XrL 

 + w2 


 X 


YH −YL  + XrL 




 + w3B 
	 2  Y + Y  	     H L  
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Therefore, firm L will invest in the new project if 
H LB ≥ 3α

(YH −YL )− X 

Y
Y −
+ 
Y
Y 

 − 2XrL 

 but repurchase shares if 
  H L   
LB < 3α

(YH −YL )− X 
 YH −Y 


− 2XrL 
 
.

  YH + YL  

• If firm H invests in the new project, equations (14), (16), and (18) are compared 
to find firm L’s best response. Subtracting (14) from (16) 
L Hyields α

w1 (YH −YL )+ w2 X 

 
Y −Y 


 , which is positive. Hence, firm L will not 
  YH  
choose to pay dividends. 
Subtracting (16) from (18) yields 
α

w1 

 
YL −YH  + w2 


 X 

 
YH −YL 
 + XrL 




 + w3 B 
  2   YH     
Thus, firm L will invest in the new project if 
B ≥ 3α

(YH −Y )− X 
 YH −YL 


− XrL 
 
but repurchase shares if L 
  YH   
H LB < 3α

(Y −YL )+ X 

 
Y −Y 
 − XrL 

 .H 
  YH   
Proof of Corollary 3 
Substituting w1 = 0.1, w2 = 0.3, w3 = 0.6 into equations (1) to (18), I re-analyse the 
equilibrium as follows: 
• If firm L pays dividends, equations (1), (7), and (13) are compared to find firm 
H’s best response. Subtracting (1) from (7) yields αw1 
 YH − YL 
 
, which is 
 2  
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obviously positive. Hence, firm H will choose to repurchase shares rather pay 
dividends. Subtracting (7) from (13) yieldsα(1− w3 )XrH + w3B , which is 
positive. Thus, firm H will invest in the new project rather than repurchase 
shares. 
•	 If firm L repurchases shares, equations (3), (9), and (15) are compared to find 
firm H’s best response. 
Subtracting (3) from (9) yieldsα

w1 

 
YH −YL  + w2 X 

 
YH −YL 


 , which is 
	  2   YH + YL  
positive. Hence, firm H will not choose to pay dividends. 
Subtracting (9) from (15) yields 
α
 
w1


 YL −YH 
 + XrL 

+ w2 

 
X 
 YL −YH 


+ XrH 



 
+ w3B 
	  2    YH + YL  	   
Therefore, firm H will invest in the new project if 
α 


 
YH −YL  + 3X 


YH −YL  + 2XrL 

 but choose to repurchase sharesB ≥ 
6  2   YH + YL   
α  YH −YL   YH −YL   if B <   + 3X   + 2XrL  . 6  2   YH + YL   
•	 If firm L invests in the new project, equations (5), (11), and (17) are compared 
to find firm H’s best response. Subtracting (5) from (11) yieldsαw1(YH −YL ), 
which is obviously positive. Hence, firm H will not choose to pay dividends. 
Subtracting (11) from (17) yieldsα
 
w1
 YL −YH 
 + w2 XrH 
 
+ w3B , which is 
  2   
positive. Thus, firm H will choose to invest in the new project. 
•	 If firm H repurchase shares, equations (8), (10), and (12) are compared to find 
firm L’s best response. Subtracting (8) from (10) 
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




α



 



 


YL 

− 

YH+
w2 Xyields
 w1 , which is positive. Hence, firm L will


+
2
 YH YL 
H L 
not choose to pay dividends. Subtracting (10) from (12) yields 



−Y Y












 
 +


XrL 

−
 −




YL YH 


YH

H

YLα
 w1 + 

+
XrL +
w2 X
 w B3




 +
2
 Y
 YL
 

Therefore, firm L will invest in the new project if 
H L 

 −B 




−Y Y
≥


 −
YH YL−
 but repurchase shares if
3
 4
X
 XrL 




 +
6
 2
 YH YL 


 

H L 
 −



−Y Y 
If firm H invests in the new project, equations (14), (16), and (18) are compared 
to find firm L’s best response. Subtracting (14) from (16) 

 −
YH YL−
B < 3
 4
X
 XrL 





.

+
6
 2
 YH YL 


 



 



−YL YH 
(Y 
choose to pay dividends. 
Subtracting (16) from (18) yields 
+
yields
 , which is positive. Hence, firm L will not
YL w2 X 


w1 H 
YH 










 YL  

 + XrL 
−
 −




YL YH 


Y

α
 w1 
H 
YH 
+ 

+
 X
 w B3w2 

2
 
 













− 
− 
α 
α 
≥
Thus, firm L will invest in the new project if 
Y YH LB  − 
Y YH L 
 − 


 −
YH YL−
 but repurchase shares if
3
 3
X
 XrL 




6
 2
 YH 


 −
YH YL−
<B 3
 3
X
 XrL 





.

6
 2
 YH 






 








α







α

)



−



α



 


•














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Proof of Lemma 6 
(a) If firm L pays dividends, equations (19), (25), and (31) are compared to find 
firm H’s best response. Subtracting (19) from (31) 
 

−




YH YL 


yields
α
 +
XrH +
w Xr2 H +
w B3 ,
 which is positive. Hence,










w1 
2

firm H will choose to invest in the new project rather than pay dividends. 
Subtracting (25) from (31) yields 
α

 
 


w1 
 







YH 










 
 

 + XrH 

−
 −
YL 


YL YH + 

+
XrH +
w2 X
 w B3 (P13)





 +
2
 YH YL
 

Given assumption (a1), (P13) is positive. Thus, firm H will choose to 
invest in the new project rather than repurchase shares. 
(b) If firm L repurchases shares, equations (21), (27), and (33) are compared to 
find firm H’s best response. Subtracting (21) from (27) 

 



 



− 

YH YL yield α
w X2 , which is obviously positive. Hence, firm H will
+
YH YL 
choose to repurchase shares rather than pay dividends. 
Subtracting (27) from (33) yields 
α

 
 












 
 

 + XrH 
 




−
 −








YL YH YL YH + 

+
XrL +
w2 (P14)
X
 w B3


w1 

 +
2
 YH YL
 

+
Given that
 1/ 3 , and
 = 0 , (P14) becomes
=
 =
 =
 rH rLw1 w2 w3 

 

 
YL −
 −



YH 


YL YH+
X
 + (P15)






w3B





α 
2 2
 YH +
YL 
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Hence, firm H chooses to invest in the new project 
 Y −Y   Y −Y  
if B ≥α  H L  + X  
H L 
 , but choose to repurchase shares 
 2   YH + YL  
if B <α 


 YH −YL 
 + X 
 YH −YL 


 
.

 2   YH + YL 

(c) If firm L invests in the new project, equations (23), (29), and (35) are 
compared to find firm H’s best response. Subtracting (23) from (35) 
yieldsα
 
w1
 YH −YL 
 + w2 XrH 
 
+ w3B , which is positive. Thus, firm H will 
  2   
choose to invest in the new project rather than pay dividends. 
Subtracting (29) from (35) yields 
α
 
w1
 YL −YH 
 + w2 XrH 
 
+ w3B (P16) 
  2   
Given w1 = w2 = w3 = 1/ 3 and assumption (a1), (P16) is positive. Therefore, 
firm H chooses to invest in the new project rather than repurchase shares. ■ 
Proof of Lemma 7 
(a) If firm H repurchases shares, equations (26), (28), and (30) are compared to 
find firm L’s best response. Subtracting (28) from (26) 
 Y −Y  
yieldsαw X  H L  , which is obviously positive. Hence, firm L will2 
 YH + YL 

 
choose to pay dividends rather than repurchase shares. 
Subtracting (26) from (30) yields 
α


 
w1 

 
YL −YH  + XrL 

+ w2 XrL 
 
+ w3B (P17) 
  2    
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Substituting w1 = w2 = w3 = 1/ 3 into (P17) yields 
α 


 
YL −YH  + 2XrL 

 + 
B 
(P18) 
3  2   3 
Thus, firm L will invest in the new project if B ≥α 


 YH −YL 
 − 2XrL 
 
but 
 2   
pay dividends if B <α 


 YH −YL 
 − 2XrL 
 
.

 2  

(b) If firm H invests in the new project, equations (32), (34), and (36) are 
compared to find firm L’s best response. 
Subtracting (32) from (34) yields 
L Hα
 
w1 (YH −YL )+ w2 X 
 Y −Y 



 
(P19) 
  YH  
Given assumption (a1), (P19) is positive. Hence, firm L will choose to 
repurchase shares rather than pay dividends. 
Subtracting (34) from (36) yields 
α

w1 

 
YL −YH  + w2 

 X 

 
YH −YL  + XrL 



 + w3 B (P20) 
   2    YH   
Substituting w1 = w2 = w3 = 1/ 3 into (P20) yields 
α 


 
YL −YH  + X 

 
YH −YL 
 + XrL 

 + 
B 
(P21) 
3  2   YH   3 
Hence, firm L will choose to invest in the new project if 
B ≥α 


 YH −YL 
 + X 

 
YL −YH 


 − Xr 
 
but choose to repurchase shares if L 
 2  
 YH   
B <α


 YH −YL 
 + X 

 
YL −YH  − XrL 

 .■

 2  
 YH  
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Proof of Corollary 4

Substituting
 w1 =
0.6,
w2 =
0.3,
w3 =
0.1 into equations (19) to (36), I re-analyse the

equilibrium as follows: 
If firm L pays dividends, equations (19), (25), and (31) are compared to find 
firm H’s best response. Subtracting (19) from (31) 
•
 

−




YH YL 


yields
α
 +
XrH +
w Xr2 H +
w B3 ,
 which is positive. Hence,










w1 
2

firm H will choose to invest in the new project rather than pay dividends. 
Subtracting (25) from (31) yields 

 

 



 



 

 + 

 −
 −








YH YL YL YHα
 


+ 

+ 
Given assumption (a1), (P22) is positive. Thus, firm H will choose to 
•
invest in the new project rather than repurchase shares. 
If firm L repurchases shares, equations (21), (27), and (33) are compared to 
find firm H’s best response. Subtracting (21) from (27) 
+
 (P22)
XrH X
 XrH w B3





w1 w2 

 +
2
 YH YL
 


 



 



− 

YH YL yield α
w X2 , which is obviously positive. Hence, firm H will
+
YH YL 
choose to repurchase shares rather than pay dividends. 
Subtracting (27) from (33) yields 
+ 

 









 
 

 + 

 
−
 −








YL YH YL YHα
 


+ 

+
 w B3 (P23)
XrL X
 XrH





w1 w2 

YH +
YL2
 
 
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Given that w1 = 0.6, w2 = 0.3, w3 = 0.1, firm H will choose to invest in the new 
H Lproject if B ≥ 3α

(YH −YL )+ X 
 Y −Y 


− XrL 
 
, but choose to repurchase 
  YH + YL   
H Lshares if B <α

(YH −YL )+ X 

Y
Y −
+ 
Y
Y 


 − XrL 

 .

  H L  

•	 If firm L invests in the new project, equations (23), (29), and (35) are 
compared to find firm H’s best response. Subtracting (23) from (35) 
yieldsα

w1
 YH −YL 
 + w2 XrH 
 
+ w3B , which is positive. Thus, firm H will 
  2   
choose to invest in the new project rather than pay dividends. 
Subtracting (29) from (35) yieldsα

w1 

 
YL −YH  + w2 XrH 

 + w3B , which is 
  2   
positive. Therefore, firm H chooses to invest in the new project rather than 
repurchase shares. 
•	 If firm H repurchases shares, equations (26), (28), and (30) are compared to 
find firm L’s best response. Subtracting (28) from (26) 
 Y	 −Y  
yieldsαw2 X  
H L 
 , which is obviously positive. Hence, firm L will 
 YH + YL  
choose to pay dividends rather than repurchase shares. 
Subtracting (26) from (30) yieldsα


 
w1
 YL −YH 
 + XrL 

+ w2 XrL 
 
+ w3B . 
  2    
Given that w1 = 0.6, w2 = 0.3, w3 = 0.1, firm L will invest in the new project if 
B ≥ 3α[(YH −YL )− 3XrL ]but pay dividends if B < 3α[(YH −YL )− 3XrL ]. 
•	 If firm H invests in the new project, equations (32), (34), and (36) are 
compared to find firm L’s best response. 
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Subtracting (32) from (34) yields 
Hα
 
w1 (YH −YL )+ w2 X 
 YL −Y 



 
(P24) 
  YH  
Given assumption (a1), (P24) is positive. Hence, firm L will choose to 
repurchase shares rather than pay dividends. 
Subtracting (34) from (36) yields 
α
 
w1 

 
YL −YH  + w2 


 X 


YH −YL  + XrL 



 
+ w3 B . 
 2  Y     H   
Given that w1 = 0.6, w2 = 0.3, w3 = 0.1, firm L will choose to invest in the new 
H Lproject if B ≥ 3α

(YH −YL )− X 
 Y −Y 


− XrL 
 
but choose to repurchase 
  YH   
H Lshares if B < 3α

(YH −YL )− X 


Y −Y 


 − XrL 

 .■

  YH  

Proof of Corollary 5 
Substituting w1 = 0.1, w2 = 0.3, w3 = 0.6 into equations (19) to (36), I re-analyse the 
equilibrium as follows: 
• If firm L pays dividends, equations (19), (25), and (31) are compared to find 
firm H’s best response. Subtracting (19) from (31) 
yieldsα


 
w1
 YH −YL 
 + XrH 

+ w2 XrH 
 
+ w3B , which is positive. Hence, 
  2    
firm H will choose to invest in the new project rather than pay dividends. 
Subtracting (25) from (31) yields 
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α
 
w1


 YH −YL 
 + XrH 

+ w2 

 
X 
 YL −YH 


+ XrH 



 
+ w3 B (P25) 
   2     YH + YL   
Given assumption (a1), (P25) is positive. Thus, firm H will choose to 
invest in the new project rather than repurchase shares. 
•	 If firm L repurchases shares, equations (21), (27), and (33) are compared to 
find firm H’s best response. Subtracting (21) from (27) 
 Y	 −Y  
yieldsαw2 X  
H L 
 , which is obviously positive. Hence, firm H will 
 YH + YL  
choose to repurchase shares rather than pay dividends. 
Subtracting (27) from (33) yields 
α
 
w1


 YL − 
2 
YH 
 + XrL 

+ w2 

 
X 

 
Y
YL −
+ 
Y
Y
H 


 + XrH 



 
+ w3B (P26) 
    	    H L  
Given that w1 = 0.1, w2 = 0.3, w3 = 0.6 , firm H will choose to invest in the new 
project if B ≥ 
α 


 
YH −YL  + 3X 


YH −YL  + 2XrL 

 , but choose to repurchase 
6  2   YH + YL   
α  YH −YL   YH −YL   shares if B <   + 3X   + 2XrL  . 6  2   YH + YL   
•	 If firm L invests in the new project, equations (23), (29), and (35) are 
compared to find firm H’s best response. Subtracting (23) from (35) 
yieldsα

w1 

 
YH −YL  + w2 XrH 

 + w3B , which is positive. Thus, firm H will 
  2   
choose to invest in the new project rather than pay dividends. 
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Subtracting (29) from (35) yieldsα
 
w1
 YL −YH 
 + w2 XrH 
 
+ w3B , which is 
  2   
positive. Therefore, firm H chooses to invest in the new project rather than 
repurchase shares. 
•	 If firm H repurchases shares, equations (26), (28), and (30) are compared to 
find firm L’s best response. Subtracting (28) from (26) 
 Y	 −Y  
yieldsαw2 X  
H L  , which is obviously positive. Hence, firm L willY	 + Y  H L  
choose to pay dividends rather than repurchase shares. 
	  Y −Y    
Subtracting (26) from (30) yieldsαw1 
L H  + XrL  + w2 XrL  + w3B . 
  2    
Given that w1 = 0.1, w2 = 0.3, w3 = 0.6 , firm L will invest in the new project if 
B ≥ 
α 


 
YH −YL  − 4XrL 

 but pay dividends if B < 
α 


 
YH −YL  − 4XrL 

 . 6  2  	 6  2   
•	 If firm H invests in the new project, equations (32), (34), and (36) are 
compared to find firm L’s best response. 
Subtracting (32) from (34) yields 
L	 Hα

w1 (YH −YL )+ w2 X 


Y −Y 


 (P26) 
  YH  
Given assumption (a1), (P26) is positive. Hence, firm L will choose to 
repurchase shares rather than pay dividends. 
Subtracting (34) from (36) yields 
α
 
w1
 YL −YH 
 + w2 
 
X 
 YH −YL 

+ XrL 


 
+ w3 B . 
  2  
 YH  	   
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Given that w1 = 0.1, w2 = 0.3, w3 = 0.6 , firm L will choose to invest in the new 
α  YH −YL   YH −YL   project if B ≥   − 3X   − 3XrL  but choose to repurchase 6  2   YH   
α  YH −YL   YH −YL   shares if B <   − 3X   − 3XrL  .■ 6  2   YH   
Proof of Lemma 8 
(a) If firm L pays dividends, equations (1), (7), and (13) are compared to find 
firm H’s best response. Subtracting (1) from (7) yieldsαw1 

 
YH − YL  , which 
 2  
is obviously positive. Hence, firm H will choose to repurchase shares rather 
than pay dividends. Subtracting (7) from (13) yields αXrH + w3 B .Given 
assumption (a2), firm H will repurchase shares rather than invest in the new 
project. 
(b) If firm L repurchases shares, equations (3), (9), and (15) are compared to find 
firm H’s best response. 
  YH −YL   YH −YL  Subtracting (3) from (9) yieldsα

w1

 
2 
 + w2 X 

 
YH + YL 




 , which is 
obviously positive. Hence, firm H will choose to repurchase shares rather 
than pay dividends. 
Subtracting (9) from (15) yields 
α

 
w1


 YL − 
2 
YH 

 + XrL 

+ w2 
 
X 
 
Y
YL −
+ 
Y
Y
H 


+ XrH 



 
+ w3B (P21) 
     H L  
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Given that w = w = w = 1/ 3 , (P21) becomes 1 2 3 
α 


 
YL −YH  + XrL + X 


YL −YH  + XrH 

 + 
B 
(P22) 
3  2   YH + YL   3 
Hence, firm H chooses to invest in the new project 
if B ≥α



 
YH 
2 
−YL 


+ X 


 Y
Y
H
H 
+
−Y
Y
L
L 



− XrH − XrL 

 , but choose to repurchase 
  
shares if B <α



 
YH −YL  + X 

 
YH −YL 
 − XrH − XrL 

 . 
 2   YH + YL   
(c) If	 firm L invests in the new project, equations (5), (11), and (17) are 
compared to find firm H’s best response. 
Subtracting (5) from (11) yields αw1(YH −YL ), which is obviously positive. 
Thus, firm H will choose to repurchase shares rather than pay dividends. 
Subtracting (11) from (17) yields α

w1 

 
YL −YH  + w2 XrH 

 + w3B , which is 
  2   
negative. Thus, H will choose to repurchase shares rather than invest in the 
new project. 
Proof of Lemma 9 
(a) If firm H repurchases shares, equations (8), (10), and (12) are compared to 
find firm L’s best response. 
Subtracting (8) from (12) yields αXrL + w3B . Given assumption (a2), firm L 
will choose to invest in the new project rather than pay dividends. 
Subtracting (10) from (12) yields 
221 

 




YL −
YH 



 



YH

H

−
YL 
 + 

 







α
 


w1


+ 

w B3 (P23)
+
XrL 


+
w2 X
 XrL

Y
 +
YL2
 
 

Substituting
w1 1/ 3 into (P23) yields
=
 =
 =
w2 w3 

 

 
 

 + 2
XrL 
α
 −
 −




YH 


YL YH YL B
+
X
 (P24)+ 
3









 +
3
 2
 YH YL 
Hence, firm L will choose to invest in the new project if 

 

B H L	  −



−Y Y


≥

 

 −
YL YHα
 +
 but repurchase shares if
2



X
 XrL 




 +
2
 YH YL 

 

 

H L 
 
−
−Y Y


(b) If firm	 H invests in the new project, equations (14), (16), and (18) are 
compared to find firm L’s best response. 
Subtracting (14) from (18) yields 

 −
YL YHα
B < +
 2



X
 XrL 





.

+
2
 YH YL 

 
−




YH YL 


α
 +
w Xr2	 L + 3	 (P25)w B






w1 
2

Given assumption (a2), (P25) is positive. Thus, firm L will choose to 
invest in the new project rather than pay dividends. 
Subtracting (16) from (18) yields 

 









 YL  

 + XrL 
−
 −




YL YH 


Y

α
 H 
YH 
 


+ 

+
w2 X
 w B3 (P26)
w1 

2
 
 

Substituting
w1 =
w2 =
w3 =
1/ 3 into (P26) yields
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α 


 
YL −YH  + X 
 YH −YL 


+ XrL 
 
+ 
B 
(P27) 
3  2   YH   3 
Hence, firm L will choose to invest in the new project if 
B ≥α


 YH −YL 
 + X 


YL −YH  − XrL 

 but repurchase shares if 
 2   YH   
 YH −YL   YL −YH   B <α   + X   − XrL  ■

 2  

 YH  

Proof of Corollary 6 
•	 If firm L pays dividends, equations (1), (7), and (13) are compared to find 
firm H’s best response. Subtracting (1) from (7) yieldsαw1 

 
YH − YL  , which 
 2  
is obviously positive. Hence, firm H will choose to repurchase shares rather 
than pay dividends. Subtracting (7) from (13) yields αXrH + w3 B .Given 
assumption (a2), firm H will repurchase shares rather than invest in the new 
project. 
•	 If firm L repurchases shares, equations (3), (9), and (15) are compared to find 
firm H’s best response. 
Subtracting (3) from (9) yieldsα

w1 

 
YH −YL 
 + w2 X 


YH −YL 



 , which is 
  2   YH + YL  
obviously positive. Hence, firm H will choose to repurchase shares rather 
than pay dividends. 
Subtracting (9) from (15) yields 
α

 
w1


 YL − 
2 
YH 

 + XrL 

+ w2 
 
X 
 
Y
YL −
+ 
Y
Y
H 



+ XrH 



 
+ w3B (P28) 
     H L  
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Given that w1 = 0.6, w2 = 0.3, w3 = 0.1, firm H will chooses to invest in the 
H	 Lnew project if B ≥ 3α

(YH −YL )+ X 
 Y −Y 


− XrH − 2XrL 
 
, but choose to 
  YH + YL   
H	 Lrepurchase shares if B < 3α

(YH −YL )+ X 

Y
Y 
+
−Y
Y 


 − XrH − 2XrL 

 .

  H L  

•	 If firm L invests in the new project, equations (5), (11), and (17) are 
compared to find firm H’s best response. 
Subtracting (5) from (11) yieldsαw1(YH −YL ), which is obviously positive. 
Thus, firm H will choose to repurchase shares rather than pay dividends. 
Subtracting (11) from (17) yieldsα

w1 

 
YL −YH  + w2 XrH 

 + w3B , which is 
  2   
negative. Thus, H will choose to repurchase shares rather than invest in the 
new project. 
•	 If firm H repurchases shares, equations (8), (10), and (12) are compared to 
find firm L’s best response. 
Subtracting (8) from (12) yieldsαXrL + w3B . Given assumption (a2), firm L 
will choose to invest in the new project rather than pay dividends. 
Subtracting (10) from (12) yields 
α

 
w1


 YL − 
2 
YH 

 + XrL 

+ w2 
 
X 
 
Y
YH 
+
−Y
Y
L 


+ XrL 



 
+ w3B 
     H L  
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Given that w1 = 0.6, w2 = 0.3, w3 
project if B ≥ 3α

(YH −YL )− X 
 
H Lif B < 3α

(YH −YL )− X 


Y −Y 
  YH + YL 
• If firm H invests in the new 
= 0.1, firm L will choose to invest in the new 
 Y −Y   H L  − 2XrL  but repurchase shares 
 YH + YL   
  
 − L  2Xr . 
  
project, equations (14), (16), and (18) are 
compared to find firm L’s best response. 
Subtracting (14) from (18) yields 
α

w1 

 
YH −YL  + w2 XrL 

 + w3 B (P29) 
  2   
Given assumption (a2), (P29) is positive. Thus, firm L will choose to 
invest in the new project rather than pay dividends. 
Subtracting (16) from (18) yields 
α
 
w1
 YL −YH 
 + w2 
 
X 
 YH −YL 

+ XrL 


 
+ w3 B 
  
Given that w1 = 0.6, w2 
project if B ≥ 3α

(YH 
 
2   
= 0.3, w3 = 0.1 
H−YL )− X 
 Y 
 YH   
, firm L will chooses to invest in the new 
−Y   L  Xr but repurchase shares if  − L  
 YH   
H LB < 3α

(YH −YL )− X 
 Y −Y 


− XrL 
 
■ 
  YH   
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Proof of Corollary 7 
•	 If firm L pays dividends, equations (1), (7), and (13) are compared to find 
firm H’s best response. Subtracting (1) from (7) yieldsαw1 

 
YH − YL  , which 
 2  
is obviously positive. Hence, firm H will choose to repurchase shares rather 
than pay dividends. Subtracting (7) from (13) yields αXrH + w3 B . Given 
assumption (a2), firm H will repurchase shares rather than invest in the new 
project. 
•	 If firm L repurchases shares, equations (3), (9), and (15) are compared to find 
firm H’s best response. 
Subtracting (3) from (9) yieldsα

w1 

 
YH −YL  + w2 X 

 
YH −YL 


 , which is 
  2   YH + YL  
obviously positive. Hence, firm H will choose to repurchase shares rather 
than pay dividends. 
Subtracting (9) from (15) yields 
α

w1 



 
YL −YH  + XrL 

 + w2 


 X 


YL −YH  + XrH 




 + w3B 
  2    YH + YL  	   
Given that w1 = 0.1, w2 = 0.3, w3 = 0.6 , firm H will chooses to invest in the 
α  Y −Y   Y −Y   
new	 project if B ≥  H L  + 3X  
H L 
 − 2XrH  , but choose to 6  2   YH + YL   
repurchase shares if B < 
α 



 YH −YL 
 + 3X 
 YH −YL 


− 2XrH 
 
. 
6  2   YH + YL   
•	 If firm L invests in the new project, equations (5), (11), and (17) are 
compared to find firm H’s best response. 
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Subtracting (5) from (11) yieldsαw1(YH −YL ), which is obviously positive. 
Thus, firm H will choose to repurchase shares rather than pay dividends. 
Subtracting (11) from (17) yieldsα
 
w1
 YL −YH 
 + w2 XrH 
 
+ w3B , which is 
  2   
negative. Thus, H will choose to repurchase shares rather than invest in the 
new project. 
•	 If firm H repurchases shares, equations (8), (10), and (12) are compared to 
find firm L’s best response. 
Subtracting (8) from (12) yieldsαXrL + w3B . Given assumption (a2), firm L 
will choose to invest in the new project rather than pay dividends. 
Subtracting (10) from (12) yields 
α

w1 



 
YL −YH  + XrL 

 + w2 

 X 

 
YH −YL  + XrL 



 + w3B 
   2     YH + YL   
Given that w1 = 0.1, w2 = 0.3, w3 = 0.6 , firm L will choose to invest in the new 
project if B ≥ 
α 


 
YH −YL  − 3X 


YH −YL  − 4XrL 

 but repurchase shares 
6  2   YH + YL   
α 


 
YH −YL  − 3X 


YH −YL  − 4XrL 

 .if B < 
6  2   YH + YL   
•	 If firm H invests in the new project, equations (14), (16), and (18) are 
compared to find firm L’s best response. 
Subtracting (14) from (18) yields 
α

w1
 YH −YL 
 + w2 XrL 

 + w3 B (P30) 
  2   
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Given assumption (a2), (P30) is positive. Thus, firm L will choose to 
invest in the new project rather than pay dividends. 
Subtracting (16) from (18) yields 

 









 YL  

 + XrL 
−
 −








YL YH Y
α
 H 
YH 
 


+ 

+
w2 X
 w B3w1 

2
 
 

Given that
 0.1,
 0.3,
 0.6 , firm L will chooses to invest in the new
=
 =
 =
w1 w2 w3 
 






 
 

 − 
■ 
3
XrL 
α

2 
− 


−








YH 
YH 
3 
YL 
YH  

YH 
 − 
YL≥
 −
project if
 but repurchase shares if
3
B 
YH 
X
 




6 
YL 
YH 

 

B
<

α

6
 2 
− −





YL−
 3
X
 XrL 




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Appendix B 
Proof of Lemma 1 
Given that firm H pays dividends, equations (5), (19), and (13) are compared in order 
to find firm L’s best response. 
H L L DSubtracting (13) from (5) yields (Z − Z )+ (I − X )+ 2λ − B . Given assumption 
(a1), firm L will choose to pay dividends rather than invest in the new project. 
H L R DSubtracting (19) from (5) yields (Z − Z )+ λ − 2λ . Thus, firm L chooses to pay 
 Z H − Z L  λ R  Z H − Z L  λ R 
dividends if λD ≥   + but repurchase shares if λ
D <   + . 
 2  2  2  2 
Given that firm H repurchase shares, equations (17), (7), and (15) are compared in 
order to find firm L’s best response. 
L DSubtracting (17) from (15) yields (X − I )+ B − 2λ . Given assumption (a1), firm L 
will choose to pay dividends rather than invest in the new project. 
H L R DSubtracting (7) from (17) yields (Z − Z )+ λ − 2λ . Thus, firm L chooses to pay 
 Z H − Z L  λ R  Z H − Z L  λ R 
dividends if λD ≥   + but repurchase shares if λ
D <   + . 
 2  2  2  2 
Given that firm H invests in the new project, equations (9), (11), and (3) are 
compared in order to find firm L’s best response. 
H L L DSubtracting (3) from (9) yields (Z − Z )+ (I − X )+ 2λ − B . Given assumption 
(a1), firm L will choose to pay dividends rather than invest in the new project. 
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λR 
Subtracting (11) from (9) yields 2λD −λR . Thus, firm L pays dividends if λD ≥ but 
2 
λR 
repurchase shares if λD < .■ 
2 
Proof of Lemma 2 
Given that firm L pays dividends, equations (4), (16), and (8) are compared to find 
firm H’s best responses. 
H L D HSubtracting (8) from (4) yields (Z − Z )+ 2λ −(X − I )− B . Thus, firm H will pay 
H L D Hdividends if (Z − Z )+ 2λ ≥ (X − I )+ B but invest in the new project 
H L D Hif (Z − Z )+ 2λ < (X − I )+ B . 
H L R HSubtracting (8) from (16) yields (Z − Z )+ 2λ −(X − I )− B . Thus, firm H will 
H L R Hrepurchase shares if (Z − Z )+λ ≥ (X − I )+ B but invest in the new project if 
H L R H(Z − Z )+λ < (X − I )+ B . 
H L D RSubtracting (4) from (16) yields (Z − Z )− 2λ +λ . Thus, firm H will choose to 
pay dividends if λD ≥ 
 Z H − Z L 


+ 
λR 
but repurchase shares 
 2  2 
if λD < 

 
Z H − Z L 


 + 
λR 
. 
 2  2 
Given that firm L repurchases shares, equations (18), (6), and (10) are compared to 
find firm H’s best responses. 
H DSubtracting (18) from (10) yields (X − I )+ B − 2λ . Thus, firm H will choose to pay 
D X H D X Hdividends if 2λ ≥ ( − I )+ B but invest in the new project if 2λ < ( − I )+ B . 
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L H R HSubtracting (6) from (10) yields (Z − Z )−λ +(X − I )+ B . Thus, firm H will 
H L R Hchoose to repurchase shares if (Z − Z )+λ ≥ (X − I )+ B but invest in the new 
H L R Hproject if (Z − Z )+λ < (X − I )+ B . 
L H D RSubtracting (6) from (18) yields (Z − Z )+ 2λ −λ . Thus, firm H will choose to 
pay dividends if λD ≥ 
 Z H − Z L 


+ 
λ R 
but repurchase shares 
 2  2 
D  Z
H − Z L  λ R 
if λ <   . ■  2 
+ 
2  
Proof of Corollary 1 
To analyse the effects of managerial myopia on equilibrium, I substitute 
w1 = 0.6, w2 = 0.3, w1 = 0.1 into managerial payoffs and compare them as follows: 
Given that firm H pays dividends, equations (5), (19), and (13) are compared to find 
firm L’s best responses as follows: 
L DSubtracting (13) from (5) yields 0.9
 Z H 
2 
− Z L 


+ 0.3(I − X )+ 0.9λ − 0.1B . Given 
  
assumption (a1), firm L will choose to pay dividends rather than invest in the new 
project. 
 Z H − Z L  
Subtracting (19) from (5) yields 0.9	  + 0.3λ
R − 0.9λD . Thus, firm L chooses 
 2  
 Z H − Z L  λR 
to pay dividends if λD ≥   + but repurchase shares 
 2  3 
 Z H − Z L  λR 
if λD <   + . 
 2  3 
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Given that firm H repurchase shares, equations (17), (7), and (15) are compared in 
order to find firm L’s best response. 
L DSubtracting (17) from (15) yields 0.3(X − I )+ 0.1B − 0.9λ . Given assumption (a1), 
firm L will choose to pay dividends rather than invest in the new project. 
Subtracting (7) from (17) yields 0.9 


Z H − Z L 
 + 0.3λ
R − 0.9λD . Thus, firm L chooses 
 2  
to pay dividends if λD ≥ 


Z H 
2 
− Z L 


+ 
λ 
3 
R 
but repurchase shares 
  
 Z H − Z L  λ R 
if λD <   + . 2 3  
Given that firm H invests in the new project, equations (9), (11), and (3) are 
compared in order to find firm L’s best response. 
Subtracting (3) from (9) yields 0.9 

 
Z H − Z L 
 + 0.3(I − X L )+ 0.9λD − 0.1B . Given 
 2  
assumption (a1), firm L will choose to pay dividends rather than invest in the new 
project. 
Subtracting (11) from (9) yields 0.9λD − 0.3λR . Thus, firm L pays dividends if 
λR λR 
λD ≥ but repurchase shares if λD < . 
3 3 
Given that firm L pays dividends, equations (4), (16), and (8) are compared to find 
firm H’s best responses. 
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Subtracting (8) from (4) yields 0.9 


Z H − Z L 
 + 0.9λ 
D −0.3(X H − I )− 0.1B . Thus, firm 
 2  
H will pay dividends if 9 


Z H 
2 
− Z L 
 + 9λ 
D≥ 3(X H − I )+ B but invest in the new 
  
project if 9 

 
Z H − Z L 
 + 9λ 
D< 3(X H − I )+ B . 
 2  
H L R HSubtracting (8) from (16) yields 0.9(Z − Z )+ 0.3λ −0.3(X − I )− 0.1B . Thus, firm 
H L R HH will repurchase shares if 9(Z − Z )+ 3λ ≥ 3(X − I )+ B but invest in the new 
H L R Hproject if 9(Z − Z )+ 3λ < 3(X − I )+ B . 
H L D RSubtracting (4) from (16) yields 0.9(Z − Z )− 0.9λ + 0.3λ . Thus, firm H will 
choose to pay dividends if λD ≥ 


Z H − Z L 
 + 
λR 
but repurchase shares 
 2  3 
 Z H − Z L  λR 
if λD <   + . 2 3  
Given that firm L repurchases shares, equations (18), (6), and (10) are compared to 
find firm H’s best responses. 
H DSubtracting (18) from (10) yields 0.3(X − I )+ 0.1B − 0.9λ . Thus, firm H will 
Dchoose to pay dividends if 9λ ≥ 3(X H − I )+ B but invest in the new project if 
D9λ < 3(X H − I )+ B . 
Subtracting (6) from (10) yields 0.9 


Z L − Z H 
 − 0.3λ 
R+0.3(X H − I )+ 0.1B . Thus, 
 2  
firm H will choose to repurchase shares if 9 

 
Z H − Z L 
 + 3λ 
R≥ 3(X H − I )+ B but 
 2  
invest in the new project if 9 


Z H − Z L 
 + 3λ 
R< 3(X H − I )+ B . 
 2  
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 Z L − Z H  
Subtracting (6) from (18) yields 0.9  + 0.9λ
D − 0.3λ R . Thus, firm H will  2  
choose to pay dividends if λD ≥ 
 Z H − Z L 


+ 
λ R 
but repurchase shares 
 2  3 
 Z H − Z L  λ R 
if λD <   + . ■ 
 2  3 
Proof of Corollary 2 
To analyse the effects of managerial farsightedness on equilibrium, I substitute 
w1 = 0.1, w2 = 0.3, w3 = 0.6 into managerial payoffs and compare them as follows: 
Given that firm H pays dividends, equations (5), (19), and (13) are compared to find 
firm L’s best responses as follows: 
Subtracting (13) from (5) yields 0.4 


Z H − Z L 
 + 0.3(I − X L )+ 0.4λD − 0.6B . Given 
 2  
assumption (a1), firm L will choose to pay dividends rather than invest in the new 
project. 
 Z H − Z L  
Subtracting (19) from (5) yields 0.4	  + 0.3λ
R − 0.4λD . Thus, firm L chooses 
 2  
 Z H − Z L  3 
to pay dividends if λD ≥   + λ
R but repurchase shares 
 2  4 
D  Z
H − Z L  3 Rif λ <   λ . 2 
+ 
4  
Given that firm H repurchase shares, equations (17), (7), and (15) are compared in 
order to find firm L’s best response. 
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L DSubtracting (17) from (15) yields 0.3(X − I )+ 0.6B − 0.4λ . Given assumption (a1), 
firm L will choose to pay dividends rather than invest in the new project. 
Subtracting (7) from (17) yields 0.4 


Z H − Z L 
 + 0.3λ
R − 0.4λD . Thus, firm L chooses 
 2  
 Z H − Z L  3 
to pay dividends if λD ≥   + λ
R but repurchase shares 
 2  4 
if λD < 

 
Z H − Z L 
 + 
3 
λR . 
 2  4 
Given that firm H invests in the new project, equations (9), (11), and (3) are 
compared in order to find firm L’s best response. 
Subtracting (3) from (9) yields 0.4
 Z H − Z L 


+ 0.3(I − X L )+ 0.4λD − 0.6B . Given 
 2  
assumption (a1), firm L will choose to pay dividends rather than invest in the new 
project. 
Subtracting (11) from (9) yields 0.4λD − 0.3λR . Thus, firm L pays dividends if 
3 3
λD ≥ λR but repurchase shares if λD < λR . 
4 4 
Given that firm L pays dividends, equations (4), (16), and (8) are compared to find 
firm H’s best responses. 
Subtracting (8) from (4) yields 0.4 

 
Z H − Z L 
 + 0.4λ 
D−0.3(X H − I )− 0.6B . Thus, 
 2  
H L D Hfirm H will pay dividends if 2(Z − Z )+ 4λ ≥ 3(X − I )+ 6B but invest in the new 
H L D Hproject if 2(Z − Z )+ 4λ ≥ 3(X − I )+ 6B . 
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H L R HSubtracting (8) from (16) yields 0.4(Z − Z )+ 0.3λ −0.3(X − I )− 0.6B . Thus, firm 
H L R HH will repurchase shares if 4(Z − Z	 )+ 3λ ≥ 3(X − I )+ 6B but invest in the new 
H L R Hproject if 4(Z − Z )+ 3λ < 3(X − I )+ 6B . 
 Z H − Z L  
Subtracting (4) from (16) yields 0.4	  − 0.4λ
D + 0.3λR . Thus, firm H will 
 2  
choose to pay dividends if	 λD ≥ 

 
Z H − Z L 
 + 
3 
λR but repurchase shares 
 2  4 
if λD < 

 
Z H − Z L 
 + 
3 
λR . 
 2  4 
Given that firm L repurchases shares, equations (18), (6), and (10) are compared to 
find firm H’s best responses. 
H	 DSubtracting (18) from (10) yields 0.3(X − I )+ 0.6B − 0.4λ . Thus, firm H will 
D X Hchoose to pay dividends if 4λ ≥ 3( − I )+ 6B but invest in the new project if 
D X H4λ < 3( − I )+ 6B . 
Subtracting (6) from (10) yields 0.4
 Z L − Z H 


− 0.3λ R +0.3(X H − I )+ 0.6B . Thus, 
 2  
H L R Hfirm H will choose to repurchase shares if 2(Z − Z )+ 3λ ≥ 3(X − I )+ 6B but 
H L R Hinvest in the new project if 2(Z − Z	 )+ 3λ < 3(X − I )+ 6B . 
 Z L − Z H  D RSubtracting (6) from (18) yields 0.4	 2 
 + 0.4λ − 0.3λ . Thus, firm H will 
  
choose to pay dividends if	 λD ≥ 

 
Z H − Z L 
 + 
3
λ R but repurchase shares 
 2  4

D  Z
H − Z L  3 R
if λ <   + λ . ■ 
 2  4 
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Appendix C 
An Example of Share Repurchase Disclosure Form 
Electricity Generating Public Company Limited 
December 17, 2001 
We, Electricity Generating Public Company Limited, hereby notify the resolution of 
the Executive Committee, no. 17/2001, held on December 15, 2001, regarding the 
approval on the proposed share repurchase for financial management purposes. 
According to the resolution of the Board of Directors, no 6/2001, held on October 29, 
2001, approved, in principle, the implementation of the Treasury Stock and 
authorized the Executive Committee to determine the details of the treasury stock 
plan. The details are as follows: 
1. The share repurchase project 
1.1 The maximum amount for the share repurchase is Baht 1,500 million. (One 
thousand and five hundred million Baht) 
1.2 Number of shares repurchased not exceed 42.86 million shares (at par value 
Baht 10 per share) or equal to 8.16 % of the total of paid-up capital. 
1.3 Procedure used for the repurchasing of shares 
../.. on the Stock Exchange of Thailand 
..... offer to general shareholders at the price of ... baht per share ( the price 
being the same) 
The repurchase period will be started from January 2, 2002 to July 1, 2002 
Remarks: The company has to disclose the proposed share repurchase not later 
than 14 days prior to the date on which the shares will be repurchased 
1. The implementation period shall not exceed 6 months when a share 
repurchase scheme is by way of purchasing from the SET. 
2. The repurchase period shall not be less than 10 days and shall not 
exceed 20 days in the case where the offering is from the general 
shareholders. 
1.4 The principle used to determine the repurchase price taking into account the 
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average market price during the last 30 days prior to the date on which the company 
discloses the information of shares repurchase. 
The share repurchase price is determined by using a conservative approach. 
The methodology is as follows: 
Dividend Discount Method (Only from Existing Projects) 
This valuation approach only takes into consideration the return on equity in 
terms of dividend receipt throughout the projects' lives. Cost of Equity is the discount 
factor used to calculate the NPV. Herein, to arrive to the Company valuation we have 
taken into consideration the dividend received throughout the tenure of the PPA 
agreement for each respective Company (Subsidiaries & Affiliate Companies) in 
terms of percentage investment held. Hence, the average market price during the last 
30 days, since November 1, 2001 until December 14, 2001 is 33.98 Baht. 
2. The information of the company 
2.1 The company's retained earning and excess liquidity is based on the Financial 
Statement as of September 30, 2001 
- The company's retained earning is Baht 3,978.81 million. 
- The company's debts, which shall become due within the 6 months including 
its interest following from the date on which the shares will be repurchased, is equal 
to Baht 743 million 
- The basis for this ability to repay the above mentioned debts and the source 
of funds for the repayment 
The Company has a consistent profitability record, where the Company reported 
net profit in the amount of Baht 2,647.95 million and Baht 1,216.74 million in the 
year 1999 and 2000, respectively. The Company reported Retained Earnings, as of 
September 30, 2001 is Baht 3,978.81 million. As of September 30, 2001, the 
Company has total debt to equity ratio at 0.26 times, where its debts from the 5-year 
debenture amount to Baht 4,457.35 million. The tenure of the debenture is for 5 
years and time to maturity is 3 years. The principal and interest are payable semi-
annually in two instalments in the month of April and October respectively. 
Since the date of share buyback (from January 2 to July 1, 2002), the Company 
is scheduled to service the debt liability for its Thai Baht Debenture, on the April 21 
2002, amounting to Baht 743 million. As of September 30, 2001, the Company has 
Liquid Assets amounting to Baht 4,829.65 million, which consists of Cash 
amounting to 2,461.76 million. Hence, a share buyback will not have any negative 
impact on the financial stability of the Company. 
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2.2 The number of minor shareholders (Free float) as in the share registration 
book finalized on September 11, 2001 equal to 278,802,900 shares or 53.02% of the 
company's paid up capital. In addition, the company encloses herewith the report of 
the company's share distribution. 
3. Reasons for the proposed share repurchase 
The Executive Committee meeting, no 17/2001, held on December 15, 2001 has 
given their consent to the Company to buyback their shares to manage the excess 
cash of the Company since this would bring in better return on investment, as 
compared to other investment opportunities. 
The Company believes that the current market price of its stock is below the 
fundamental value of the Company. Therefore, through a share buyback the 
Company would be in a position to reflect the real fundamental value of the 
Company. This reflects the confidence of the management in the Company with 
regard to its ability to generate strong cash flows and maintain consistent future 
growth. Besides this, the benefit to the shareholders is evident in a higher E.P.S. and 
higher Book Value per share. 
The Executive Committee of the Company approve the share repurchase scheme, 
with an investment not exceeding Baht 1,500 million or which in term of shares 
repurchased does not exceed 42.86 million shares (that is not exceeding 8.16% of the 
total shares issued by the Company), which in either of the case does not exceed 10% 
of the total shares issued by the Company. 
4. Likely impacts after the share repurchase. 
4.1 Impact on the shareholders 
The Company has a dividend pay out policy of approximately 40% of net 
profit. Thus, post share repurchase the shareholders would receive a higher dividend 
payment, since the number of shares outstanding would reduce by the number of 
shares repurchased and as such shares repurchased do not qualify for dividend 
payment. Therefore, this will increase the return on equity. 
4.2 Impact on the company 
The share repurchase will have impact on Cash and Book Value of the 
Company, where if the Company repurchases shares for Baht 1,500 million the 
liquid assets and book value will reduce by Baht 1,500 million. 
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5. The description of the resale of shares and of the shares written off. 
- Procedure for shares resold 
../.. on the Stock Exchange of Thailand 
../.. by Public Offering 
Remarks: The Company should resell the shares on the Stock Exchange of 
Thailand or by Public Offering, depends on the situation at that time of shares resold. 
- Period for the resale of share is from January 2, 2003 to July 1, 2005 (after 6 
months from the completion date of share repurchase and not later than 3 years from 
this time). 
Remarks: The period for the resale of shares may be earlier than the above 
information in case of the repurchase period ended before July 1, 2002. 
- Principle used to determine the resale price. 
The Company has a policy to follow the regulations as per the Ministerial 
Regulations Re: Rules and Procedures for Share Repurchase, Disposition of 
Repurchased Shares and Shares Written Off in a Public Limited Company B.E. 2544, 
as follows: 
The Company will dispose all the repurchased shares under from this scheme by 
offering them on the main board of Stock Exchange of Thailand or through general 
offering under the regulations of Stock Exchange of Thailand. The disposal period 
may start after 6 months from the completion date of the share repurchase scheme 
and the Company will dispose all the repurchase shares within 3 years. 
The Company will dispose all the repurchased shares prior to issuance of new shares. 
The price for disposal of shares will be based on the return on investment and the 
need of cash for future investments 
In the event, the Company does not or is unable to dispose the repurchased shares 
within 3 years from the date of completion of the share repurchase the Company will 
reduce its capital by write off of the remaining unsold repurchased shares. 
6. Shares repurchased in the past 
- None -
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The company certifies that the information contained in this report and attached 
documents are true and complete in all respects. 
(Mr. Sitthiporn Ratanopas) 
President & CEO 
Note: Listed companies must report any resolutions of the board of directors 
regarding proposed projects for share repurchase on the date of the above mentioned 
meeting or up until 9.00am on the following day of business via facsimile and the 
Exchange's ELCID. 
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